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There are several ways a state can deal with religion and religious believers. In 1918, 
for example, the Fifth Congress of Soviets officially proclaimed the Communist 
constitution. This marked the turning point in the creation of an anti-religious legal 
system. It comprised the Communist atheist doctrine and laid the foundation for the 
subsequent legal provisions, which gradually and steadily crushed every religious 
institution.1 Its most comprehensive decree was “On the Separation of Church from 
State and School from Church”, and the first part basically reads as a liberal 
constitution, similar to the French constitutional separation of state and the churches 
of 1905. It separated the church from the state and it granted equality of religions and 
states freedom of conscience – the right to believe and not to believe.2  
 Of course, Lenin did not intend this constitution to function as a legal 
document concerning religious freedom for Soviet citizens and to regulate the tasks 
of a liberal state in a secular fashion. Communism was considered incompatible with 
religion: a bourgeois method of exploiting the proletariat. Lenin and the Bolsheviks 
decided upon their anti-religious strategies: it would not suffice to let religion simply 
“wither away” as the people would gradually become more educated and lifted from 
poverty.3 The Bolshevik practices at the beginning of their regime focused on a 
pragmatic approach signifying the weakening of the role of the position of the hated 
“servant of the autocracy” – the Russian Orthodox Church – and other faiths as well. 
Formal legal documents were mirrored by secret instructions setting out hate 
campaigns and shocks of terror, fully intended to destroy religion in the creation of an 
atheist society and the making of a new people by eliminating “the enemies of the 
                                                          
1
 Szczesniak, Boleslaw, The Russian Revolution and Religion. A Collection of Documents Concerning the 
Suppression of Religion by the Communists, 1917-1925, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1959, p. 
15.  
2
 Szczesniak 1959, p. 35. 
3
 Marsh, Christopher, Religion and State in Russia and China. Suppression, Survival, and Revival, New York: 
Continuum 2011, p. 54. 
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people”.4 More and more laws, decrees, provisions, and party statements 
continuingly addressed questions relating to attacking religion. These were not 
merely announcements or prescriptions, as the Bolsheviks combined them with 
practice. A brutal campaign against believers was unleashed. Church property was 
desecrated, looted, and violently taken over. Dozens of bishops and thousands of 
clergy were arrested, often tortured, and executed for “counterrevolutionary 
activities”. A wave of terror had swept the country.5  
 It is recorded that just in the year 1922 – the year in which Joseph Stalin had 
become secretary-general of the communist party – 2,691 priests, 1,962 monks and 
3,447 nuns had been executed, and thousands more were send to one of the Gulag 
camps.6 In the decade between 1928 and 1938 purges against clergy and believers 
starkly increased, and this phase ended with what is commonly referred to as ‘The 
Great Terror’, or the Stalinist purge. This decade marked the institutional destruction 
of the Church.7 Thousands of religious believers (“counterrevolutionaries”) were 
executed for “religious crimes” and hundreds of thousands were sent off to labor 
camps or psychiatric hospitals.8 In addition to these measures, the atheistic 
propaganda machine had warmed up. The state publisher produced several 
periodicals, with titles as The Godless (Bezbozhnik) and The Anti-Religious (Anti-
Religioznik).9 The atheistic message was constantly spread through use of media.10 
By 1927, publishing houses had printed about a million and a half atheistic books and 
pamphlets. By 1932, the League of the Militant Atheists, the anti-religious 
organization which united workers, peasants, students and intelligentsia, had 5.5 
million members. Intended as an atheistic propaganda instrument, it soon evolved 
                                                          
4
 Pospielovsky, Dimitry, A History of Marxist-Leninist Atheism and Soviet Antireligious Policies. Volume 1 of A 
History of Soviet Atheism in Theory and Practice, and the Believer, Houndmills: MacMillan 1987, p. 35-36. 
5
 Pospielovky, Dimitry, Soviet Anti-Religious Campaigns and Persecutions. Volume 2 of A History of Soviet 
Atheism in Theory and Practice, and the Believer, Houndmills: MacMillan 1988, pp. 1-18.  
6
 Marsh 2011, p. 56.  
7
 Pospielovsky 1987, p. 43. 
8
 Froese, Paul, The Plot to Kill God: Findings from the Soviet Experiment on Secularization, Los Angeles: 
University of California Press 2008, p. 122. 
9
 Szczesniak 1959, p. 15; Pospielovsky 1987, p. 29.  
10
 Pospielovsky 1988, p. 37.  
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into a vehicle for pogroms of all sorts.11 Children and teenagers were also actively 
drawn into antireligious organizations, such as the Pioneer and the Komsomol, which 
aimed at turning the youth in good Soviet citizens. At the university level, a special 
antireligious faculty “the Institute of Red Professors” had been set up, while in the 
same period the Russian Academy of Sciences was cleansed from anti-Marxist 
scholars and practicing Church members; after the arrests most of them perished in 
camps and prisons.12 Throughout these years, as Alexander Solzhenitsyn reiterated, 
“[…] we must always remember that: Religious believers, of course, were being 
arrested uninterruptedly.”13  
 In this anti-religious political ideology, atheism is not regarded as a conviction 
privately held, but one that the state must achieve for all its citizens by all means and 
measures. The state, in a totalitarian effort, is committed to “liberate” people from 
religion and cleanse society from religious believers.  
 
Political atheism is one of the five models for the relation between state and religion. 
A state can: 1) categorically reject religion, 2) be agnostic towards religion, 3) 
accommodate minority religions, 4) prioritize one particular religion, and 5) enforce 
one specific religion. This results in these state ideologies: 
 
1) Political atheism; 2) Political agnosticism; 3) Multiculturalism; 4) State Church 
Doctrine, and 5) Theocracy. 14 
The model of political agnosticism stands for treating – or ignoring – all religions and 
non-religions alike. Multiculturalism focuses on minorities. Choosing Sharia? focuses 
on the second model, multiculturalism, and on the fifth model, theocracy. The 
                                                          
11
 Marsh 2011, pp. 64-65. 
12
 Pospielovsky 1987, p. 46.  
13
 Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, The Gulag Archipelago 1918-56, London: The Harvill Press 1986 (2003), p. 24-25.  
14
 See for a longer exposition of the five models: Cliteur, Paul, ‘State and religion against the backdrop of 
religious radicalism’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 2012, pp. 127-152. Cliteur defines 
multiculturalism as a state model as “treating all religions alike”. I depart from that and define it as 
“accommodate minority religions”.   
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importance of the second model, political agnosticism, is embedded throughout the 
dissertation.   
 It should not come as a surprise that eradicating religion (including believers) 
is irreconcilable with the central tenets of liberal democracy. A modern liberal 
democracy aims to secure justice for all citizens, and does not persecute those who 
hold and carry out religious beliefs. Democratic states uphold the principle of non-
discrimination and respect liberty of conscience. The politically atheist state is not a 
model that should serve as a serious contender when we consider the possibilities of 
arranging state-religion affairs.  
 However, on the world’s stage, the opposite of political atheism is, 
unfortunately, indeed a serious contender: theocracy is alive and kicking. This 
political model determines the rights and duties of citizens in Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
Islamic fundamentalism, also described as Political Islam and Islamism, is a 
religious-political ideology that is not only limited to these two countries. Since a few 
decades, due to oil trade, globalization and mass migration, Islamist religious leaders 
and followers have been globally espousing a political doctrine firmly grounded in 
religion that aims to influence the lives of people worldwide. Karima Bennoune, 
professor of international law and author of Your Fatwa Does Not Apply Here. Untold 
Stories from the Fight Against Muslim Fundamentalism (2013), warns against “a 
creeping Islamization” that transfigures lifestyles and limits individual freedoms – of 
both Muslims and non-Muslims – all over the world.15 She laments Western left-of-
center responses to Muslim fundamentalism to talk about something else whenever 
the topic comes up: “The anniversary of September 11 is a time to criticize the U.S. 
government. An Afghan women having her nose cut off by the Taliban becomes a 
platform for saying that there is violence against women everywhere. I think when we 
talk about Muslim fundamentalism, we have to actually talk about it. It exists.”16  
                                                          
15
 Bennoune, Karima, Your Fatwa Does Not Apply Here: Untold Stories from the Fight Against Muslim 
Fundamentalism, New York: Norton & Company 2013, p. 8. 
16
 Bennoune 2013, p. 24. Italics in original.  
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 A part of this dissertation is dedicated to Bennoune’s message: we have to 
talk about Islamic fundamentalism; it exists. Not merely from a humanitarian point of 
view, also from an academic viewpoint it is important to seriously consider the 
consequences of a political ideology that challenges the relationship between religion 
and the state as we know in the West. The second chapter is about the origin of 
Islamic fundamentalism as well as on its consequences, and the ways in which its 
adherents push for control. Sharia, the collected laws of Islam, lies at the heart of 
political Islam.  
 British-German professor of Arabic and Islam Joseph Schacht (1902-1969), 
the leading Western scholar on Islamic law, described Sharia as the sacred law of 
Islam. It consists of “an all-embracing body of religious duties, the totality of Allah’s 
commands that regulate the life of every Muslim in all its aspects; it comprises on an 
equal footing ordinances regarding worship and ritual, as well as political and (in the 
narrow sense) legal rules.”17 One of the ways in which Islamic fundamentalism is 
manifest in Europe is through Sharia councils. Since the 1980s, these councils have 
been operating in the United Kingdom. They function as a legal order that stands 
apart from the British body of laws. The third chapter is about Sharia councils in the 
United Kingdom and their relationship to Islamic fundamentalism, as well as the 
consequences these minority legal orders have for individuals.  
The central research question is: what are the implications of the political ideologies 
of multiculturalism and Islamic fundamentalism? And, more in particular, what is the 
interaction between these ideologies when it comes to the debate on the legitimacy 
of sharia councils in the United Kingdom? Modern, multicultural, states struggle to 
respond to these religious-political challenges to liberal democracy. They wonder 
whether Sharia councils should be accommodated. Or whether individuals should be 
allowed to choose to live under Sharia laws.  
                                                          
17
 Schacht, Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1982, p. 1.  
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 One point of view is that society itself may be diverse and multi-cultural, the 
legal order that regulates it should be mono-cultural.18 16th century French political 
philosopher Jean Bodin conceptualized the modern sovereign state as having the 
exclusive right to make laws and execute them within its territory.19 “The rights, 
obligations, and democratic procedure are non-negotiable as they are based on a 
single body of laws and one language,” as professor of Jurisprudence Afshin Ellian 
contends as well.20 The idea is that there should be “one law for all”. In addition, 
individuals may have the liberty to hold or dismiss religious beliefs, but the state 
should principally not favour religion over non-religion or vice versa. In establishing a 
legal order that oversees the social order of the entire population equally, the state 
should be “agnostic” when it comes to religious issues.21  
 A third contender for a model for state-religion affairs is thus political 
agnosticism. Rather than mildly favouring one religion over other sets of belief (as is 
the case for model number 4, the state church doctrine), the state should not take 
positions on religious questions: not in its daily administration, not in its laws, and not 
in its constitution either. Political agnosticism does not view religion as something 
that is good and deserves to be promoted, nor does it see it as a dangerous force 
that needs to be contained.22 Since the state represents all citizens – individuals who 
are religiously divided yet united under the nation-state –, social order and justice is 
served best when a formal position of equality is supported through religiously neutral 
laws. Part of being politically agnostic is that the state does not take a position on the 
idea that religion, whether from an individual or communal point of view, contributes 
                                                          
18
 Ellian, Afshin, ‘Emancipation and Integration of Dutch Muslims in Light of a Process Polarization and the 
Threat of Political Islam’, Middle East Program Occasional Paper Series Summer 2009, pp. 15-23 (19). 
19
 Bodin, Jean, On Sovereignty. Four Chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth (Edited and Translated 
by Julian H. Franklin), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992. 
20
 Ellian 2009, p. 19.  
21
 T.H. Huxley (1825-1895), who coined the term agnosticism, said: “Agnosticism is not a creed, but a method.” 
Almost a hundred years later Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) stated about whether we can know whether there 
is a god, that “The agnostic suspends judgment, saying that there are not sufficient grounds for affirmation or 
for denial.” See Cliteur, Paul, The Secular Outlook. In Defense of Moral and Political Secularism, Chicester: 
Wiley-Blackwell 2010, pp. 57-59. 
22
 See also: Laycock, Douglas, ‘Religious Liberty as Liberty’, Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 1996, pp. 313-
356 (313-314).  
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to a positive or negative life. The state simply “does not know” and is insensitive to 
claims that are detrimental for or made on behalf of any religion. It should not have 
an opinion, because it is not the role of the state to have an opinion about religion, 
religious believers or religious communities.23  
 In 2013 I visited the United Kingdom to research Sharia Councils. I have had 
numerous open-ended interviews with academics, activists, lawyers, and the 
member of the House of Lords who initiated a bill to restrict the legal remit of these 
councils. I went to a beth din – a rabbinical council, visited the Nuneaton-based 
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal and attended hearings at the Sharia council of the 
Birmingham Central Mosque and the Islamic Sharia Council in London.  
 Sharia councils are not universally viewed as “problematic”. Of course, Islamic 
fundamentalists themselves favour the existence of such institutions. They choose 
Sharia over democratically established laws. But there is another significant stream 
of thought that sees Sharia councils as a possibility, rather than a problem. Take for 
instance former Archbishop Rowan Williams, who was the principal leader of the 
British Anglican church in 2008 and Baron Nicholas Phillips of Worth Matravers, who 
was the most senior judge in England and Wales that same year. They made high-
impact speeches on how Muslim minorities should be accommodated in their need 
for legal institutions based on laws following from the Islamic religion.24 This is based 
on the notion that religion and membership of a community is so vital for one’s well-
being that this should be accommodated into a minority legal order. This forms the 
foundation of state-religion model number 3: the multiculturalist model. The idea that 
one’s cultural and religious identity is so important that the state should recognise 
                                                          
23
 “An agnostic has no opinion on whether God exists, and neither should the government. But an agnostic also 
believes that humans are incapable of knowing whether God exists. If the government believed that, it would 
prefer agnostics over theists and atheists. Agnostics have no opinion for epistemological reasons; the 
government must have no opinion for constitutional reasons. The government must have no opinion because it 
is not the government's role to have an opinion.” See: Laycock, Douglas, ‘Equal Access and Moments of Silence: 
The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers’, Northwestern University Law Review 1986, pp. 1-67 
(7-8).  
24
 Williams, Rowan, ‘Civil and Religious Law in England: a Religious Perspective’, 7 February 2008. Available 
online at http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1137/ and Phillips, Nicholas, ‘Equality 
before the Law’, Keynote speech at the East London Muslim Centre, 3 July 2008. A transcript can be found in: 
Ahdar, Rex and Aroney, Nicholas (eds.), Shari’a in the West, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010, pp. 309-318. 
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and respect it as such is part of an ideology that deserves to be studied in itself. 
Where does this body of thought come from? What are the implications of this 
ideology? 
 Firstly, I discuss the foundations of the ideology of multiculturalism. In the 
second chapter, I lay down the basis of Islamic fundamentalism. Finally, I bring these 
ideologies together in a case-study on Sharia councils in the United Kingdom. The 
development of British Sharia councils is the result of the combination of 
multiculturalism and Islamic fundamentalism. These political ideologies combined are 
especially interesting, for: if individuals should be supported in their religious identity, 
what does that mean when they choose for religious fundamentalism? 
  Regarding the methodology of the three chapters I would like to state the 
following. Each chapter could very well be a book onto itself.  To that end, the 
chapters “read” differently. The first one is an in-depth analysis – a critique – of the 
central tenets of multiculturalism. For that, I have chosen to highlight the work of the 
world’s leading multiculturalist philosophers. The second chapter is an exploration of 
the elemental structure of Islamic fundamentalism. Here I have selected those 
authors and sources that best explain the political implications of this body of 
thought. Whereas the first chapter is very analytical, the second one is quite 
descriptive. Together they form the groundwork for the third chapter. In addition to a 
descriptive and a critical analysis of Sharia councils in the United Kingdom, this 
















In the past few years, multiculturalism has become a popular target for politicians. 
Everywhere in Europe, political leaders are calling for the bankruptcy of the 
multiculturalist model. British Prime Minister David Cameron stated in 2008 that 
“State multiculturalism is a wrong-headed doctrine that has had disastrous results”.25 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel held a speech in 2010 in which she stated that 
multiculturalism has “utterly failed”.26 In 2011, then French president Nicholas 
Sarkozy responded to a voter on television: “Oui, c’est un échec”.27 Former Spanish 
prime minister Jose Maria Aznar said “I'm against the idea of multiculturalism. 
Multiculturalism divides our societies, debilitates our societies, multiculturalism does 
not produce tolerance, nor integration.”28 
 The fact that so many political leaders deemed it necessary to criticize the 
political ideology or public philosophy of “multiculturalism” is remarkable. Apparently, 
it is seen as an important perspective. It is experienced as a way of thinking with 
pernicious consequences; if not, all those important political leaders would not have 
thought it necessary to take such a stance. But what is also manifest from those 
reactions is that it is not clear what exactly they reject. None of those political voices 
spelled out clearly why they reacted so vehemently. Do they all reject the same 
thing? The word “multiculturalism” has many meanings. There are many 
interpretations of multiculturalism,29 and the term has become a “buzzword, a 
                                                          
25
 Sparrow, Andrew, ‘Cameron Attacks “State Multiculturalism”’, The Guardian 26 February 2008, 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/feb/26/conservatives.race> 
26
 Weaver, Matthew, ‘Angela Merkel: German Multiculturalism Has “Utterly Failed,”’ The Guardian 17 October 
2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-Multiculturalism-failed> 
27
 (“Yes, it’s a failure.”) Agence France-Presse, ‘Multiculturalism Has Failed, Says French President’, Daily 
Motion 11 February 2011 < http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xgzqs8_Multiculturalism-has-failed-says-
french-president_news>. 
28
 ‘Multiculturalism 'a big failure: Spain's ex-prime minister Aznar’, 27 October 2006, via 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1726950/posts 
29
 And many there are, Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf mention varieties within multiculturalism: 
“as represented for instance by Charles Taylor (1992), Will Kymlicka (1995), Bhikhu Parekh (2000), Brian Barry 
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crusade, and a gigantic mystification”.30 Some use it to indicate no more than cultural 
variety. So “multiculturalism” is prevalent in e.g. Sydney, if that city is home to many 
people from different cultural backgrounds. Others use the word “multiculturalism” to 
indicate a positive attitude towards cultural plurality. So you are deemed to be a 
“multiculturalist” if you believe that a multitude of cultures in one society is something 
that deserves to be cherished. There is a bewildering variety of uses of the word and 
a concomitant variety of associations people have with it.  
 Will Kymlicka, Canadian political philosopher who is best known for his work 
on multiculturalism,31 discerns three patterns of multiculturalism. Firstly, there is state 
recognition – he labels it ‘empowerment’ – of indigenous people, such as the Maori, 
Aboriginals or Inuit. Secondly, there are forms of granting autonomy to sub-state 
national groups, such as Scots in Britain, Frisians in the Netherlands, and Germans 
in South Tyrol. Lastly, there are forms of multiculturalist recognition for immigrant 
groups. 32 Kymlicka, as well as other Canadian multiculturalist philosophers such as 
Charles Taylor, drew inspiration for their theories from Indian minorities in Canada. 
Yet, their work transcends that early focus on indigenous groups into modern 
multiculturalism as we know it in contemporary Western-Europe regarding Islamic 
immigrants and subcultures. It is this variant that this thesis centers around. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(2001) (who takes a critical stance), Tariq Modood (2007) and Anne Phillips (2007).) A divergent set of civic 
programs might be labeled as 'radical Multiculturalism' or 'polycentric Multiculturalism' (Shohat and Stam 
1994), 'insurgent Multiculturalism' (Giroux 1994), 'public space Multiculturalism' (Vertovec 1996), 'difference 
Multiculturalism' (Turner 1993), 'critical Multiculturalism' (Chicago Cultural Studies Group 1994) 'weak' or 
'strong' Multiculturalism (Grillo 2005). Indeed, Steven Vertovec (1998) has pointed to at least eight different 
kinds of Multiculturalism while Garard Delanty (2003) suggests another list with nine types of 
Multiculturalism.” See: Vertovec, Steven and Wessendorf, Susanne, ‘Introduction. Assessing the backlash 
against Multiculturalism in Europe’, pp. 1-31 (2), in: Vertovec, Steven and Wessendorf, Susanne (eds.), The 
Multiculturalism Backlash: European discourses, policies and practices, London: Routledge 2010.  
30
 Higham, John, “Multiculturalism and universalism: A history and critique”, American Quarterly 1993, pp. 195-
219 (208). 
31
 See: Kymlicka, Will, Multiculturalist Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1995. See also: Parekh, Bhikhu, A New Politics of Identity: Political Principles for an Interdependent World, 
Palgrave MacMillan, Houndmills 2008; Parekh, Bhikhu, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and 
Political Theory, Macmillan Press, Houndmills/London 2000; Taylor, Charles, “The Politics of Recognition”, in: 
Taylor, Charles, Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition, Edited and introduced by Amy Gutman, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 1994, pp. 25-75. 
32
 Kymlicka, Will, ‘The rise and fall of Multiculturalism? New debates on inclusion and accommodation in 
diverse societies’, International Social Science Journal 2010, pp. 97–112 (101). 
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  This chapter will outline the origins of the ideology that is multiculturalism, 
analyse this ideology and critique it. With the ideology of multiculturalism I refer to a 
normative stance. Multiculturalism in that sense does not describe anything but 
prescribes a course of action, a way states and society have to deal with religious 
and cultural differences. I will break down the definition and evaluate its underlying 
assumptions. I propose to use the widest definition: “multiculturalism refers to a 
broad array of theories, attitudes, beliefs, norms, practices, laws and policies that 
seek to provide public recognition of and support for accommodation of non-
dominant ethnocultural/religious groups.”33 The definition of multiculturalism falls into 
two categories; 1) theory and moral attitudes, including political viewpoints, and 2) 
laws, practices and policies derived from theory and corresponding attitudes.34 I will 
focus on the first branch. So, whereas political leaders are now denouncing 
multiculturalism as state practice, its underlying ideology is very much alive today. 
 “Multiculturalism is a social-intellectual movement that promotes the value of 
diversity as a core principle and insists that all cultural groups be treated with respect 
and as equals,” as psychologists Fowers and Richardson contend in Why is 
Multiculturalism Good? (1996). Moreover, it is a moral movement that intends to 
enhance the dignity, rights and recognized worth of marginalized groups. It is “[…] 
inspired primarily by a moral perspective on human life that values diversity, 
tolerance, human rights, and authenticity.”35 American-Israeli professor of Law Amos 
Guiora states that multiculturalism is – philosophically, morally and practically – “an 
                                                          
33
 Ivison, Duncan, ‘Introduction: Multiculturalism as a Public Ideal’, p. 2, in: Ivison, Duncan (ed.), The Ashgate 
Research Companion to Multiculturalism, Surrey: Ashgate 2010. This definition is borrowed from Ivision, yet is 
expanded by the incorporation of the elements ‘laws’ and ‘religion’, so that the definition of Multiculturalism 
refers to‘ non-dominant ethnocultural/religious groups’ and ‘practices, laws and policies’. 
34
 Regarding laws, practices and policies, according to Kymlicka, multiculturalist citizenship for immigrant 
groups includes a combination of the following policies: “constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation 
of Multiculturalism at central, regional and municipal levels; the adoption of Multiculturalism in school 
curriculum; the inclusion of ethnic representation and sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media 
licensing; exemptions from dress codes, Sunday closing legislation and so on (either by statute or by court 
cases); allowed dual citizenship; the funding of ethnic group organisations to support cultural activities; the 
funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction; and affirmative action for disadvantaged 
immigrant groups”. See: Kymlicka 2010, p. 101. 
35




embrace, or at least, ‘understanding’, by society of different communities, ethnicities 
and religions living in the nation-state”.36 Importantly, it is a social-intellectual 
movement lifted to the status of a political ideology, which has consequences for 
citizens. 
 One of the most important and well-known critiques on multiculturalism is put 
forward by Susan Moller Okin, who questioned the compatibility of multiculturalism 
and feminism. Until the past few decades, Okin writes, minority groups – both 
immigrants and indigenous peoples – were expected to assimilate into majority 
cultures. That expectation is now considered to be oppressive, and Western 
countries have shifted to devising policies that are more responsive to persistent 
cultural differences. Yet, one issue which recurs across all contexts had gone 
virtually unnoticed in current – at the time of Okin’s publication in the 1990s – 
debates: “what should be done when the claims of minority cultures or religions clash 
with the norm of gender equality that is at least formally endorsed by liberal states 
(however much they continue to violate it in practices)?”37 She lists several clashing 
practices, such as the wearing of the traditional Muslim head scarves and full face 
veils, polygamy, female genital mutilation, child marriage or marriages that are 
otherwise coerced.  
 But the multiculturalist debate is not limited to feminist issues. Other real and 
pressing issues concern, inter alia, home-grown Islamist terrorism, practical limits on 
free speech (for instance the Danish cartoon crisis, the murder of Charlie Hebdo 
cartoonists), legal plurality in the form of sharia councils, a rise in anti-Semitism 
(including the murder of Jews) and violence against homosexuals, and segregated 
neighborhoods where Sharia patrols enforce Sharia law. Among Islam-rooted 
immigrants and later generations we see a high level of adherence to Islamic 
fundamentalism and increased radicalization. We read about fundamentalist Imams, 
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the influx of Saudi funds for mosques and education, and young Muslims joining IS to 
fight a holy war, where they commit murder, torture and rape. 
 Yet, these issues do not address the critique on multiculturalism from an 
analytical angle, but more so from a practical point of view. Multiculturalism is thus 
criticized mostly because of the practical problems connected to the ideal. But let us 
start at the basis, instead. It is fundamentally important to question the focus on 
culture itself, first, and question why culture is considered as something that is worthy 
of our respect as such, second. Then I consequently discuss identity theory and the 
‘politics of difference’’. The second part of this chapter is an analysis of the 
propositions and conclusions that form the basis of the multiculturalist ideology. To 
make the analysis livelier, I have added a fictitious case of minorities struggling with 
tradition, modernity and harmful practices in the country of Sealandistan.  
 
Why focus on culture? 
 
Let us see if we can trace the origins of the focus on culture. That requires a 
definition of culture. Multiculturalists have a different interpretation of culture than 
anthropologists.38 Needless to say, definitions range widely within any scientific 
discipline, and cultural anthropology is no different. I will here present some widely-
used and overarching definitions of culture. To start with the online Oxford Dictionary 
which refers to culture as 1) The arts and other manifestations of human intellectual 
achievement regarded collectively, e.g. ‘20th century popular culture’; 2) refined 
understanding or appreciation of this, e.g. ‘men of culture’; 3) The customs, arts, 
social institutions, and achievements of a particular nation, people, or other social 
group, e.g. ‘Caribbean culture’ ‘people from many different cultures’; 4) The attitudes 
and behavior characteristic of a particular social group, e.g. ‘the emerging drug 
culture’.39 It is this last one which is relevant to this study. 
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 Nineteenth century anthropologist Sir Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917) wrote 
“Culture or civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole 
which includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, laws, customs and any other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society”.40 This definition, 
which Tylor launched in his 1871 book Primitive Cultures, is taken at the moment the 
term culture came into play the way we are used to nowadays.41 Later, 
anthropologists included shared values in the definition of culture. A value is “[…] an 
enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally 
or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of 
existence.”42 Values are said to be acquired early in life, through family, surrounding 
environments and school. “They provide us with fundamental values and 
assumptions about how things are. Once a value is learned, it becomes integrated 
into an organized system of values where each value has a relative priority. This 
value system is relatively stable in nature but can change over time reflecting 
changes in culture as well as personal experience. Therefore, individuals based on 
their unique experiences not only differ in their value systems but also in the relative 
stability of these value systems.”43 Most anthropologists would nowadays define 
culture as “[…] the shared set of (implicit and explicit) values, ideas, concepts, and 
rules of behaviour that allow a social group to function and perpetuate itself. Rather 
than simply the presence or absence of a particular attribute, culture is understood as 
the dynamic and evolving socially constructed reality that exists in the minds of social 
group members. It is the ‘normative glue’ that allows group members to communicate 
and work effectively together.”44 It is the task of anthropologists to identify a group’s 
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culture – to sketch out an ethnography – in order to understand how one’s culture 
influences the way the world is perceived.  
 This field of science thus studies culture and tries to define the concept of 
culture, and describes various cultures. In itself that is a descriptive act. Description 
is an end in itself, and has no normative basis, no emancipation agenda, and no 
political goals, nor aim for social change or cultural transformation.45 The choice for 
anthropologists to study culture needs no explanation, just as biologists do not need 
to explain why they study flora and fauna. The focus on culture stems from an 
interest researchers have for this particular phenomenon, just as historians like to 
study history.  
 But why do political philosophers focus on culture? What is it about culture that 
it triggers this special attention? One could say humans are intimately bound together 
by their culture and various group loyalties. Culture is inextricably linked to human 
nature. Try to think of an individual without culture: it is impossible. We are all raised 
with values, norms, practices, traditions, language, a sense of common history, and 
more. Yet, I wonder, if culture is inescapable – like breathing, why not assume it 
instead of emphasize it? We assume our inner organs work in a certain way, but we 
do not uplift these bodily functions to a special status. Friendship and love influence 
our lives. Yet, friendship and love is not the focus of a field of research which leads to 
ideological thinking. Why is culture ‘the chosen one’, out of everything that forms and 
influences individual experience? Is it really that self-evident as multiculturalist 
philosophers tend to present us? There are several ways to address this question. 
One can trace back the origins of singling out culture, and consequentially one can 
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The idea of the unique value of cultures stems from the ideal of authenticity, which in 
turn is strongly influenced by the 18th century German Romantic philosopher Johann 
Gottfried von Herder (1744 –1803).46 While earlier philosophers had tried to explain 
the phenomenon of difference, Herder was the one who accepted, and celebrated, 
diversity.47 Bhikhu Parekh (1935), Indian-born British political theorist, writes on this: 
 
“For Herder, the influence of culture permeated the individual’s ways  
of thinking, feeling and judging, food, clothes, bodily gestures, way of  
talking, manner of holding himself or herself together, pleasures, pains,  
values, ideal, dreams, nightmares, forms of imagination, and aesthetic  
and moral sensibilities. Human beings felt at home and realized their  
potential only within their own culture and were awkward and  
profoundly disoriented outside of it, which is why Europeans, who  
displayed great civic virtues at home, often behaved with uncharacteristic 
brutality when travelling or living abroad. Not surprisingly every  
community ‘holds firmly’ to its culture and seeks to transmit it across 
generations ‘without any break’. Its commitment to its culture was based  
not on rational conviction or utilitarian considerations but ‘prejudice’, an 
unquestioning and grateful acceptance of its inheritance accompanied by  
pride and confidence in its value. Prejudice ‘returns people to their centre 
[and] attaches them more solidly to their roots’. Since no man could be  
human outside his cultural community, membership of it was a basic  
human need just as much as food and psychical security.  
 All Cultures, for Herder, were unique expressions of the human  
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spirit, incommensurable and, like flowers in the garden, beautifully 
complementing each other and adding to the richness of the world.”48  
 
Herder believed that individuals could only be ‘truly human’ if they were ‘true to 
themselves’. “All peoples must be allowed to unfold toward their unique destinies, 
which requires resisting external pressure and other inducements to mimic and 
thereby become derivatives of another culture.” His rejection of the ideal of individual 
equality has been a guiding principle for the development of group identity.49  
 Identity theory is a result from that Herderian ‘ideal of authenticity’. Freud 
formulated identity as a link an individual has with the unique values which are 
fostered by a unique history of a people (he referred to Judaism). He mentioned it 
only loosely and did not tie it to any specific race or religion. Freud’s disciple, German 
born American Erik Erikson (1902 – 1994) wrote on this: “It is this identity of 
something in the individual’s core with an essential aspect of a group’s inner 
coherence which is under consideration here: for the young individual must learn to 
be most himself where he means most to others – those others, to be sure, who have 
come to mean most to him. The term identity expresses such a mutual relation in that 
it connotes both a persistent sameness within oneself (self-sameness) and a 
persistent sharing of some kind of essential character with others.”50 Erikson 
combined Freud’s focus on the internal psyche (‘personal identity’) with a sociological 
approach (‘social identity’). (The psychoanalyst wrote this in the 1950s in the United 
States, at the time of the civil rights movement.) American researcher Seth Schwartz 
summarizes these ‘Eriksonian’ concepts: “[p]ersonal identity [is] the set of goals, 
values, and beliefs that one shows to the world. Personal identity includes career 
goals, dating preferences, word choices, and other aspects of self that identify an 
individual as someone in particular and that help to distinguish him or her from other 
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people. […] [S]ocial identity was identified as a sense of inner solidarity with a 
group’s ideals, the consolidation of elements that have been integrated into one’s 
sense of self from groups to which one belongs. […] Aspects of self, such as native 
language, country of origin, and racial background would fall under the heading of 
group identity.”51 
 ‘Identity theory’ was developing at the time of the American Civil Rights 
movement and has been significant for the ideology of multiculturalism. From the 
1890s onward African Americans had been challenging ‘Jim Crow laws’ – state laws 
which were devised to segregate blacks and whites when using public facilities, such 
as housing, medical care, public transport and schools. In a 1896 landmark United 
States Supreme Court decision of Plessy v. Ferguson, the court confirmed the 
‘separate but equal’ doctrine, which meant that under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which addresses citizenship rights and equal protection of the laws, states may 
uphold segregation along the lines of race, provided that the quality of each group's 
public facilities was equal. In the Plessy v. Ferguson case, Homer Plessy challenged 
his arrest after he refused to give up his seat to a white man on a train in New 
Orleans, as the Louisiana state law required from him. The Supreme Court denied 
his appeal, and stated that: “The object of the (Fourteenth) amendment was 
undoubtedly to enforce the equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature 
of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or 
to endorse social, as distinguished from political, equality. . . If one race be inferior to 
the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the 
same plane.”52 Social inequality thus justified legal and political segregation. 
 It wasn’t until the second half of the twentieth century that success was 
achieved. One of the major achievements of African American emancipation efforts is 
Brown v. Board of Education, when the US Supreme Court ruled in 1954 that laws 
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that enabled race segregation in schools were unconstitutional. Those laws violated 
the ‘equal protection clause’ of the Fourteenth Amendment and did away with the 
‘separate but equal’ doctrine. Following the spirit of the Brown v. Board of Education 
judgment, racial integration was now not merely legally required, but much more 
considered morally required, even though it took decades more of legal proceedings 
to fight Jim Crow laws. Yet, finally separatism was deemed incompatible with the 
innate equality of individuals.53  
 A year after Brown, an up to now unidentified speaker delivered an address at 
America’s oldest and then most influential black history organization, the Association 
for the Study of Negro Life and History, stating that real integration “[…] required 
changed minds as well as changed laws. “Legal gains and favorable court decisions 
[…] cannot complete the work that must be done,” he declared, “The spirit of legal 
justice must permeate the undercurrents of community life.”54   
 An illustration of African Americans demanding equal status is found in the 
‘textbook’ problem. In the 1960s, ‘pro-Black’ activists lamented the content of 
educational material, either portraying coloured people as silly, ignorant individuals, 
or excluding African Americans and black history altogether. Just as segregated 
classrooms, racist textbooks were considered to injure “[…] Black self-concept, Black 
self-identification, and especially Black self-esteem.” If textbooks did not provide a 
positive image for African Americans, the children would continue to suffer from a 
sense of racial inferiority.55 The campaign was successful; racist slurs were removed 
and new material about African Americans was added. Some activists even 
demanded the insertion of historical material that celebrated the ‘gifts’ of ethnic 
groups, and sometimes pressed for the inclusion of positive misrepresentations in the 
curriculum. This had the unintended consequence that some white conservatives 
demanded that negative material about their own past causing harm to their mental 
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health, be excluded.56 “So did every other racial and ethnic group, each seeking its 
own immaculate stripe in the multiculturalist rainbow. The result was a curriculum 
that celebrated “race” and “diversity” but downplayed racism.”57 This ‘textbook 
revolution’ aimed to create and protect African American nascent identity, and this 
new form of ‘identity politics’ was deeply rooted in the belief that public problems 
should be defined in terms of individual mental health: “Prefiguring many 
multiculturalists today, textbook activists defined their politics along racial or ethnic 
lines in order to make each individual feel fixed, grounded, and proud.”58  
 The idea of an extolled Black identity was fueled by intellectuals and 
community leaders, for example author and activist W.E.B. Du Bois (1868-1963), 
who inspired African Americans to embrace their African heritage. And, of course, by 
Martin Luther King and the Black Panthers. The idea that African Americans would 
not find equality with white Americans until a separate black community had been 
successfully built was elevated by Malcolm X and others. “Black power” became a 
new political agenda, and even though originally founded on the negative identity of 
cruel chattel slavery and racist violence, new phrases were adopted, such as “Black 
is beautiful” and “soul brother”. Black power (a phrase originally coined by activist 
Stokely Carmichael (1941-1998)) was defined as “a call for black people in this 
country to unite, to recognize their heritage, and to build a sense of community.” To 
become “[…] an effective political force in the United States, […] blacks must achieve 
“self-identity” and “self-determination” as a group, not as individuals. The result would 
be a rising black consciousness, “an attitude of brotherly, communal responsibility 
among all black people for one another.”59 Thus, where Brown was founded on the 
conviction that skin colour and ethnicity were irrelevant in making public or private 
decisions, now racial status was back on the agenda. It was more and more used to 
justify public and private preferences in favor of African Americans, such as 
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affirmative action, e.g. different university admission standards or hiring and tenure 
procedures.60 This was a paradoxical development, to be sure. Also, this ‘identity 
politics’ was not merely reserved for black Americans, as Native Americans, Latinos, 
Asian Americans and other groups appealed for inclusion within civil rights discourse 
as well. By using group identity discourse, community leaders established a sense of 
shared cultural values based on history, descent, and ethnicity. Membership of these 
separate subgroups led to certain entitlements, such as ‘recognition’ in a wider 
sense, and changes in laws, policies and judicial decisions.61 More so, social 
transformation itself was part of the political agenda. In Strange Fruit: Why Both 
Sides are Wrong in the Race Debate, British author Kenan Malik (1960) writes:  
 
“Soon not just blacks but everyone had an identity that was uniquely 
theirs and separated them not only from the white man but from 
every other kind of man, too, and indeed from Man in general. Using 
the template established by Black Power activists, Native 
Americans, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, Chinese Americans, not to 
mention myriad white ethnics, set up their separate cultural 
organisations. Women and gays became surrogate ethnics, each 
with their own particular cultures, identities and ways of thinking. 
‘The demand is not for the inclusion within the fold of “universal 
humankind” on the basis of shared human attributes; nor is it 
respect “in spite of one’s differences”, […]. ‘Rather, what is 
demanded is respect for oneself as different.’ At the heart of the 
new politics of identity was the claim that one’s political beliefs and 
ways of thinking should be derived from the fact of one’s birth, sex 
or ethnic origins, a claim that, historically radicals would have 
regarded as highly reactionary and that lay at the heart of racial 
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ideology. Yet, by the end of the 1960s, it was not the expression of 
identity but the language of commonality that […] ‘came to be 
perceived by the new movements as a colonialist smothering – an 
ideology to rationalise white dominance”.62  
 
American sociologist Nathan Glazer (1923), author of We Are All Multiculturalists 
Now (1998), locates the abandonment of the ideal of assimilation in the failure of 
integration of blacks in American society, making them the ‘storm troops’ of the 
battles of multiculturalism in the United States.63 It is the lack of integration that has 
inspired multiculturalism as a political doctrine. The idea is: if, in practice, minorities 
do not fit in, we can at least praise them in words.  
 Writing at the time of the civil rights movement, psychoanalyst Erikson warned 
against the development of a negative group identity, chosen for by young people 
who feel socially or personally marginalized within religious, ethnic and economic 
structures. He believed that the theory of identity could be useful when dealing with 
youngsters turning their negative energy into becoming “[…] exactly what the 
careless and fearful community expects him to be […]”.64 This sounds familiar to us 
now. Regarding immigrants in modern day society, Canadian multiculturalist Will 
Kymlicka argues: “Without some proactive policies to promote mutual understanding 
and respect and to make immigrants feel comfortable in mainstream institutions, 
these factors could quickly lead to a situation of a racialised underclass, standing in 
permanent opposition to the larger society.”65  
 The inescapability of culture becomes particularly salient when a group of 
people is confronted with another group’s different culture, and has to live together 
on a shared territory (hence multiculture). This is for instance the case with (mass) 
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migration. Cultural diversity leads to a cultural awareness that would have been 
absent if it were a monoculture. Yet, one could still make a case for integration within 
the majority culture of the host society. Within multiculturalist thinking, however, this 
demands the unjustifiable sacrifice of one’s cultural identity. In the aftermath of the 
American civil rights movement, the West gradually embraced the concept of minority 
identity and its consequential entitlements as something that could just not be 
denied. ‘Recognition’ of one’s separate identity based on non-chosen factors, such 
as sex, sexuality, heritage, or ethnicity, and even chosen factors, such as religion, 
has become a moral imperative.  
 
From identity theory to a ‘politics of difference’ 
 
The American civil rights movement and subsequent legislation (e.g. affirmative 
action) was ‘identity politics in action’. The moral imperative of ‘accommodating 
difference’ entered the legal and political sphere. Charles Taylor (1931), a Canadian 
political philosopher known for his work on multiculturalism, emphasizes the 
importance of recognition of culture for one’s well-being.66 In the opening lines of his 
widely acclaimed essay ‘The Politics of Recognition’ (1994), he states  
 
“The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by 
the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real 
damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a 
confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or 
misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in 
a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.”67 
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This idea is grounded in the conviction that minority groups are authentic and unique, 
and have a right to non-interference on their unique path to development. Individual 
members of these subgroups living in a nation with a dominant majority should be 
free from the imposition of majority norms and standards.  
 By now, we have identified two powerful moral foundations of multiculturalism. 
First, resulting from the civil rights movement, there is the ideal of opposing racism, 
discrimination and oppression endured by members of – perceived as weak –minority 
groups caused by a dominant majority. (For instance, Jewish and Mormon minorities 
are not perceived as weak.) Second, we have the notion of recognition of the 
uniqueness of individuals and cultures, and the right to follow one’s unique path to 
self-realization within that particular culture. These two moral foundations are tied 
together in the multiculturalist aim of reducing suffering. ‘Celebrating difference’ 
should be the norm, rather than ignoring difference. That implies exalting and 
exaggerating personal traits that do not belong to the domain of the majority 
American-European, white, heterosexual, (male) culture. This approval is considered 
vital for one’s self-realization. But even beyond the realm of discrimination, 
‘misrecognition’ of one’s identity in itself “[…] shows not just a lack of due respect. It 
can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due 
recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need”, 68 Charles 
Taylor tells us, and “[e]veryone should be recognized for his or her unique identity.”69  
 Everyone’s uniqueness logically implies difference between individuals, or 
groups of individuals, and assimilation to or being ignored by a dominant or majority 
identity is “[…] the cardinal sin against the ideal of authenticity.”70 This uniqueness, it 
follows, should not merely be recognized, but also politically and institutionally 
accommodated through a politics of difference. Multiculturalist philosopher Bhikhu 
Parekh writes in A New Politics of Identity (2008), that he believes that “marginalized 
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or denigrated groups” have poor self-respect and sometimes even suffer from self-
hatred. It is not enough to merely enjoy equal rights, opportunities and access to 
requisite resources. Individuals “[…] need a sense of self-worth and self-respect if 
they are going to overcome the passivity and self-doubt generated by crippling self-
images.”71 And, Parekh continues, “[a]s Charles Taylor correctly observes, social 
recognition is central to the individual’s identity and self-worth and misrecognition can 
gravely damage both. […] Misrecognition, therefore, can only be countered by 
undertaking a rigorous critique of the dominant culture and radically restructuring the 
prevailing inequalities of economic and political power.”72  
 This lifts multiculturalism to the level of political ideology. Not injuring self-
respect is a wider social and political goal in itself and one’s self-respect is taken to 
depend on the opinions held by a nation’s majority of Euro-American culture bearers. 
Taylor is aware that while a politics of equal dignity – the other end of the pole, one 
could say – requires non-discrimination in the form of difference-blindness, the 
politics of difference actually defines non-discrimination as something that requires 
making individual and group distinctions the basis of differential treatment.73 An 
example is affirmative action. This emancipatory program is for people whose 
heritage used to mount to discrimination, and instead provides them with advantages 
on, for instance, the job market or educational access. Taylor is also aware that the 
second model (the politics of difference) could be taken to violate the principle of 
non-discrimination. But, the author continues, the politics of equal dignity “[…] 
negates identity by forcing people in a homogenous mold that is untrue to them.” But 
it is considered even more adverse that the mold is not a “neutral set of difference-
blind principles”, but a representation of the hegemonic culture. In reality, in a politics 
of equal dignity only minority or suppressed cultures are forced to adapt to its 
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structure – multiculturalists believe.74 Taylor claims that such a difference-blind basis 
is inhospitable to difference and that a uniform treatment should make place for a 
system that acknowledges the demand of recognition of the equal value of all 
cultures: “[…] that we not only let them survive, but acknowledge their worth.”75 
Multiculturalism, Taylor claims, extends the principles that the ‘politics of equal 
respect’ already established: “Just as all must have equal civil rights, and equal 
voting rights, regardless of race or culture, so all should enjoy the presumption that 
their traditional culture has value.”76 Parekh agrees that that value of a collective 
identity manifests itself in self-worth and social standing, in the sense of common 
belonging and the collective empowerment, a moral anchor, and concludes that “[a] 
theory of politics that ignores this has only a limited appeal”.77 From the perspective 
of five constitutional models that offer a way to deal with state and religion, it 
becomes clear that Parekh and Taylor believe that the state should play an active 
role in acknowledging the worth of minority identity, rather than remaining agnostic 
towards it.   
 Culture is thus a source of the good, and even when it encompasses bad 
practices, ‘culture’ deserves our respect as an abstract concept. Not just ‘culture’, 
cultures (plural), and the many different lifestyles that different cultures offer humans, 
need to be respected. Bhikhu Parekh denounces the idea of ‘moral and cultural 
monism’ as well, in his acclaimed book Rethinking Multiculturalism (2000). Monism, 
he claims, promises there is “[…] only one correct or best way to understand human 
existence and lead the good life.”78 Parekh explains the notion of cultural monism:  
 
“The idea that different ways of life can be graded is equally untenable.  
It presupposes that a way of life can be reduced to a single value or  
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principle, that all such values or principles can in turn be reduced to,  
and measured in terms of, a single master value or principle, and that  
the good can be defined and determined independently of the agents 
involved. No way of life can be based on one value alone.79 It necessarily 
involves a plurality of values, which cannot be reduced to any one of  
them and which can be combined in several different ways. Furthermore,  
the values realized by different ways of life are often too disparate to  
be translated into a common and culturally neutral moral language, let  
alone measured on a single scale.”80  
  
This excerpt against the idea of cultural monism, or “monoculturalism”, shows that 
culture is not merely considered a source of good, it can also not be seen other than 
in terms of its manifold manifestations. In other words: all cultures are different and 
cannot be measured in terms of better and worse. This leads to the conclusions that 
all cultures are good, all cultures are different, and all cultures are equal (for, if one 
cannot judge, every culture is equal). This stance is commonly called “cultural 
relativism”.81 Johann Gottfried von Herder did not think all cultures were equal in 
terms of equally good, but equal because culture was equally important for all its 
members.82 Bhikhu Parekh does not subscribe to this classic multiculturalist trio of 
‘good, different, equal’. He states that, yes, different cultures present their members 
with different systems of meaning and visions of the good life. Nevertheless, he 
believes that from that does not follow that cultures cannot be compared and judged, 
nor that each culture is equally good for its members, nor does it mean that all 
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cultural differences need to be valued. Culture can be best changed from within, as 
well as through a process of ‘cultural dialogue’ or ‘intercultural dialogue’.83  
 Will Kymlicka, who is just like Charles Taylor a renowned Canadian 
multiculturalist philosopher, agrees with the foundations of the theory as espoused in 
Taylor’s essay ‘The Politics of Recognition’. Like Taylor, Kymlicka’s work starts off 
with a focus on indigenous peoples; previously self-governing, territorially 
concentrated cultures such as Indians in Canada. Notwithstanding, the propositions 
he uses for indigenous peoples later develop into a multiculturalist ideology that fits 
immigrant minority cultures as well. In his book Multiculturalist Citizenship (1996), he 
laments traditional human rights thinking with its foundation of difference-blindness:  
 
“Some liberals, particularly on the right, think it is counterproductive to 
pursue a 'colour-blind' society through policies that 'count by race'. 
Affirmative action, they argue, exacerbates the very problem it was intended 
to solve, by making people more conscious of group differences, and more 
resentful of other groups. This dispute amongst liberals over the need for 
remedial affirmative action programmes is a familiar one in many liberal 
democracies. But what most post-war liberals on both the right and left 
continue to reject is the idea of permanent differentiation in the rights or 
status of the members of certain groups. In particular, they reject the claim 
that group-specific rights are needed to accommodate enduring cultural 
differences, rather than remedy historical discrimination.”84 
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Kymlicka opposes post-war liberals who do not agree with the notion that specific 
ethnic or national groups should be given a permanent political identity or an 
adjusted (legal) status. He believes that majoritarian decision-making renders cultural 
minorities vulnerable to significant injustice at the hands of the majority, which will 
exacerbate ethnocultural conflict.85 A larger political, institutionalized, structure is 
needed to preserve minority culture and protect it against the homogenizing forces of 
the majority culture within a state. Besides peaceful co-existence as a multiculturalist 
goal, it is the importance of cultural membership for developing and sustaining self-
identity, as well as individual well-being, that is the driving force behind Kymlicka´s 
reasoning. In Liberalism, Community and Culture (1989), he writes that individuals 
make life choices from a spectrum of alternatives offered to us through a cultural 
framework. “People make choices about the social practices around them, based on 
their beliefs about the value of these practices (beliefs which, I have noted, may be 
wrong86). And to have a belief about the value of a practice is, in the first instance, a 
matter of understanding the meanings attached to it by our culture.”87 Each individual 
needs to feel a sense of security from the cultural framework(s) from which he makes 
his choices, Kymlicka argues.88 Practically, this implies that immigrants who wish to 
stay inside their own culture, should be granted that space through non-
discrimination policies and anti-prejudice measures, such as positive portrayals in 
textbooks and government materials. They are also morally entitled to legal 
exemptions, such as Sunday-closing exemptions for Jews and Muslims and 
exemption from restrictive helmet legislations for Sikhs.89 Regarding language 
development, Kymlicka is convinced that a unilingual focus – a focus on adopting the 
native language of the state – is harmful to members of minority cultures, “cutting 
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them off unnecessarily from their heritage”. It is also counterproductive integration-
wise, as well as bordering on racism.90 The old-fashioned approach to minority rights 
– meaning the lack of them:   
 
“[…] has often been guilty of ethnocentric assumptions, or of over- 
generalizing particular cases, or of conflating contingent political strategy  
with enduring moral principle. This is reflected in the wide range of  
policies liberal states have historically adopted regarding ethnic and  
national groups, ranging from coercive assimilation to coercive segregation, 
from conquest and colonization to federalism and self-government. The  
result has often been grave injustices against the ethnic and national  
minorities in many Western democracies. But the failure to develop a 
consistent and principled approach to minority rights may have even  
greater costs in the newly emerging democracies. At present,  
the fate of ethnic and national groups around the world is in the  
hand of xenophobic nationalists, religious extremists, and military  
dictators.”91 
 
Respecting minority cultures is thus not merely the proper way to go about, as ‘a 
moral right to authenticity’ in order for people to become their selves (self-realisation), 
but it also serves a purpose, namely not endangering the lives of minority individuals 
under majority rule. Bhikhu Parekh, like Kymlicka, highlights several civil wars in the 
final pages of his book to illustrate the importance of multiculturalist citizenship.92  
 
To summarize. Earlier, I asked the question ‘Why focus on culture’? The answer is 
not difficult: culture is presumed to be good. Herder had an important influence on 
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the idea that we should value and celebrate cultural uniqueness. Freudian 
psychological theory – also from the Romantic era – established the notion of identity 
and argued it is ‘important’, making it a marker within psychology. Political 
philosopher Charles Taylor said on culture: “[O]ne could argue that it is reasonable to 
suppose that cultures that have provided the horizon of meaning for large numbers of 
human beings, of diverse characters and temperaments, over a long period of time – 
that have, in other words, articulated their sense of the good, the holy, the admirable 
– are almost certain to have something that deserves our admiration and respect, 
even if it is accompanied by much that we have to abhor and reject.”93 Thus, 
“[p]eople cannot flourish, the argument for multiculturalism runs, unless they can 
become who they truly and fully are. They – we – are not isolated atoms, each 
complete by himself or herself. We belong to larger communities, each with its 
customs, accomplishments, memories of what was, and images of what should be. 
For people to realize their full worth, they must appreciate the worth of their collective 
identity; still more, the majority-culture bearers they live in must recognize the full 
worth of their collective identity”.94 Individuals have a moral right to authenticity, and 
not being able to live your life according to the practices and beliefs of one’s own 
(minority) culture, is considered harmful to one’s well-being. That is multiculturalism 
from a psychological perspective. From a political and societal point of view, it is the 
multiculturalist objective to avoid a social division between first and second class 
citizens, a division which is the result from misrecognition of minority cultures. 
Multiculturalism is an emancipatory project, aimed to relieve minorities from the 
interference or dominance of the majority culture of the host society. And, ultimately, 
multiculturalism should deter the majority from persecuting minorities, to keep them 
out of the hands of malignant leaders.  
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 The multiculturalist political ideology gained formal currency as academia took 
it up, as governments began to formalise its ideas in programs, and the “chattering 
classes” adopted its views as Islam and Muslims became more salient in western 
nations. It is important we take it seriously, and analyse and critique it.  
 
Breaking down multiculturalism 
 
In his article ‘Why respect culture?’ (2000), political scientist James Johnson wonders 
why particularistic claims of cultural communities are given special normative weight 
in our political judgments and deliberation. He argues that many political 
philosophers, such as Charles Taylor, Bhikhu Parekh and Will Kymlicka, urge to 
respect culture up to the extent of pursuing policies and designing institutions that 
actively promote and protect cultural commitments. Yet, as Johnson states, these 
and other multiculturalist philosophers – and their discussants – simply presume that 
we should do so, without providing convincing arguments what the moral reasons are 
for respecting culture in any direct sense.95 I subscribe to that judgment, and I would 
like to add that the works of these authors not seldom demonstrate a lack of clarity 
and coherence. Claims are posed and one sentence later mitigated to a degree they 
basically counter the prior claims. Take for instance Kymlicka’s view on the need for 
immigrants to integrate into the host society:  
 
“The expectation of integration is not unjust, I believe, so long as immigrants 
had the option to stay in their original culture. Given the connection between 
choice and culture which I sketched earlier, people should be able to live and 
work in their own culture. But like any other right, this right can be waived, 
and immigration is one way of waiving one's right. In deciding to uproot 
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themselves, immigrants voluntarily relinquish some of the rights that go along 
with their original national membership.”96 
 
We can distill claim 1: Immigrants should be able to stay in their own culture. Claim 2: 
Immigrants’ rights to stay in their own culture can be waived. How should the reader 
decide what’s best according to the author? To echo philosopher Jeremy Waldron 
(1953): let us see “[…] how much substance there would be if various determinate 
communitarian claims were taken one by one, and their proponents were forced to 
abandon any reliance on vagueness and equivocation. In the end, that is the best 
way to evaluate the array of different meanings that are evoked in this literature.”97  
 I will trace back and evaluate the line of multiculturalist reasoning. The 
objections to the foundation of multiculturalism can be made more easily when the 
theory is broken down into propositions and conclusions. Inspired by “practical 
ethics”98, I present the reader with the fictitious case of the Blueskins and Greenskins 
living in Sealandistan, who want to peacefully co-exist.  
 
The propositions and conclusions are primarily based on the theories of Charles 
Taylor, Will Kymlicka, and Bhikhu Parekh, who I take to be exemplary for 
multiculturalist thinking. They are part of a much larger socio-intellectual movement 
and political ideology that is multiculturalism. The following analysis on the doctrine of 
multiculturalism thus goes beyond these three thinkers. Like every comprehensive 
political ideology, its adherents and contributors occasionally differ in opinion, 
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demonstrate nuances and can even mutually disagree. Yet, in general, this is the 
basis of multiculturalism:  
 
The propositions:  
 
1) Who someone authentically is, is given by his (ethno/religious) cultural identity; 
2) Nonrecognition of cultural identity constitutes psychological harm. 
 
The conclusions tied to these propositions are:  
  
1) Culture is good; 
2) Cultures are equal;  
3) Cultural differences are either good, but if not, they should at least be tolerated; 
4) Minority cultures must not be criticized by the dominant culture which has the 




Although multiculturalist proponents, I would say, ‘of course’, nuance the 
abovementioned claims, this is the foundation from which they build their political 
ideology. Let us start with evaluating the propositions.   
 
1. Who someone authentically is, is given by his (ethno/religious) cultural identity 
 
To begin with proposition 1: Who someone authentically is, is given by his 
(ethno/religious) cultural identity. Charles Taylor stresses that every individual is 
unique. Whether that is true depends on one’s definition of uniqueness. From the 
perspective of DNA, yes, every individual is unique. No human is exactly the same, 
therefore we can ascribe a certain ‘uniqueness’ to each and every one of us. But I 
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doubt this is what Taylor means by uniqueness when we tie it to the need for 
recognition. I suppose no individual is waiting to be recognized for his or her unique 
DNA structure. There must be something more the author is hinting at. But, why is it 
actually important for the author to state that all individuals are unique?  
 That is because Taylor believes it is morally wrong not to recognize 
particularities. The uniqueness of individuals is presented as self-evident. Thus, 
according to Taylor, claiming all human beings are equal is both factually wrong – 
considering individual differences – and morally wrong, as not respecting difference 
is considered harmful. Posing a statement as self-evident is not necessarily 
problematic, but it does become so when the opposite of that statement is actually 
more in line with what the author proposes. To explain: suppose we instead take the 
position that ‘Every individual is not unique’. Would this not correspond better with 
the statement that group memberships are important for people’s well-being, for the 
sake of coherence?   
 Taylor pleads for a politics of accommodating difference. He ascertains the 
need for state measures and a shift in attitude that shows respect for minority groups. 
From the multiculturalist perspective, a state should not have to let go of its universal 
affirmation of equality to accommodate random wishes of randomly dispersed 
individuals within a territory (John from Arkansas would like this, Mary from New York 
would like that). The founding principle of multiculturalism is that humans flock 
together based on a shared culture. If all individuals are unique, how would they 
know which group to belong to? Claiming individual authenticity is fundamentally at 
odds with the presumed needs for group recognition. Cultural groups consist of 
individuals who are deemed alike. If multiculturalists wish to make the argument for 
respecting culture, they should abstain from making statements on the individual 
distinctiveness of human beings.  
 This brings us back to the proposition that who someone truly (authentically) 
is, is dependent on his identity. Freud’s disciple Erikson described personal identity 
as “[…] the set of goals, values, and beliefs that one shows to the world. Personal 
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identity includes career goals, dating preferences, word choices, and other aspects of 
self that identify an individual as someone in particular and that help to distinguish 
him or her from other people.”99 But, it is not personal identity that multiculturalists 
need in order to structure their argument. It is group identity.  
 The ‘unique person’ that one is today, is created within, and by, a culture. One 
can agree, but also because ‘culture’ is an abstract term without a specific 
substance. It cannot be refuted that we are all products of a, or ‘our’, culture. And if 
culture changes, so do we, as we are the ones who are the agents capable of 
changing culture. So, no matter how we act or what we believe, that what we do and 
think is our culture. Stating that individuals develop a cultural identity within a larger 
cultural framework is like saying ‘humans breath oxygen’ and may be an interesting 
field for psychologists (hence Freud and Erikson), but is in itself an empty statement. 
It does not logically lead to a particular political theory of any kind. Ascribing anything 
to the empty category that is culture is rather vague. Thus, cultural diversity is a fact, 
yes, but it is unclear what the justification is for making it a political goal of moral 
importance that needs to be furthered.100  
 Individuals have a cultural identity no matter what, as long as they are part of a 
social group – and not living as hermits from birth. This is what Erikson would have 
labelled as social identity: “[S]ocial identity was identified as a sense of inner 
solidarity with a group’s ideals, the consolidation of elements that have been 
integrated into one’s sense of self from groups to which one belongs. […] Aspects of 
self, such as native language, country of origin, and racial background would fall 
under the heading of group identity.”101 Personal and social identity are thus joined 
together into a concept of ‘cultural identity’, a ‘group identity’. As Parekh states: 
“People value their collective identity for various reasons: it is the basis of their sense 
of self-worth and social standing; it bonds them to those sharing it, and generates a 
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sense of common belonging and the collective empowerment that accompanies it; 
and gives them a moral anchor, a sense of direction, and a body of ideals and 
values.”102  
 Thus, under a multiculturalist regime people are entitled – and morally 
encouraged (“you are good the way you are”, “become who you are”, as well as 
politically stimulated (subsidized, exempted from laws) – to live out this ‘authentic’ 
cultural group identity. Yet, culture and identity as concepts within political theory are 
difficult. For instance, ‘culture’ is always there. For example, if a state decides to rid 
society of all religion, religion might go away. But ‘culture’ will still be there, just in a 
different form, namely, a culture without religion. ‘Culture’ in itself is a meaningless 
term. The same goes for ‘identity’. Why then the need to single cultural group identity 
out, lift it up and aim to preserve it in abstracto?  
 A helpful course now would be to make “cultural identity” less abstract. So I 
ask: which culture? Which cultural aspect within our identities warrants extra 
attention? People are ‘members’ of all sorts of ‘communities’. For instance, we align 
ourselves based on shared professions (scholars, bakers, teachers), sports, sexual 
orientation, neighborhoods, age group, educational level, arts, regional culture and 
so forth. In a lifetime, we can switch identities and for instance go from a vegan 
Marxist to a fur wearing capitalist (or from fur wearing Marxist to vegan capitalist). 
Yet, multiculturalists ignore most of these self-chosen allegiances and are merely 
concerned with ethno/religious-culture.103 The community culture that multiculturalists 
take to be important for one’s self-realization is thus always an ethnic and/or religious 
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cultural identity. No multiculturalist calls attention to the importance of a Rotterdam 
identity to citizens of Rotterdam.  
 So, multiculturalists elevate one’s personal identity to the status of group 
identity, and group identity = ethno/religious-identity. If we consider the contemporary 
origins of multiculturalism, namely, the civil rights movement, it makes sense. One 
cannot change one’s ethnic roots, and thus ethnicity is lifted (but only for minorities). 
Ethnicity is “authentic”, and authenticity is good. 
 An important point of critique is that this perspective confines or guides 
individuals to a culture they were born into, and not one which they have chosen for 
after more options became available at a later stage in life. The act of 
“hypostatization” or “reification” (to ascribe substance or real existence to mental 
constructs or concepts) actually limits individuals in what Kymlicka labels making life 
choices:  
 
“In deciding how to lead our lives, we do not start de novo, but rather  
we examine “definite ideals and forms of life that have been developed  
and tested by innumerable individuals, sometimes for generations.” The 
decision about how to lead our lives must ultimately be ours alone, but 
this decision is always a matter of selecting what we believe to be most 
valuable from the various options available, selecting from a context of  
choice which provides us with different ways of life.”104  
 
The selection of what is deemed best in terms of life options is, if multiculturalist 
ideology be accepted, constituted by the ‘heritage’ of those stemming from one’s 
“own” ethnicity and religion. For, if multiculturalists would encourage Redskin Indians 
to learn about family values from 8th century Hanbali Muslims, and would stimulate 
Mexican Jews to check out Mongolian musical history, that would debase the idea 
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that group identity is formed by a distinctive, and traceable to one’s own, culture. 
Kymlicka does not stimulate humans to choose from options out of general human 
history. If that were the case, there would not be a need for focusing on preserving 
multiculture.  
 Out of all the options one has when composing a lifestyle, ethnicity is one 
element that is not optional. Yet, individuals still have the option to carry out that part 
of their genetic make-up into their sense of self. Individuals with a non-white ethnicity 
in a majority white society do not have to lift their ethnicity as an important marker of 
their identity. But if we go along with multiculturalist thinking, members of minorities 
should be encouraged to highlight this part of themselves, because cultural 
authenticity is valued. This downplays the viable option to not make one’s heritage a 
vital part one’s life. It also assumes a cohesiveness in ethnical or religious heritage, 
as well as a group cohesiveness, that is not always there.105  
 Moreover, it negates the reality of culture as an ever-changing phenomenon. A 
focus on a return to ethnicity (including a religious heritage) stresses continuity, 
community survival and links throughout the generations.106 Imagine the lives of our 
grandparents, or even our parents, and see the changes in lifestyles and mentality. It 
makes no sense to state that, with the ideal of authenticity in the back of our minds, 
we should be encouraged to be inspired by the lifestyles of our ancestors without 
asking ourselves whether that lifestyle is conform modern standards. And even 
individuals who share the exact same heritage often diverge from one another 
significantly: siblings do not seldom have different preferences and conceptions of 
the good life. But even beyond generational change, individuals do not seldom chose 
to ‘leave their community’ and are not looking for a sense of belonging to a collection 
of individuals sharing their heritage, and do not define themselves in terms of their 
“given” cultural identity.  
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 As Jeremy Waldron points out, “[…] Kymlicka is guilty of something like the 
fallacy of composition.”107 The multiculturalist philosopher establishes that life 
choices are made in a cultural context, and the options have culturally defined 
meanings. However, from that it does not follow that there must be a particular 
cultural framework, nor that membership in a culture is of a particular relevance.108 
The question remains: which culture? Which aspects of our cultural identity make us 
who we truly are? The answer: “those which are deemed important” is circular and 
has no meaning.  
 Moreover, the tragedy for multiculturalists seems to be that blacks have much 
less culture in common with other blacks, and whites with other whites, than is 
necessary for upholding their multiculturalist ideology. Their tragedy is that some 
whites like Tolstoy and some blacks like Tolstoy; some whites like Bach and some 
blacks like Bach. The idea of a common culture for some ethnic groups or religious 
groups is increasingly a myth. So this common culture has to be “invented”, 
“imagined”. Their assertions about that common culture often exude a sort of 
desperate and categorical tone. There is much more ‘cross-cultural dialogue’ and 
understanding than is compatible with multiculturalist premises. Secularist Paul 
Cliteur (born in the Netherlands) feels intellectually comfortable around Afshin Ellian 
(from Iran) and Ayaan Hirsi Ali (from Somalia), although he shares his cultural 
heritage with Ian Buruma (Dutch writer who believes in the notion of Enlightenment 
fundamentalism109) and Maurits Berger (Dutch Arabist who endorses Sharia 
councils).  
 These cross-cultural understandings are very difficult to understand on the 
basis of the multiculturalist philosophy. That also explains the aggressive 
commentary on Hirsi Ali when she formulates criticism of – supposedly – her own 
religion: Islam.110 If she apostatizes she is assumed to be manipulated by angry 
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white men. You are supposed to stick to the faith in which you are born, because this 
is “multiculturalist proof” that culture is valued by its members. As Hirsi Ali found her 
way out of her imposed cultural identity, she was labeled a “dissident” who “did not 
represent Muslim women”, and was found unqualified to voice her critiques on 
minority issues and religion. That someone who is Muslim can decide to become 
atheist and deliver cultural criticism is beyond multiculturalist understanding. 
Multiculturalists do not like or stimulate cultural change.111 In that respect, in their 
attempt not to offend Muslims when formulating critiques, undeservedly understood 
as stereotyping, “[…] Westerners may condescendingly think of other human beings 
“as eternally sealed within their own cultural totalities and/or permanently condemned 
to live their lives within the confines of their ‘most authentic’ systems of beliefs and 
values,” wrote the Syrian-born academic Sadiq Jalal Al-Azm (1934).112 
  
To conclude. Proposition number 1 is: Who someone truly (authentically) is, is given 
by his cultural identity. Multiculturalists focus on groups, not on individuals. 
Individuals cannot be seen apart from their group culture, a group identity is vital to 
their sense of self. I expressed the view that a focus on “cultural identity” is so broad 
it becomes meaningless. Multiculturalists thus cannot maintain a completely abstract 
view on “cultural identity”, but ultimately must focus on ethno-religious group identity. 
Other allegiances, such as profession or age, do not matter to multiculturalists. The 
act of focusing on a shared ethno-religious identity as something important becomes 
part of a balancing act in remaining vague on what that identity entails. For: the 
moment abstraction is exchanged for concreteness, factual group cohesion comes 
under pressure which diminishes the idea of a group identity.  
 I do not deny that (large) groups of individuals do flock together. Orthodox 
Jews do so in Antwerp, and the Amish do so in Ohio. But some of those group 
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members leave their community and do not want to be defined in terms of that 
particular group identity. The question remains: why does group identity call for a 
particularly positive assessment, rather than merely establishing ethno-religious 
communities as sociological practicalities? Or leave thoughts about cultural identity to 
the psychologists? For that, multiculturalists use proposition number 2.  
 
2. Nonrecognition of cultural identity constitutes psychological harm 
 
Proposition number 2 is: Nonrecognition of cultural identity constitutes psychological 
harm. Crucial to multiculturalist thinking is taking one’s identity to be of vital 
importance to the concept of self-respect, a form of a permanent psychological 
condition which should not be damaged (e.g. by critique), but respected (in word and 
(legal) action) and in some ways extolled, and secondly, that this identity is based on 
the group to which you belong to. From this perspective, one’s identity is not chosen, 
but assigned at birth, that is, it is based on an ethno-religious, cultural, background.  
 In Why Respect Culture?, James Johnson suggests two justifications. One, we 
might respect culture because we consider it valuable, because individuals value 
culture. Or, two, we might respect culture on consequentialist grounds, meaning it 
contributes to the well-being of individuals or a group or perhaps avoid civil war.113 
The first one reads, culture is important, because it is important. We just have to 
assume its intrinsic value. That is difficult, because ‘culture’ in itself is neither good or 
bad. It is a collection of beliefs and practices of which parts change over time, and 
each facet needs to be evaluated on the basis of its (de)merits. Charles Taylor 
accentuates an instrumentalist justification for multiculturalist theory, viz. avoiding 
psychological harm, even to the extent of avoiding a ‘crippling self-hatred’. He has 
not described how recognition should be bestowed on the recipient, nor made explicit 
what constitutes interference at being what one truly is. He defines the importance of 
recognition by means of the via negativa: it not so much important to receive 
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recognition, but to be free from non-recognition or misrecognition. The latter two are 
presumed to constitute psychological harm. It even goes so far that the claims to 
identity are taken to be non-negotiable. “One says: ‘I can give up many things for the 
social good, but I will not give up my identity. I should not be required to sacrifice who 
I am for the sake of the benefit to others.”114 Accommodating someone in their 
personal preferences which are presented as culturally originating, is crucial to 
showing respect, at least, that is the idea. The emphasis lies on perceived weak 
minorities, on those who are viewed to suffer from a critical attitude towards their way 
of life. This presumed suffering is presented as self-evident.  
 The ultimate foundation of Taylor’s (and Kymlicka’s and Parekh’s) theory is: 
“people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them 
mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of 
themselves”115. It sounds plausible. But is it true? Is it true that misrecognition is a 
form of psychological harm? Would no longer being confirmed as a member of a 
particular community by outsiders constitute harm? Multiculturalist philosophers do 
not offer sufficient viable reasons why this should be the case. It is also not 
consistent with the accusation that members of the cultural hegemony exclude 
minority members. It seems to me that emphasizing one’s different position as 
member of a minority culture is not very “inclusive”.   
 This assumption of harm could be considered as an attempt to project 
emotions unto others. This also becomes clear when we ask the question: who 
should recognize who? Parekh writes:  
 
“This feeling of being full citizens and yet outsiders is difficult to  
analyse and explain, but it can be deep and real and seriously damage  
the quality of their citizenship and their commitment to the political 
community. It is caused by, among other things, the narrow and  
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exclusive manner in which wider society defines the common good,  
the demeaning ways in which it talks about some of its members,  
and the dismissive or patronizing ways in which it behaves towards  
them. Although such individuals are free in principle to participate  
in its collective life, they often stay away or ghettoize themselves for  
fear of rejection or out a deep sense of alienation.”116 
 
Interestingly, what this also exposes is that there is no general moral duty to respect 
individuals for whom they truly are, as nonrecognition causes harm. I will explain. 
Take, for example, “John”. John is an Iraqi-born Muslim living in Birmingham. He 
disapproves of people who do not follow his religion. In fact, an important part of who 
John truly is, is expressed through his dismissive attitude towards non-believers. He 
wishes not to recognize a non-believer for whom that person truly is, and prefers to 
be critical or even dismissive of western values. If we were to follow multiculturalist 
theory, we respect John’s true nature. We should not even criticize John for criticizing 
other people’s life choices. John has the right to believe whatever he wishes, and we 
should be respectful and tolerant of his position. So far so good. But now we change 
John a little bit. This time, John is a white male citizen living in Liverpool. John does 
not recognize Muslims for who they truly are, in fact, he is quite dismissive of Islam. 
He regularly unfolds his critique on life choices inspired by that religion, stating that 
Islam is detrimental to individual well-being. He questions the merits of Islam-inspired 
practices, such as veiling and praying five times a day. Now, multiculturalists would 
label this lack of recognition as a form of causing psychological harm, as well as 
arrogant, condescending and eurocentric, possibly even racist and discriminatory. 
The moral duty of not not recognizing an individual for who he truly, is thus a one-
way street.117 That is what I mean with the fact that for multiculturalists there is no 
general moral duty to respect individuals for whom they truly are. As we will see at a 
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later stage in conclusion 4: minority cultures must not be criticized by the dominant 
culture which has the positive obligation to preserve minority cultures. Multiculturalist 
philosophers do not focus on the need for recognition of Inuit by a minority of 
Pakistani Shiite Muslims. Or recognition of Caribbean Africans by the Pennsylvania 
Dutch. Recognition should be bestowed on minority groups by white Euro-American 
culture bearers. It assumes that members of the cultural hegemony have an 
enormous power and influence on the mental well-being of minority members, a 
power the latter does not have on the majority. It assumes that white Euro-Americans 
are psychologically immune to critique from minorities (even to the accusation of 
being inherently racist) – and if not immune, at least they are considered adults who 
should be able to deal with it. Minority members, on the other hand, are considered 
dependent on the approval of white Euro-Americans for a sense of self-worth. Where 
does that idea come from?  
 In The Tyranny of Guilt. An Essay on Western Masochism (2010), French 
philosopher Pascal Bruckner (1948) dissects the idea that members of minorities 
suffer under misrecognition by a dominant European, white majority culture. The 
fixation some multiculturalists have on the duty to ensure the mental wellbeing of 
minority group members comes from a strong sense of guilt. He writes: 
 
 “Since 1945 our continent has been obsessed by torments of  
repentance. Ruminating on its past abominations – wars, religious  
persecutions, slavery, imperialism, fascism, communism – it views  
history as nothing more than a long series of massacres and sackings  
that led to two world wars, that is, to an enthusiastic suicide.  
Unparalleled horrors, the industrialization of death on a grand scale in 
 the Nazi and Soviet camps, the promotion of bloodthirsty clowns to  
the rank of mass idols, and the experience of radical evil transformed  
into bureaucratic routine: that is what we have achieved.”118  
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Bruckner formulates the consequence: “[t]hus we Euro-Americans are supposed to 
have only one obligation: endlessly atoning for what we have inflicted on other parts 
of humanity.”119 And this is often adopted by multiculturalists. For instance, Will 
Kymlicka’s Multiculturalist Citizenship (1995) ends with the passage that “the fate of 
ethnic and national groups around the world is in the hand of xenophobic nationalists, 
religious extremists, and military dictators.”120 And not in the hands of members of 
minority groups themselves, we must conclude, who are docilely awaiting their fate. 
The history of slavery, colonialism and genocide is the proof that Euro-Americans are 
(potential or actual) perpetrators by default, capable of racism, discrimination and 
persecution. Members of minorities, on the other hand, are vulnerable and innocent 
by default, in need of protection by the majority, yet awaiting their destiny of 
marginalisation by that same majority, a destiny only the majority can control. This is 
the psychological underpinning of the perceived relationship between majority and 
minority individuals. Bruckner asks:  
 
“How can we fail to see that this leads us to live off self-denunciation 
while taking a strange pride in being the worst? Self-denigration is all 
too clearly a form of indirect self-glorification. Evil can come only from 
us; other people are motivated by sympathy, good will, candor. This is 
the paternalism of the guilty conscience: seeing ourselves as the kind of 
infamy is still a way of staying on the crest of history. Since Freud we 
know that masochism is only a reversed sadism, a passion for 
domination turned against oneself. Europe is still messianic, exporting 
humility and wisdom. Its obvious scorn for itself does not conceal a very 
great infatuation. Barbarity is Europe’s great pride, which it acknowledges 
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only in itself; it denies that others are barbarous, finding attenuating 
circumstances for them (which is a way of denying them all responsibility).”121 
 
The Euro-American majority has the moral duty to make sure minority individuals do 
not suffer psychological harm from nonrecognition or misrecognition of the 
worthiness of their cultures.  
 Consider the assumption that “Nonrecognition of cultural identity constitutes 
psychological harm”. It has to be said that, again, it is presented as self-evident. That 
does not have to be problematic, our political system is founded on self-evident 
notions, such as that human beings prefer freedom over oppression, and equal 
opportunity over discrimination.122 These ideas do not require to be evidenced in 
every treatise. However, the indication that minority members are victims of 
unbearable psychological harm (“crippling”) through the act of non-recognition or 
misrecognition, does require some support. What is also missing, is a clear view of 
what recognition, or lack of non-recognition, entails. There appear to be two levels; 
the individual level and the institutional level. 
 Multiculturalist thinkers confuse the entities – the individual, the group or 
cultures themselves123 – that warrant protection or recognition; the individual from a 
psychological need to belong or not to feel degraded, a group that deserves 
protection against discrimination or a culture that is in danger of going extinct. But a 
‘group’ is not an entity which deserves protection or recognition from any analytical 
angle. Groups have no feelings. Groups fail as a unit to experience psychological 
harm. Or, as American author Ophelia Benson and British author Jeremy Stangroom 
describe:  
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“But literally speaking, groups don’t value things. Groups can’t literally  
value anything, any more than nations or communities or families can,  
because groups don’t have minds. It is only people (and some animals)  
who can value cultural practices, because it is only people who have minds,  
and they have them in a singular, one at a time. Their thoughts can’t ever  
be added together to make a larger group thought, which then becomes  
‘what the group thinks.’ Thoughts can’t be poured into a large bowl to  
make soup; they can only be added to a pile of distinct entities, with the  
entities remaining distinct. The thoughts of people never melt into each  
other, no matter how high the heat.”124               
 
The same goes for cultures. Humans contain culture, cultures on their own do not 
exist and have no interests whatsoever. Of course, in normal discourse, and for 
sociological and political reasons, we constantly refer to groups, as well as to the 
abstract notion of ‘culture’. But that does not defer to the fact that the only unit that 
actually values or needs something, is the individual. That is what makes it 
problematic to accept the notion that cultural identity is in need of recognition. One 
could raise the issue that under modernization and globalization, minority cultures 
are faced with much more ‘change’ than members of the majority culture and that this 
is a difficult psychological process unevenly distributed amongst citizens of a nation. 
But change can also be positive; there are great psychological advantages for 
members of minority cultures changing their culture under the influence of the 
dominant majority. More freedom, more liberty, more choices, greater wealth, peace, 
stability and many more of the plusses the West has which has caused immigration 
flows towards the Euro-American culture. Apparently, the monoculture from the 
“culture of origin” compelled immigrants to move away in search of change.   
 Another question that needs answering, is how the act of recognition, or 
absence of non- or misrecognition should be bestowed upon people. We have 
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answered the question who should recognize whom (members of the majority should 
recognize members of the minority), but how does one recognize another human 
being?  
 Taylor writes that minorities should not have to be confronted with demeaning 
images of themselves. Though, not being degraded does not require being seen as 
equal, nor does it demand acknowledgement of one’s cultural distinctiveness.125 
Abolishing discriminatory laws is not the same as legislating affirmative action. This 
vagueness of how to go about the practice of avoiding non-recognition does not help 
Taylor’s argument. Should a white, Euro-American male approach a black American-
Haitian, and say: “I recognize your Haitian heritage. (Now, let’s do business 
together).” Or should the white man merely think that inside his head? Or is simply 
not degrading a fellow human based on his skin color enough? Or does not 
abolishing harmful cultural traditional practices – for instance ritual slaughter – suffice 
for recognizing a cultural group?126 But where to draw the line of tolerating harmful 
practices? To quote Jeremy Waldron: “I suspect that the popularity of modern 
communitarianism has depended on not giving unequivocal answers to these 
questions.”127 
 
The conclusions following the propositions 
 
I would now like to evaluate the conclusions that multiculturalists connect to the 
propositions that 1) Who someone truly (authentically) is, is given by his 
ethno/religious cultural identity, and that 2) nonrecognition of cultural identity 
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constitutes psychological harm. This set of ‘givens’ leads to the conclusion that 1) 
‘culture is good’, 2) cultures are equal; 3) Cultural differences are either good, but if 
not, they should at least be tolerated; and 4) Minority cultures must not be criticized 
by the dominant culture which has the positive obligation to preserve minority 
cultures.  
 In order to illustrate the critique more clearly, I present the fictitious case of 
Sealandistan:  
 
In the beautiful country of Sealandistan live two cultural communities: the 
Blueskins and the Greenskins. Blueskins value animal welfare. In fact they 
take great pride in it, and are hurt, shocked and offended when others don’t. 
Therefore, all Blueskins treat all animals with great care. The Blueskins are 
also very satisfied with their loving attitude toward the elderly: traditionally, 
citizens over the age of 90 are administered a pill ending their lives. This 
way, the elderly will not grow any older stuck with bodily malfunctioning, 
worries about their upcoming death and being left to reminisce about the 
days which were, feeling lonely. They share their nation with the Greenskins. 
The Greenskins value life like nothing else, and are very much disturbed by 
the way the Blueskins, as they see it, “murder” their elderly and are 
frightened they will be required to follow that practice in the future. Luckily, 
they can relax a bit during their “feast of animal kicking”. This festivity takes 
place every third Saturday of the month, when Greenskins assemble animals 
on village squares. Under the tunes of folklore music and the company of 
friends and family, they take turns kicking animals until the creatures die. The 
Greenskins take great pride in participating at the feast of animal kicking. It 
confirms their heritage, from which they draw cultural pride and a sense of 
belonging. Most would be hurt, shocked and offended if the Blueskins would 




We will come back to Sealandistan in a short bit and return to the ideology of 
multiculturalism.  
 
1. Culture is good 
 
First of all, let us discuss conclusion number 1: “culture is good”. Interestingly, none 
of the multiculturalist philosophers claim that culture is purely ‘good’. Culture is 
important as multiculturalists consider it to define one’s identity – that is, if you are a 
member of a cultural minority. Culture is thus important to people, therefore, culture 
is good, the justification goes. The word “important” has some vagueness to it which 
many authors fail to analyse adequately. Does it mean “inevitable”? Does it mean 
“favourable”? This ought to be made clear. All that “important” means, is that people 
hold beliefs and act in a certain matter, because they want to. This is a form of 
circular reasoning: why do people act in a certain way? Because they want to. Why 
do people want to act in a certain way? Because it is important to them. Why is it 
important to them? Because they want to. But some people also want to kill their 
daughter for having a non-Muslim boyfriend. Or value their membership of the Ku 
Klux Klan. That individuals want to, value, or find something important for their 
identity is not decisive when answering the question whether something deserves 
respect, recognition or toleration. 
 That culture encompasses reprehensible practices as well is widely accepted. 
However, according to them, that acknowledgement does not affect the conclusion 
that overall culture is important to its members, and therefore good. Especially 
“traditional” cultures have value. Taylor claims: “Just as all must have equal civil 
rights, and equal voting rights, regardless of race or culture, so all should enjoy the 
presumption that their traditional culture has value.”128 Because culture is the source 
of identity, and living one’s identity is crucially important to one’s well-being, cultural 
membership is good, and culture is thus a source of good. I have stated under 
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proposition number 1 (identity is given by one’s culture) that ‘culture’ is a catch-all 
term for the aggregate of individual human thought, creation and behaviour. Yet, 
multiculturalists take culture to be good, because individuals value culture. And even 
when a collection of individuals demonstrate ‘bad’ or ‘abhorrent’ practices – e.g. child 
marriage or animal abuse, we should not draw the conclusion that culture is bad, 
because even the bad practices are valued (otherwise they would logically abandon 
these practices). That those practices are harmful to the victims is not recognized in 
the same way as non-recognition of the culture is conceived to be harmful to the 
perpetrators.  
 Community cultures can have a negative effect on individual well-being.129 
Interests between community members do not seldom conflict. Take for instance, the 
relatively high suicide rate among south-east Asian girls in the United Kingdom: male 
members value their culture of protecting modesty by means of restricting the girls’ 
freedom to choose how they want to live.130 This causes tremendous (and lethal) 
depressions among these women. In this sense, culture is not valued, not by these 
women. Now, a multiculturalist can say that this is merely a part of South-East Asian 
culture and that in general, their culture provides a meaningful framework for making 
life choices. But, that is revolting if that framework entails prompting suicide. Yes, 
specific practices are part of a culture, such as ritual slaughter, child marriage, drug 
use, consensual sex, promoting higher education and dodge ball. The sum of all 
practices, at best, asks for description, not prescription.  
 Multiculturalists, do acknowledge the fact that cultural frameworks can cause 
harm to members, and it would be a misrepresentation of multiculturalism to say that 
such acknowledgments do not exist. However, the general statement of, and the 
focus on, the value of culture as something good and worthy of our respect, stands. 
But valuing a ‘good’ practice does not cancel out a ‘bad’ practice for the sake of 
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maintaining coherence within the abstract concept of ‘culture’. Culture is not good, 
nor is it bad, specific practices and beliefs are good or bad. Love, good; anti-
Semitism, bad. Criminalising rape, good; pillaging, bad, and so forth.  
 Back to Sealandistan. If we follow multiculturalists we must conclude that both 
Blue- and Greenskin culture are good, because it offers the individual members a 
sense of belonging, it enables them to live according to their authentic heritage, 
creating an identity from which they make their life choices. Yet, not every member is 
happy. Some elderly Blueskins are unsatisfied and Greenskin animal rights activists 
are unhappy with their monthly feast of animal kicking. Moreover, both Green- and 
Blueskins are not convinced the other culture is good. In fact, generally speaking, 
both communities believe they themselves have a refined and joyous culture and that 
the other culture brings forth a malicious practice. (By the way, internal dissent is not 
appreciated, either.) They interchange debate with gnashing of teeth, wondering how 
to solve ethno-cultural tensions. Who is right? Who should change? And as the 
tension builds, more and more elderly and animals have an early meeting with their 
creator. A multiculturalist would not be able to help. Both cultures are merely 
considered good, a valuable framework for one’s identity, a moral anchor. But 
perhaps we are judging multiculturalism too soon. I will continue the analysis.  
 
2. Cultures are equal 
 
We now arrive at multiculturalist conclusion number 2: Cultures are equal. That is, 
cultures are not factually equal, but they are morally equal in the sense that cultures 
provide its bearers with equal value. No one’s culture is better than anyone else’s. In 
1996, for example, the Dutch cabinet send out the message that “the debate over 
multiculturalism must be conducted from the starting principle that cultures are of 
equal value”.131  
                                                          
131
 See also Caldwell, Christopher, Reflections on the revolution in Europe: can Europe be the same with 
different people in it?, London: Allen Lane 2009, p. 70.  
59 
 
 In Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique Of Multiculturalism (2001), 
philosopher Brian Barry (1936-2009) states it is logically impossible to recognize all 
cultures as equal. This is because cultures have, as he phrases it, ‘propositional 
content’: “It is an inevitable aspect of any culture that it will include some ideas to the 
effect that some beliefs are true and some false, and that some things are right and 
others wrong. The demand for cultural equality runs into conceptual problems of a 
kind that are not inherent in the demand that we should find equal value (or any value 
at all) in every cultural artefact such as a painting. This is, indeed, an absurdly 
inappropriate demand. But the reason is simply that, unless discriminations are 
made, ascribing value to something ceases to have any point.”132 Barry believes 
affirming everybody’s culture simultaneously is as tenable as stating: “everybody has 
won, and all must have prices.133 Or as Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori 
(1924) explains: “To attribute “equal value” to all cultures […] destroys the very notion 
of value. If everything is of value, nothing is of value: the value loses its content”.134  
 Truly, even multiculturalists draw the line of equality and value somewhere: 
the value of culture for minorities should be duly recognized by members of the 
majority; not doing so is a bad cultural trait and should be changed. Imposition of 
majority norms at the cost of authentic minority culture is bad. Being from a white 
majority and not or not rightly recognizing someone’s non-white minority identity is 
bad. It is arrogant, condescending, intolerant, and bordering on racist and 
discriminatory. Interestingly, this bad, or to some abhorrent, practice of non-
recognition is part of a culture, a culture which – if we assume the Herderian 
philosophy underlying multiculturalism to be correct – is important to its members, 
and is thus a source of good. This contradiction makes it difficult, if not impossible to 
found multiculturalism as a worthwhile ideology. That is, if non-recognition of minority 
culture is an inherent part of the (dominant) culture, why should we not respect that? 
                                                          
132
 Barry, Brian, Culture and equality: An egalitarian critique of Multiculturalism, Cambridge: Polity Press 2001, 
p. 270.  
133
 Barry 2001, pp. 270-271. 
134
 Sartori, Giovanni, Pluralismo, multiculturalistismo e estranei, Milano: Rizzoli 2000, in: Joppke 2004, p. 242. 
60 
 
Is multiculturalist theory in that sense not self-defeating? In a sense it is. If all cultures 
are different yet equal and are entitled to recognition, than the phenomenon of 
culturally-based nonrecognition of minorities should be respected. Because – the 
theory goes – even if it is accompanied by an abhorrent practice, culture deserves 
our admiration and respect. We should admire and respect the dominant culture, 
even though it supposedly imposes psychological harm on others by not naturally 
recognizing the worth of their minority cultures.  
 This contradiction might be lifted, if we adjust the maxim: members of minority 
cultures should be respected by members of the majority culture.135 Multiculturalist 
theory is about restoring a power imbalance which aims to contribute to peaceful 
coexistence of a plurality of peoples in one nation. Although formally multiculturalists 
state that all cultures are equal – or of equal value, the focus on respect for minority, 
by majority actually leads to the conclusion that “some cultures are more equal than 
others”. In no theory of multiculturalism is the act of recognition reciprocal.136 
Members of a majority culture, who are in a more powerful position (at least, that is 
the assumption), are not presented as individuals who may claim authenticity, but as 
humans who are expected to be able to do away with some of their cultural beliefs 
(e.g. reject the belief that refusing to shake a woman’s hand is unacceptable) and 
practices (e.g. giving leeway to the violation of animal rights in the case of ritual 
slaughter) in order to accommodate those for minority cultures. It also means that 
multiculturalist theorists present their audience with the moral instruction to hold their 
own culture against the light, while members of minority cultures have the moral right 
to keep their culture intact. The Euro-American dominant majority confronts their 
“own group” with a cultural critique (e.g. “you are descendants of slave 
owners/colonists/bystanders during the Nazi regime”), a critique which is not deemed 
to cause psychological damage. It is only members of minority cultures which are 
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allegedly susceptible to getting hurt. That conclusion, probably unintentionally, 
demonstrates the implicit superiority of the dominant culture; the power to change for 
the good and to show benevolence to members of minority groups, as Bruckner 
argues.  
 A cultural hegemony owes respect to minorities. This notion is incompatible 
with the notion of equality of cultures. The problem is that multiculturalists conflate 
equal worth with some worth.137 If cultures are considered equal, because they are 
equally valuable to its members, then all members of all cultures should be respected 
and cleared from interference. This also means that minority cultures may not 
adversely impact majority culture. That the content of culture, viz. the aggregate of 
individual member’s thought, creation and actions, is factually unequal, is 
unimportant to multiculturalists. It would make more sense if the claim would be: 
good culture is good, bad culture is bad, or even better: good practices are good, bad 
practices are bad, and some cultures have more good practices than others. Yet, if 
culture is good in general and all cultures are equal, then there can be no moral 
apartheid between cultures. That also means the end of the idea that members from 
one culture are expected to perform the act of accommodating, while others are 
entitled to receive cultural accommodation.  
 In Sealandistan, unfortunately, even though there is a degree of intermarriage 
and both groups are interspersed throughout the territory, both members of the 
Greenskins as the Blueskins encounter intercultural rivalry and suspicion. In other 
words, they are dealing with incompatible, or, at least, opposing visions of the good 
life and a good society, leaving both communities with the feeling of an environment 
in danger of existence.138 This is not uncommon. American political scientist Robert 
Putnam found that ethnic diversity tends to reduce social solidarity and social 
capital.139 This effect of several cultures co-existing with the feeling of an 
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environment in danger of existence is of the utmost importance to multiculturalists. 
Softening the feeling of cultural endangerment is even more important than the well-
being of the elderly or animal welfare. Multiculturalists are not likely to dive into 
ethical discussions on specific cultural practices, but call for respecting difference.  
 
3. Cultural differences are either good, but if not, they should at least be tolerated 
  
This leads us to conclusion number 3: Cultural differences are either good, but if not, 
they should at least be tolerated. 140 Every society recognizes difference. We socially 
recognize the young apart from the old, men apart from women, we notice skin 
colour, the successful, the beautiful, the ugly, the rich, the poor, and the psychically 
and mentally handicapped. Societies acknowledge relationships of marriage and 
kinship, and work with the difference between employer and employee status. Living 
a life means encountering differences galore. Sometimes we wish to exacerbate 
those differences, for instance by investing in an education, writing literature, train for 
a sports career, aiming to achieve something that will make us stand out (and be less 
equal to others). British philosopher Brian Barry argues that the fact of difference is 
universal and so is its social recognition. Yet, despite its universality, especially in 
contemporary western societies does differentiation tend to be more complex and 
more ‘optional’ than in traditional societies. Barry attributes this to our consumer ethic 
and the whole concept of lifestyle.141 For example, in Why the West is Best: A Muslim 
Apostate’s Defense of Liberal Democracy (2011), author Ibn Warraq tells about the 
day he took an Iraqi colleague to an American bookstore in New York to show him 
thousands and thousands of different magazines covering all different fields of 
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interest for the consumer.142 Individuals in modern societies can choose from a 
plethora of ideological convictions and can switch during their lifetime. The presence 
of so many options makes the act of choosing worthy of study itself.  
 Ethno-religious culture is one of many sources of differentiation. The analytical 
issue at stake is that multiculturalists embraced the fallacious reasoning of the 
is/ought problem: there is cultural pluralism, therefore there ought to be cultural 
pluralism, they believe. There is (descriptive) indeed a plurality of cultures within a 
nation, but that does not logically lead to the multiculturalist doctrine which prescribes 
a plurality of cultures.143 In fact, Kymlicka believes that “of course, the whole point of 
multiculturalism is to normalize diversity”,144 and other multiculturalists invoke cultural 
pluralism as their founding principle.145 Multiculturalist thinkers believe it is not 
enough to merely establish that something is different, but that it is good that there is 
plurality, whatever the content may be. In popular culture we notice that difference 
should be celebrated; we get told “if we were all the same the world would be a dull 
place” (imagine those poor monocultural African tribes not mixed with Asian 
homosexuals and Inuit).  
 The focus on plurality is actually an odd one in itself. The festive embrace of 
difference often regards cosmopolitan manifestations of culture. One can think of 
music festivals celebrating African music, enjoying an Indian curry, incorporating 
sarongs in one’s wardrobe. The celebration of difference in this sense is limited to 
music, food, dress and art. When members of cultural minorities, on the other hand, 
turn to practices beyond what can be “celebrated”, multiculturalists call for tolerance 
(or “an intercultural dialogue”146, which I consider a form of extended tolerance). An 
example is the Islamic call for prayer, the ‘muezzin’ calling from the top of a minaret 
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in neighbourhoods in European cities. This can be quite an intrusive sound, even 
annoying to some. Yet, multiculturalist thinking warrants people to be tolerant. Thus, 
when the practice under scrutiny or group reputation turns non-celebratory, it is 
respect for diversity that is required. When a practice performed by a minority is not 
appreciated by the “cultural hegemony”, multiculturalists call out on the value the 
practice has for those practicing it, for the sake of difference and in the name of 
equality. Multiculturalists lift the status of ethnical and/or religious minorities, and 
single its members out for their distinctness. It reminds us of the segregation of the 
races in the United States before the Supreme Court ruled Brown v. The Board of 
Education: ‘separate but equal’, but this time with a modern twist: ‘different, but 
equal’. American historian John Higham (1920 – 2003) finds praising plurality 
curious: “On the surface, one would think that the goal of equality would not be well 
served by highlighting or increasing differences among people. At least, we are 
entitled to some explanation of how an emphasis on differences of endowment will 
advance equality. To my knowledge none has been suggested by our 
multiculturalists.”147  
 Instead, it would be better if the concept of respecting culture would be 
replaced entirely by the ideal of keeping and improving good practices and getting rid 
of bad practices. This would of course require a standard of what we consider to be 
good and what we consider to be bad practices. Unfortunately, the chances of 
carrying out such a standard are frustrated by the multiculturalist embrace of diversity 
(non-intervention) and respect (attributing a positive connotation), often regardless of 
what that practice entails. Or, as British author Patrick West writes in The Poverty of 
Multiculturalism (2005): “We are commanded to respect all difference and anyone 
who disagrees shall be shouted down, silenced or slandered a racist. Everyone must 
be tolerant. And that’s an order.”148  
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 What Patrick West is trying to convey is that there is intolerance towards those 
who are assumed to be intolerant. Here we enter the realm of political correctness. 
Political correctness is defined as: “agreeing with the idea that people should be 
careful to not use language or behave in a way that could offend a particular group of 
people”, or “conforming to a belief that language and practices which could offend 
political sensibilities (as in matters of sex or race) should be eliminated”, according to 
dictionary Merriam Webster.149 It is considered a contentious term, and generally the 
label of being politically correct is imposed on people by their (political) opponents.150  
 Not doing or saying anything that another group might find offensive is not 
new. Every day and age in the world’s history has known issues that were silenced. 
Take for instance the Victorians, who were prudish about sex. Or any topic that 
seemed related to socialism in the fifties in the United States due to the threat of 
communism. However, as American sociologist Stan Gaede explains in When 
Tolerance is No Virtue (1993), today’s “PC” has no substance: it is intolerance itself 
that should not be tolerated: “Thus, although the politically correct would have a great 
deal of difficulty agreeing on what constitutes goodness and truth, they have no 
trouble at all agreeing that intolerance itself is wrong. Why? Because no one 
deserves to be offended.”151 Obviously, this position is logically untenable. As Gaede 
puts it: “If you are intolerant of someone who is intolerant, then you have necessarily 
violated your own principle. But if you tolerate those who are intolerant, you keep 
your principle but sacrifice your responsibility to the principle.”152 Nevertheless, 
tolerance can be a convenient norm in a society that is characterized by a plurality of 
norms and behaviour. In fact, tolerance would be redundant in a society where all 
humans act and believe the same.  
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 But is the definition of tolerance used correctly and consistently? I believe not. 
There has been a mix-up. Tolerance is not the same as approval. Nor is it 
indifference; there is an important distinction. For instance, one could not be 
bothered by a Hare Krisha neighbour. This is not “tolerating” another man’s religion; it 
merely means a person does not have any offsetting thoughts or emotions on the 
topic. Or, as American philosopher Brian Leiter (1963) formulates: 
 
“For there to be a practice of toleration, one group must deem another 
differing group’s beliefs or practices “wrong, mistaken, or undesirable”  
and yet “put up” with them nonetheless. That means that toleration is  
not at issue in cases where one group is simply indifferent to another.  
I do not “tolerate” my neighbors who are non-White or who are gay,  
because I am indifferent as to the race or sexual orientation of those in  
my community. “Toleration,” as an ideal, can only matter when one group 
actively concerns itself with what the other is doing, believing, or “being.”153  
 
The act of toleration is thus accompanied by the conviction that some belief or 
practice is wrong. The underlying premise of supporting the idea of tolerance is quite 
simple: many of the arguments trade, at bottom, on a simple idea: namely, that “[…] 
being able to choose what to believe and how to live […] makes for a better life. 
Being told what you must believe and how you must live, conversely, make lives 
worse.”154  
 Multiculturalism has departed from tolerance. Originally, tolerance is about not 
banning or outlawing a practice. Under multiculturalism, it has become about 
withholding judgement. It considers rejection, negative judgment or a lack of respect 
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as intolerance. To illustrate, take for example Parekh, who writes on whether minority 
cultures should conform to fundamental liberal values: “This amounts to saying that 
minority cultures should be respected only of they become liberal, an extreme form of 
intolerance that shows scant respect for their identity.”155 If we take the concepts of 
tolerance and intolerance correctly, however, rejecting – yet not interfering – a 
minority culture on the basis of being illiberal is a form of tolerance. Under tolerance, 
it is perfectly possible to not interfere in behaviour, for example the veiling of women 
in Islam, yet have an outspoken negative opinion on it: “I agree you have the right to 
demonstrate this behaviour, yet I advise against it and I hope you will choose 
otherwise.” This is not an act of intolerance, although multiculturalists would label it 
as such. Intolerance would entail taking steps to ban the practice, such as 
introducing legal penalties. Voicing disagreement while allowing a custom to carry on 
is, in fact, tolerance. If one does not disagree with a custom, we have to label non-
interference as approval or indifference, which tolerance empathically is not.  
 A problem arises when a cultural practice limits a person’s space to make 
choices. It is a classic problem that one’s freedom can limit another’s. One should 
think of John Stuart Mill’s famous Harm Principle. Considering both physical force in 
the form of legal penalties, as well as the moral coercion of public opinion, Mill writes 
that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member 
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”156 Toleration 
should end there where freedom is exerted to effectively cause harm to another 
individual. Thus, while the idea of tolerance is in essence laudable, it is not the 
obvious means when a practice is not merely perceived by outsiders as wrong, but 
also by those individuals undergoing it. Female genital mutilation and forced 
marriage are examples that illustrate the limits of the desirability of tolerance quite 
well. Interestingly, toleration also implies a power relationship. As Paul Cliteur states: 
“Tolerance is about putting up with something that people can also refuse to put up 
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with. That means that tolerance always implies the superior power of the tolerant one 
over the one whose practice is tolerated.”157  
 In her book Infidel (2006), Somali-born Dutch political scientist Ayaan Hirsi Ali 
describes multiculturalism and tolerance in action. In their attempts not to come 
across as intolerant people, the Dutch offered Muslims to maintain their communal 
identity by granting them Islamic schools, subsidies for Muslim organizations, all 
according to the general ‘live and let live’ principle. The idea behind this was that 
immigrants needed self-respect and that that was to be found in a strong feeling of 
communal belonging. Forcing Muslims to integrate Dutch norms and values was 
considered to be in breach of precisely those Dutch norms and values; in short, 
people should be granted the freedom to believe and act the way they pleased. The 
Dutch took on this mentality because they wanted to be good people. Like Pascal 
Bruckner, she finds that there was a sense of guilt stemming from the colonial past in 
Indonesia and from the way they looked away when the Nazi’s brought a relatively 
large percentage of Jews to death compared to elsewhere in Europe. But also, as 
Hirsi Ali argues, because enabling immigrants to live a separate lifestyle would 
enable the Dutch to not actually having to have to live with immigrants. Charity 
bought the ability to look away. “Paying and looking the other side – that is the 
current definition of tolerance.” The result was that immigrants did live separated 
from the Dutch, went to school separated, and led separated lives. There were no 
children of Dutch descent in Muslim schools. The little girls were veiled and 
separated from the boys during prayers and gym classes. The children were not 
encouraged to ask questions or to be creative. They were taught to be obedient and 
keep a distance from unbelievers. This political empathy with immigrants allowed 
cruelty to continue. Thousands of Dutch Muslim women and children were 
systematically abused – there was no denying in that. Little girls were genitally 
mutilated on kitchen tables, and young women who fell in love with someone of their 
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own liking were beaten half to death or even murdered.158 The suffering of these 
women was indescribable, Hirsi Ali writes. She observes that the Dutch are 
sympathetic to the fate of those suffering all over the world, are active in the United 
Nations and collect money and goods for global charity. Yet, they refuse to 
acknowledge the silent suffering of those women and children living in their own 
streets. Hirsi Ali concludes that this multiculturalism, that is respecting the ways of 
immigrants from other cultures, simply did not work. It meant the denial of basic 
rights for women and children. There were many people who refused to learn the 
Dutch language, and who consciously refuted Dutch values of tolerance and 
personal liberty. They married people from the villages they came from and 
continued living in their own world while living in the Netherlands.159 The Dutch hope 
was that if Muslims would be allowed to live according to their own customs, 
segregated from the rest, they would integrate best.160  
 We must conclude that, apparently, multiculturalists do not consider it their 
métier to answer the question where to draw the line between tolerable and 
intolerable practices, and what moral and pragmatic standard should be used in 
deciding.  
 Problematic is that the moral conviction that intolerance is deemed as morally 
suspect as racism and discrimination (according to a multiculturalists the worst 
beliefs and behaviour, more abject than bad cultural practices causing harm to fellow 
community members). This coheres with a third option when dealing with difference. 
Next to celebration and tolerance, is non-judgmentalism. When members of 
multiculturalist minorities demonstrate behaviour that is flat out harmful and 
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dangerous (in academic literature referred to by the euphemist ‘illiberal’) to other 
members, such as honour-based violence, multiculturalists turn silent.161  
 Rumy Hasan points to the multiculturalists’ (laudable) goal of fighting racism. 
That is why, he states, there is a belief that cultural differences are deemed to be 
respected, and, unfortunately and erroneously leads to downplaying any problems 
within a minority culture. The fear is that criticising aspects can accentuate negative 
stereotyping and “[…] give the green light to further racist slanders and attacks.”162  
 Thus, multiculturalists maintain that culture is good. When it becomes painfully 
obvious it is not, proponents of the multiculturalist ideology are analytically 
challenged. Does the tension perhaps exist because multiculturalism “by definition 
makes a fetish of cultures?”, Ophelia Benson and Jeremy Stangroom wonder in 
Does God Hate Women? (2009). In order to maintain an overly positive attitude 
towards culture one must treat a culture as monolithic. “As soon as you admit that 
cultures have internal dissent and disagreement and nonconformity, the whole idea 
of protecting or deferring to particular ‘cultures’ breaks into incoherence”, Benson and 
Stangroom say.163 It makes sense. The idea of protecting and thereby perpetuating 
minority cultures stems from the assumption that the individuals who form the group 
share that wish. If there is internal dissent, multiculturalists regress into vagueness, 
and demonstrate the inability to take sides. The best multiculturalists have on offer is 
making general statements that cultural practices should be in accordance with 
human rights.  
 When invited to “pass a verdict” if confronted with a “different” custom, it is not 
uncommon for multiculturalists to fall prey to relativism. Relativism is best defined by 
listing the following claims taken from James Rachels’ The Elements of Moral 
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Philosophy (2003). It is originally based on the anthropologists’ line of approach. 
First, relativists claim that different societies have different moral codes. Second, that 
what is right within a society is determined by the moral code of that society. That 
means that if the moral code of a society says that a certain action is right, then that 
action is right, at least within that society. Third, there is no objective standard we can 
resort to to judge the moral code of one society better or worse than another’s. 
Fourth, our own society’s moral code is merely one among many, it has no special 
status. Fifth, there is no such thing as a “universal truth” in ethics. By that is meant 
that there are no moral truths that hold for all people at all times. Lastly, trying to 
judge the conduct of other peoples is an act of mere arrogance, an act of “cultural 
chauvinism”. We should therefore adopt an attitude of tolerance when we consider 
the practices of other cultures.164 Cultural relativism is tied to moral relativism. That 
can be descriptive: “some human beings have fundamentally different moral 
standards and values”. There is also normative moral relativism: “For individuals or 
groups with divergent moral frameworks, when their moral differences cannot be 
rationally resolved they should not judge the moral behavior of each other nor act 
toward each other in such a way as to attempt to bring one side into conformity with 
the standards of the other.”165 Not good, not bad, but different. This is the category 
that multiculturalists embrace. 
 The consequences of accepting the doctrine of cultural relativism is that we 
can no longer state that the practices of another society are inferior (or superior) to 
our own. We can also no longer criticize our own culture, as there is no universal 
standard to judge our practices with. We can merely establish the fact that certain 
practices occur in our society and that things are done differently elsewhere, as there 
is no universal standard to decide what is right and what is wrong. And thus 
differences are good, or should at least be tolerated.  
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 Connected to relativism is post-modernism, an intellectual trend still not 
abandoned by academics, nor by other intellectual or media elites, and a trend which 
has seeped through in wide popular convictions. Haideh Moghissi (1944), who 
authored Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Limits of Postmodern Analysis 
(1999), lists the characteristics of postmodernism. I cite her list in its entirety: 
 
 “The disenchantment with the foundation of modern social thought, with 
Western modernity, and the demystification of scientific objectivity and 
objective knowledge; 
 The emphasis on narratives and the rejection of metanarratives and grand 
theories; 
 Suspicion of classical notions of reason, truth, universal progress, and the 
rejection of the idea of the existence of a hidden essential meaning and 
direction in history, with the emphasis, instead on discontinuity, difference and 
the celebration of the ‘local’; 
 The concern over representations of the ‘Other’, both imagined and real, and 
over the process of marginalization of Others; 
 An absorption with language and the study of discourse as ways of thinking 
and speaking which reflect the distribution of power in society; 
 An engagement with questions of sexuality as a historical construct and with 
sexual diversity and difference; 
 A preoccupation with identity and with the notion of identity as a choice not a 
destiny; 
 A mistrust of power; 
 An awareness that the way things are and are done is not the only way and 
that all beliefs and knowledge are cultural constructs, and hence contingent 
and conversable.”166 
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To give an idea what postmodern literature looks like, consider this example. Nick 
Cohen, British journalist and author of What’s Left (2007), illustrates postmodernist 
writing (in an almost hilarious way), when he argues in favor of clearer writing. He 
cites one sentence written by Judith Butler, a famous feminist (“acclaimed by her 
fellow theorists as one of the most significant thinkers in America”). It goes like this:  
 
“The move from a structuralist account in which capital is understood to structure 
social relations in relatively homologous ways to a view of hegemony in which power 
relations are subject to repetition, convergence and rearticulation brought to the 
question of temporality into the thinking of structure, and marked a shift from a form 
of Althusserian theory that takes structural totalities as theoretical objects to one in 
which the insights into the contingent possibility of structure inaugurate a renewed 
conception of hegemony as bound up with the contingent sites and strategies of the 
rearticulation of power.”167 
 
Emerita professor of psychology and women’s studies Phyllis Chesler formulates the 
problem of postmodernism as well in The Death of Feminism (2006): “For years now, 
academics have pretended that brilliance and originality can best be conveyed in a 
secret. Mandarin language that absolutely no one, including themselves, can 
possibly understand. In my view, this obfuscation of language has been employed to 
hide a considerable lack of brilliance and originality and to avoid the consequences of 
making oneself clear.”168 
 Postmodernism, like cultural relativism, promotes a celebration of cultural 
difference and rejects an emphasis on universal human rights. Moghissi sees 
common ground between postmodernists and Islamic fundamentalists. Both share an 
“[…] unremitting hostility to the social, cultural and political processes of change and 
                                                          
167
 Cohen, Nick, What’s Left? How the Left Has Lost Its Way, London: Harper Perennial 2007, p. 100. 
168
 Chesler, Phyllis, The Death of Feminism, New York: Palgrave MacMillan 2006, p .18. 
74 
 
knowledge and rationality, originating in the west, known as modernity.”169 
Multiculturalists share the postmodern reluctance for cultural change. That is why 
“differences” have to be “tolerated”, so that members from minority groups do not 
have to succumb to the “imposition” of majority norms and practices. This leads us to 
the fourth conclusion.  
 
4. Minority cultures must not be criticized by the dominant culture which has the 
 positive obligation to preserve minority cultures. 
 
Haideh Moghissi writes that some scholars are suffering from the “Lawrence of 
Arabia syndrome”. They hold on to lower moral expectations when analyzing “simpler 
societies”. This leads to a situation where intellectuals rise to defend practices, even 
when activists and intellectuals in are crying out in countries elsewhere. “The 
condition of “the Lawrence of Arabia syndrome” leads Western scholars to leap to the 
defense of any and all aspects of the foreign cultures they study, especially third-
world societies, even if this means defending conduct they would never tolerate in 
their own country and even if it means ignoring or criticizing intellectuals from the 
societies they study who condemn the very things they defend.”170 For instance, in 
the multiculturalist debate, multiculturalist intelligentsia in the West craft an image of 
Muslim women with depicting them as “[…] empowered, militant, and dignified 
citizens with a firmly integrated sense of self.”171 
 Yet, Muslim women in Europe do not always have the “agency” that is 
projected upon them. Nor always the lack of it, either. But what matters here is that 
multiculturalists use the “agency-argument” to shelve their judgment. Instead of 
condemning acts that would never be allowed in the Euro-American culture, 
multiculturalists focus on the liberty to choose. A good example is Parekh’s defense 
of clitoridectomy (also known as female genital mutilation). Although the UK 
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government criminalized it in 1985, Parekh focuses on those adults freely undergoing 
it and the benefits it has for these women.172 But regardless of membership of a 
culture is coerced, maintained under pressure or freely chosen, it is very well 
possible to pass judgment nonetheless. To some, this seems like a wild statement, 
but it really is not. The point is that the fact that someone does something out of free 
will by no means implies we should forsake public judgment. Especially not if the 
debate concerns rites considered unacceptable for members of the majority culture 
and when members from the minority culture vehemently protest against it. Criticism 
and rejection is then perfectly warranted.  
 However, Charles Taylor writes: “[A]ll should enjoy the presumption that their 
traditional culture has value”,173 and “cultures […] are almost certain to have 
something that deserves our admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied by 
much that we have to abhor and reject.” That it is better to withhold negative 
judgment when it comes to bad ideas and practices is not explicated by 
multiculturalists as such. Yet, negative judgment logically falls under the header of 
non-recognition. Moreover, Parekh steers in that direction by stating that the basic 
concern underlying political correctness – which he would like to rename ‘political 
decency’ – is valid. “It represents a protest against stigmatization, intended or 
unintended humiliation, subtle and crude ways of keeping others in their place, 
triggering their painful personal and collective memories, and perpetuating 
inequalities of power and esteem. Forms of expression and modes of address are 
never politically and culturally innocent”.174  
 Multiculturalist discourse consists of a subset of terminology. This discourse is 
identified through terms as equality, dignity, respect, recognition, difference, 
tolerance, agency, inclusion – all good. Insensitive, arrogance, superiority, 
oppression, racism, discrimination, dominance, supremacy, exclusion – all bad. Even 
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unintended humiliation should be carefully avoided in order not to cripple people with 
self-hatred.  
 This principled intellectual ‘laissez-faire’ when it comes to abhorrent practices 
is connected to the ideal of multiculturalism. In his Multiculturalism. Some 
Inconvenient Truths (2010), British scholar Rumy Hasan describes a ‘soft’ form of 
multiculturalism in the United Kingdom, which started to take shape in the 1980s. In 
the modern Western context multiculturalism is understood to mean the prevalence 
of ‘minority’ cultures – mainly the cultures of ethnic and racial minority settlers – 
alongside the culture of what Hasan labels the ‘indigenous majority’. The key aspect 
is ‘difference’ from the dominant culture, “[…] and it is the tolerance and acceptance 
of this difference that lies at the core of multiculturalism’s policy prescriptions.” 
Paramount to this ‘soft’ multiculturalism is not so much legal exceptions or state 
subsidies, but instead a non-interventionist approach on behalf of local and national 
government.175  
 Hasan identifies two groups of theorists, commentators and activists who 
endorse multiculturalism. Firstly, there are white liberals and progressives who 
oppose western imperialism, colonialism, and dominance over non-white peoples 
(amongst the most influential of these are Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor, and others). 
Secondly, there are those originating from ethnic minorities, who Hasan collectively 
describes as ‘cultural nationalists’. The most prominent ones are Bhikhu Parekh and 
Tariq Modood. What unites these groups is a commitment to anti-racism and anti-
discrimination. Both groups fail to apply strong critiques against ethnic, religious and 
cultural minorities. The doctrine of “live and let live” is founded upon the notion of 
recognition of and respect for difference.176 There is however, one exception. That is: 
relativists condemn judging. That means that if someone condemns a practice, a 
relativist would condemn that condemning. The act of condemning condemnation is 
not that overt. It usually entails stating that moral indignation is ‘intolerant’, even 
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though, as shown above, moral indignation is constitutive of toleration. It also invokes 
all sorts of relativist arguments. Multiculturalists value difference as an asset in itself, 
rather than determining the merits and demerits of specific practices and behavior. It 
is unclear why the jump from factual difference needs to be made to appreciate 
factual difference. This attitude can only be maintained by not being specific.177 That 
is because the moment a specific practice (e.g. full face veiling, ritual slaughter, 
radicalization of youths) needs to be evaluated, a general positive attitude is 
insufficient. Relativism calls the idea of moral progress into doubt.178 
 Let us return to the case of Sealandistan. In Sealandistan, the two 
communities are equal in size. If we would alter the case a bit, making the Blueskins 
– where animals have a better future than the elderly – the hegemonic community. 
Traditionally, the elderly are fed a lethal pill by their relatives after their 90th birthday, 
to prevent suffering. People are free to criticize this custom and it is likely that the 
tradition will perish in the process of modernization. This is because change in a 
hegemonic community is either not considered to have adverse psychological 
effects, or people are just expected to deal with stress induced by change. On the 
other hand, the minority Greenskin feast of animal kicking must be respected, so the 
Blueskin intellectual elite believes. Even moral rejection of the practice is considered 
“intolerant”. A national debate on the (de)merits of this monthly happening might 
cause tension within the nation, the multiculturalists fear. Even more, those wanting 
to address the issue are consistently portrayed as racists, as “not all Greenskins 
celebrate the feast”. Even though some Greenskins themselves indeed fiercely 
oppose the practice – some even dispute that it is a part of their traditional cultural 
heritage, Blueskin multiculturalist philosophers have embraced the notion that for 
Greenskins it is important that their minority cultural identity is recognized. Moreover, 
those few Greenskin public intellectuals criticizing the practice have been shunned 
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from the community, and Blueskins therefore do not accept them as noteworthy 
representatives anymore. They do listen to Greenskin leaders who say that racism 
and discrimination are the underlying motives for critiquing the lack of animal welfare. 
The Parliament of Sealandistan has decided animal welfare laws do not apply to 
Greenskins and has agreed to subsidize the feast. Some Blueskins actually 
participate, as they want to celebrate diversity.179 Nonetheless, for most – non-elite – 
Blueskins, this ‘feast’ is unacceptable. Every month, the squares of Sealandistan 
colour red with animal blood, new generations are continuingly indoctrinated with this 
horrible custom, and the police has difficulty controlling the protests of animal rights 
activists demanding that animals be replaced by piñata’s. However, the nation 
continues allowing the feast as Greenskins are considered to need their minority 
culture for a sense of self-worth and it is believed that their sense of belonging largely 
depends on the feast. Not intervening in the monthly animal kicking avoids societal 
tensions, the argument goes. Also, some are worried that abolishing the practice 
might drive the tradition underground, making it impossible to exert some control of 
the event at all.  
 Now we reverse the situation. This time Greenskins make up the dominant 
majority. Under the influence of modernity, the feast of animal kicking has been 
altered. Children now dress up as their favourite animal, and no kicking is involved. 
The Greenskins are proud of their ability to progress morally. Although, it did make 
some members of the older generation a bit grumpy. They feel Sealandistan was 
better in the old days, when people did not give up on their traditions under the 
pressure of something as futile as “animal welfare”. They miss the old days, hanging 
around with family and friends, kicking animals to death in happy harmony. Some are 
even a bit lonely, reminiscing about the days that were.  
 But, at least they do not have to worry about being slipped a lethal pill after the 
age of 90, a practice common under the Blueskins. This cultural minority traditionally 
“takes care” of its elderly in a way that revolts the Greenskins. The Blueskins, 
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however, do not see anything wrong with this practice. They celebrate life 
passionately, and it helps them to know they will not be left to suffer, old and 
forgotten. Nope, ninety is a beautiful age. Who would want to be older than that, 
anyway? Moreover, the funerals are truly festive, with people coming together in 
beautiful traditional dress, singing old Blueskin songs. Blueskin community leaders 
state that the ‘90 Pill’-tradition is an “act of true love”. However, not all Blueskins 
value the practice. Slowly, but surely, modernity is entering the community. More and 
more, elderly are coming forward saying they do not want other people deciding for 
them when to go. Parents and children are learning to make clear arrangements on 
the basis of mutual consent. But there is still a long way to go. Change takes time, 
and the (subsidized) community leaders are not willing to give up yet. In the 
meantime, Blueskin intellectuals hope to speed up the process of modernity by 
calling for legal penalties for this “act of murder” of their elderly. Because, as it is 
now, the ‘90 Pill’-tradition is exempted for murder from the Sealandistan penal code. 
These intellectuals, however, are in a double bind: not only are they loathed in their 
own community, they are also ignored by the Greenskin elite, as the latter see them 
as obnoxious troublemakers. In addition, the politically correct intelligentsia believe 
that it is important for the well-being of the minority of Blueskins to be respected and 
recognized in their cultural identity, even if that entails tolerating a practice they find 
revolting. Some even take great pride in not succumbing to the increasing pressure 
to abolish the ‘90 Pill’-tradition, and revere their broadmindedness. But others are 
willing to meet the critics halfway, and suggest to up the age to 95. They are 
concerned that banning the practice entirely might endanger the culture of Blueskins 
and will cause social tensions. Moreover, the Greenskins believe legislating against 
the practice is counterproductive, as they think it will frustrate the natural process of 
letting go of the tradition within the Blueskin community. This debate has been 
lingering for quite some time. In the meantime, many elderly are put to rest, even if 
they had many years to go still.  
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   We return to reality. What this case obviously lacks, is the universalist position 
that kicking animals to death for fun or terminating the lives of healthy elderly without 
consent are practices one should judge as harmful and not to be tolerated. No matter 
what individuals state is valuable to their sense of communal belonging. From the 
doctrine of multiculturalism, however, there are three responses to the feast of animal 
kicking and the ‘90 Pill’-tradition: celebration, tolerance, and relativism (non-
judgmentalism). This is because multiculturalists conclude from the idea that culture 
or cultural heritage is vital to one’s identity (which, as I stated above, is not 
necessarily the case), that minority cultures need to be free from criticism and 
preserved. Kymlicka states that a larger and political, institutionalized structure is 
needed to preserve minority culture and protect it against the homogenizing forces of 
the majority culture within a state. He writes: “People make choices about the social 
practices around them, based on their beliefs about the value of these practices 
(beliefs which, I have noted, may be wrong)180. And to have a belief about the value 
of a practice is, in the first instance, a matter of understanding the meanings attached 
to it by our culture.”181 Each individual needs to feel a sense of security from the 
cultural framework(s) from which he makes his choices, Kymlicka argues.182  
 An alternative to this “intellectual laissez-faire is provided by 19th century 
philosopher John Stuart Mill. In his article ‘Mill and the Value of Moral Distress’, 
Jeremy Waldron takes the position that moral distress is actually positive, and not a 
form of harm that Mill would not admit. This means that the feeling of being disturbed 
by the simple knowledge that lifestyles are practiced or opinions held which are taken 
to be immoral, is not harmful, but contributes to social progress.183 Moral distress 
should thus not be suppressed, but ventilated. Mill’s treatise involved, inter alia, the 
question what the limits of the power that can be legitimately exercised by society 
over the individual are. But even more so, it was an argument for free speech. Mill 
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thought of free speech not merely as an end, but as a means for social and moral 
progress. 
  Now, one could easily argue that being disturbed by someone else’s lifestyle is 
something that should be kept private and ignored. Mill, though, was convinced that 
when widespread moral distress is detectable in the community, then – other than 
taking it is a ground for interference – that is a positive and healthy sign that the 
processes of “ethical confrontation” are taking place.184 Ethical confrontation, as 
Waldron defines it, is “[…] the open clash between earnestly-held ideals and opinions 
about the nature and basis of the good life. Ethical confrontation should be 
understood to include conflicts on all sorts of issues – moral, philosophical, political 
and religious – and to range from verbal debate on the one hand to the 
demonstration and flaunting of the substance of rival lifestyles on the other.”185 If 
there is no ethical confrontation than that would be alarming evidence that we are 
failing in our task to keep our society progressive. How so? Because, first, it 
contributes to the emergence of new and better ideas: “[…] brand new ideas do not 
spring up ready-formed in the minds of their proponents; they emerge as it were 
phoenix-like from ‘the collision of adverse opinions’ in the antagonism of open debate 
and confrontation.”186 The second argument does not relate to ideas themselves, 
Waldron continues, but to the way in which they are held.  
 
 “According to Mill, progress is empty and the truth about the 
 good life not worth pursuing, if the views that result are not  
 held in a lively and committed spirit with a full awareness of  
 their meaning and significance for human life and action.  
 When ideas and lifestyles clash in open debate, each is put  
 on its mettle, and its adherents are required continually to  
 reassert and therefore to re-examine the content and grounds  
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 of their views. No view, however popular, can afford to take  
 its pre-eminence for granted in an atmosphere of open  
 controversy; each person will take his view seriously and  
 be made acutely aware in the course of the debate of all  
 its implications for his life and practice. So, if a given creed 
 has anything to offer, ethical confrontation will bring it out;  
 and if it has darker, hidden implications, those too in the course  
 of earnest and committed debate about its desirability.”187  
 
Moreover, involvement in ethical confrontation, Mill believed, benefited humans both 
morally and intellectually. That is partly a matter of “[…] the development of a certain 
sort of open-mindedness – the open-mindedness that results when each man is 
intellectually alert to the possibility of criticism and cares passionately about its 
adequate rebuttal.” The existence of clashing opinions is the only explanation of the 
progressive character of western civilization.  
 If anything, Waldron submits, these arguments suggest the rethinking of moral 
offence and distress. Ethical confrontation stimulates progress and improves people 
morally and intellectually. But it is not a painless affair; if one takes its views 
seriously, it hurts to be contradicted and it distresses to see lifestyles that contradict 
one’s grounds. Colliding opinions naturally disturb people. However, “[i]f nobody is 
disturbed, distressed, or hurt in this way, that is a sign that ethical confrontation is 
not taking place, and that in turn, as we have seen, is a sign that the intellectual life 
and progress of our civilization may be grinding to a halt.”188 So, if moral progress of 
humans and civilization at large depend on the collision and confrontation between 
opposing views of the good life, then the last thing that we should want is that 
individuals keep their opinions silent when it comes to opposing ideas and lifestyles. 
Mill is thus calling for a public confrontation between practicing adherents of rival 
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and antagonistic ethics. Otherwise, he believed, ‘the calmer and more 
dispassionate bystander’ will not be reached and the benefits to society will not be 
realized.189 To conclude, a progressive person has no interest in avoiding the 
“distress occasioned by contradiction or the pain and shock of forceful debate”.190 
From a Millean perspective, Blueskins and Greenskins must debate the issues at 
stake. The fact that that leads to distress and tension is uncomfortable, yes, but it is 
also a sign that there is a need for debate. Avoiding it wanting to alleviate tensions 
will not work.  
 A multiculturalist does not share this view. The idea is that 1) respect for the 
individual is held high, 2) the personality of the individual can only develop truly in 
terms of his cultural heritage, and that therefore respect for the cultures of differing 
cultural groups is equally important as respect for the individual. This conclusion is 
not sound. Ethno-cultural groups can very well limit the ability to “choose life options”. 
A community of people sharing a heritage is not only a source of good, but can be 
forced to continue to exist by powerful community leaders. The value of the 
community is placed above all other value, crushing individual aspirations and 
freedoms.191 Some people leave such suffocating communities. These are people 
who have been raised into a group culture and decided later in life to choose a 
lifestyle diverting from the one they were born into. In fact, many people alter the 
‘culture’ they grew up in, and every generation develops in a slightly different way 
from the one before.  
 Moreover, we should adopt a critical attitude towards our own personal identity 
and heritage. Besides, it is perfectly possible to respect an individual while 
questioning and criticizing his cultural heritage and wanting him to adopt certain 
norms, beliefs and practices. In fact, through art, literature, debate, education or 
mere conversation people address injustices and promote ideals. If we look back to 
our history, we notice the phenomenal, unprecedented, change in for instance 
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technology, medicine, emancipation, literacy, equal access to institutions, and more, 
in just three generations. If there would have been an influential force imposing 
cultural stagnation throughout the past hundred years, we would still have census 
suffrage, common illiteracy, no women in public functions, and moreover, no I-phone, 
to name a few elements of the past. We would still believe homosexuality is a 
punishable sin and that women should be fired from their jobs the moment they are 
pregnant. Critiquing cultural beliefs and practices is a common everyday exercise. 
Wanting to improve society (and even being conservative is striving to improve 
society by stopping progressives) is even the primary goal of education and debate. 
It is why individuals create medicine, restore buildings, and vote for parliament. It is 
why people write and read books, give and go to lectures.  
 In short, even if we were to accept that culture is important for one’s identity 
and that non-recognition constitutes psychological harm, then still it is not a logical 
conclusion that cultural practices and beliefs should be maintained through respect or 
tolerance. It is very well possible to acknowledge culture as an identity marker and 
that non-recognition causes distress, but still believe that all practices and beliefs are 
up for debate and change.  
 Let us bring back “John” to illustrate this. This time, John is an immigrant from 
Mali, from the Dogon people. He left his home country in exchange for Germany in 
hope of a better future. John is shocked when he encounters Germany and German 
culture. It is all about work, work, work and the people are so serious, and seriously 
dull. Also, the weather is horrible. Germans in general do not seem to have a 
particular interest in his culture. He becomes depressed, as he realizes fitting in will 
be harder than anything he could have ever imagined. Together with other Dogons, 
he retreats into his cultural roots. Now, we can easily give in to the idea that John’s 
Dogon culture provides him with an identity, and that it depresses him nobody is 
interested in that (non-recognition caused him psychological harm). However, there 
is no indication that this should result in publically not-judging Dogon cultural beliefs 
and practices and that Dogon culture in Germany should be preserved (for instance 
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by granting subsidies or halting critiques). Especially since other Dogon individuals 
have made tremendous and successful efforts into integrating in Germany. John 
could have also invested in the German culture and language, and gradually become 
more accustomed. If for John, the culture shock is so big he is not able to recuperate, 
then still the logical consequence is not preserving his minority culture. At most, it 
means he should be helped through the process of integration, not screened from it. 
In other words, there are no strong arguments for praising a morale where the 
cultural hegemony is constantly testing its own values and practices and bringing 
them up to date, while at the same time ignoring minority practices and beliefs or 
stating those are fine just the way they are. It is not very respectful of the individual, 
to say the least.    
 Why then the call for preservation? One reason for the call for preservation is 
the concern that a given community may go extinct . This is not a form of genocide, 
but the idea that a group’s distinct ethno-culture over the generations dissipates and 
disintegrates into mainstream culture. The loss of language, for instance, or 
intermarriage leads to extinction. In the world’s history, many cultures have ceased to 
exist at a given point. One can think of the Ancient Greek, Romans, Inca’s, and 
Maya’s. But even nowadays cultures are going extinct, for instance, the Alyutors (25 
members left), the Kamasins (2 members left) and the Kerek (4 members left), all 
peoples endangered with assimilation into the Russian population.192 Their children 
are more likely to feel in tune with a Russian identity than their grandparents. For 
multiculturalists who believe ethnicity is a defining marker of mental well-being, this 
process of going extinct must be stopped. As Dutch legal philosopher Paul Cliteur 
(1955 -) writes:  
 
“Ethnic multiculturalists often complain about cultures vanishing  
without rendering account of why that has happened. Or rather:  
they suggest the disappearance has something to do with dark 
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machinations such as colonialism, imperialism or its sublimated 
version: universalism. But is it not possible that cultures vanish because  
people turn away from them – completely voluntary? Sometimes,  
humans simply leave an identity behind, like a snake losing its skin.  
Why should we not accept that as a fact of life?”193  
 
The position that it is not unacceptable that cultures go extinct is emphasized when 
we acknowledge that tight-knit communities exert pressure on individuals not to 
integrate within the dominant culture. One can think of gossip, social control, 
ostracizing, or violence, not excluding murder. Then, being a member of an ethno-
cultural/religious minority is not beneficial to the freedom of choosing life options, but 
a restriction. Susan Moller Okin, author of the famous essay ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad 
for Women?’ wrote: “In the case of a more patriarchal minority culture in the context 
of a less patriarchal majority culture, no argument can be made on the basis of self-
respect or freedom that the female members of the culture have a clear interest in its 
preservation. Indeed, they may be much better off if the culture into which they were 
born were either to become extinct (so that its members would become integrated 
into the less sexist surrounding culture) or, preferably, to be encouraged to alter itself 
so as to reinforce the equality of women—at least to the degree to which this is 
upheld in the majority culture.”194 But, as British scholar Rumy Hasan correctly points 
out, boys and young men do not escape cultural and religious coercion: “[…] for they 
are also forced to pray, to wear 'traditional' forms of dress, for Muslims, to fast during 
the month of Ramzaan, for Sikhs to wear a turban, grow 'religious' beards, etc.”195 
 Individuals who wish to make themselves loose from their heritage, are guided 
back by two forces: people from their own community (family members, neighbours, 
community elders) and multiculturalists, who maintain that one’s background 
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determines identity. To suggest a minority has the moral and legal right to be 
preserved – by not-judging, subsidizing, exempting from laws – and justifying that 
process by calling on a psychological need to belong to a minority community or 
‘authenticity’, makes no sense. It also implies wanting to preserve a culture that is 
withering away because its members are in the process of relinquishing their heritage 
voluntarily. In addition, preserving a minority culture is an artificial process. The 
following will make that clear.  
 The question that arises when asking how to preserve a minority culture is: 
culture at which stage? Hypothetically, if we would want to preserve an Afghan 
minority culture in France, we have to ask which version. If we choose the Afghani 
1970s, we can leave the burkas, as women wore mini-skirts and went to university. If 
we would like to preserve contemporary Afghan culture, we should subsidize a 
French Taliban. Preservation in the form of subsidies, but also halting debates on 
cultural beliefs or practices from the basis of “respecting differences” implies taking a 
“[…] favored ‘snapshot’ version of it, and insist that this version must persist at all 
costs, in its defined purity, irrespective of the surrounding social, economic, and 
political circumstances.”196 Members of minority groups are subsequently 
encouraged, morally, politically and institutionally, to hold on to their traditional 
culture. But all cultures develop under the influence of globalization, international 
trade, consumerism, technology, Hollywood entertainment, internet, mass migration, 
in short: we live in a world of cultural exchange. Jeremy Waldron explains: 
 
“In this context, to immerse oneself in the traditional practices of,  
say, an aboriginal culture might be a fascinating anthropological  
experiment, but it involves an artificial dislocation from what actually  
is going on in the world. That it is an artifice is evidenced by the fact  
that such immersion often requires special subsidization and extraordinary 
provision by those who live in the real world, where cultures and practices  
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are not so sealed off from one another. The charge, in other words, is one  
of inauthenticity. 
 Let me state it provocatively. From a cosmopolitan point of view, 
immersion in the traditions of a particular community in the modern  
world is like living in Disneyland and thinking that one's surroundings 
epitomize what it is for a culture really to exist. Worse still, it is like  
demanding the funds to live in Disneyland and the protection of modern  
society for the boundaries of Disneyland, while still managing to convince 
oneself that what happens inside Disneyland is all there is to an adequate  
and fulfilling life. It is like thinking that what every person most deeply  
needs is for one of the Magic Kingdoms to provide a framework for her  
choices and her beliefs, completely neglecting the fact that the framework  
of Disneyland depends on commitments, structures, and infrastructures 
that far outstrip the character of any particular facade. It is to imagine that 
one could belong to Disneyland while professing complete indifference  
towards, or even disdain for, Los Angeles.”197  
 
Multiculturalism is about maintaining the status quo, regardless of what that status at 
that moment is. It can be compared with sitting on a train which chooses its own 
destiny, describing the landscape as it passes by, stating at any given moment that 
that is the way the landscape should look like. But as the train passes, the landscape 
changes. This is not problematic when a traditional culture entails art, dress, 
language, food and dance, in other words, when one embraces a “[…] a sanitized 
conception of cultural identity, blind to the ways it can be illiberal, distorted by social 
relations of domination, exclusion, and misrecognition.”198 It does become a problem 
when harmful customs and beliefs are perpetuated, even though a part of the 
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community no longer subscribes to those. Then the train should be sent in another 
direction.  
 Whereas Charles Taylor, with his politics of difference, is steering in the 
direction of “the equivalent of an endangered species act for human beings”, in the 
words of American legal scholar Stanley Fish (1938), Parekh is open to cultural 
change.199 Parekh addresses the problem of bad customs, yet believes that 
members of the cultural hegemony should not interfere: as I stated earlier, he 
believes that culture can be best changed from within, as well as through a process 
of “cultural dialogue” or “intercultural dialogue”.200 The ideal is that a sense of societal 
belonging is cultivated, without the pressure of assimilation, where legitimate cultural 
differences are protected, plural cultural identities are cherished, and the shared and 
precious identity of shared citizenship is not weakened.201 Earlier, I added to 
Parekh’s statement that it is unclear what he understands to be legitimate cultural 
differences. It is rather vague what Parekh aims to do: he wishes to respect plurality, 
yet at the same time he encourages dialogue to promote change for the sake of 
shared citizenship, for a “sense of belonging”. It is as if saying: “We respect you for 
who you are, now change.” It is this and other inconsistencies that has prompted Fish 
to draw the conclusion that as a concept, multiculturalism is incoherent and cannot 
be meaningfully either affirmed or rejected.202 He explains it like this. There are two 
sorts of multiculturalists, “boutique multiculturalists” and “strong multiculturalists”:  
 
“Boutique multiculturalism is the multiculturalism of ethnic restaurants, 
weekend festivals, and high profile flirtations with the other in the  
manner satirized by Tom Wolfe under the rubric of “radical chic.” Boutique 
multiculturalism is characterized by its superficial or cosmetic relationship  
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to the objects of its affection. Boutique multiculturalists admire or appreciate 
or enjoy or sympathize with or (at the very least) “recognize the legitimacy 
of” the traditions of cultures other than their own; but boutique 
multiculturalists will always stop short of approving other cultures at a  
point where some value at their center generates an act that offends  
against the canons of civilized decency as they have been either  
declared or assumed.”203  
 
The boutique multiculturalist will thus value culture, but only up to a certain degree. 
He holds its own culture as a standard to decide where that line is, and thus does not 
truly respect differences. Fish compares this with what he calls “strong 
multiculturalism”. A strong multiculturalist, such as Taylor, will avow a deep 
commitment to respecting cultures as pillars of identity and self-respect. Tolerance is 
the basic principle underlying his doctrine. However, Fish continues, the problem with 
tolerance as a foundation is that it is simply not possible to be faithful to it, because it 
is inevitable that sooner or later the culture whose core values you have been 
tolerating will reveal itself to be intolerant itself. We can illustrate his point. Let us 
bring back John. This time, John is an indigenous Briton. He believes Islam is a 
beautiful religion that has much to offer its followers. Last year, he travelled to 
Morocco, where he enjoyed the special foods and rode on camels. He has a small 
painting of a mosque hanging in his living room, reminding him of the beautiful time 
he had there. John lives in London. In the past twenty years, more and more Muslim 
immigrants and their descendants have moved into his neighbourhood. He enjoys 
the kebab and likes the way Muslim girls combine their headscarves with their outfits. 
John, however, is not so much captivated by Islam’s view on alcohol. He enjoys a 
drink, and feels more in line with the “keep them coming”- mentality than the Islamic 
one of temperance. He finds it all the more shocking that lately Muslim men are 
patrolling his neighbourhood, discouraging and even intimidating people who drink on 
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the streets or sell alcohol.204 As a boutique multiculturalist, John can easily step in 
and join in on the critical debate and ask for police forces to intervene as these 
Muslim men overstep their boundaries. A strong multiculturalist, however, will not be 
able to remain consistent on his multiculturalist convictions. As a strong 
multiculturalist, he would have to a) accept that Islam is important for the Muslim’s 
identity and that critiquing the Muslim men’s behaviour would be harmful, and b) 
draw the conclusion that intimidating people into not drinking alcohol is a difference 
that should be tolerated, and that Islam as a minority culture should be protected and 
preserved against outsiders wishing to change it. This is impossible, as the following 
makes clear. 
 The distinctiveness of the culture that the strong multiculturalist has been 
valuing shows to work against moderation or integration into a larger whole. For, if 
you award minority groups with a special status, they will claim it. When the minority 
culture is confronted with the choice to either give up or moderate certain beliefs or 
practices for the sake of fitting in with a larger whole, a stressed culture will fight back 
as much as they can, whether it be with anti-discrimination legislation or violence, 
Fish argues. If John were a strong multiculturalist, he must make a decision: he 
either deepens his tolerance so that it also includes the intolerance at the heart of the 
Muslim men who no longer tolerate people drinking alcohol (and tolerance is no 
longer his guiding principle). Or he condemns the core intolerance, making him 
intolerant and not having respect for the culture anymore.205 The strong 
multiculturalist is actually a boutique multiculturalist, the difference being that the 
prior in general takes difference much more seriously than the latter, who embraces 
multiculturalism more as a cosmopolitan ‘lifestyle shopping experience’. In general, 
because a strong multiculturalist cannot get involved in the realization of any 
particular difference. The moment he speaks on behalf of preserving a particular 
culture, he is no longer a multiculturalist. That is because one cannot honour diversity 
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in general and at the same time show allegiance to a culture that is not willing to 
return the favour. In other words, if John the strong multiculturalist would pick the 
side of the Muslim men deterring alcohol, the end result would be that there will no 
longer be alcohol in his neighbourhood, women in burkas, and no homosexuals 
holding hands: it will have become a Sharia controlled place where no plurality exists. 
John is now a monoculturalist. John’s multiculturalist position can thus result in two 
positions: him stating there are limits, meaning he does not respect culture and 
cultural differences, or he is committed to respecting difference and must let go of the 
principle of tolerance and plurality.206  
 Wanting to preserve a culture within a wider nation is not a logical 
consequence of the notion that members of minority cultures value their identity 
(which in itself is not necessarily true). Even so, it is not possible to pinpoint which 
phase of a culture needs to be preserved, if at all. And lastly, preserving a culture is 
not desirable in the case of practical problems. Then culture needs to change. When 
deciding on when that should be the case, multiculturalism cannot be applied due to 




Analytically, the position of multiculturalism can only persist if there would never be a 
conflict of views. That would be the case if members of minority cultures would live 
segregated from members of the majority culture, and if there is no internal dissent 
calling for a moral or legal verdict. This is, however, never the case. Multiculturalism 
can only operate on general premises, vagueness and equivocation, and is not 
operable when a particular matter arises. That is why multiculturalist ideologists such 
as Taylor, Kymlicka and Parekh take no responsibility for the practice of plurality as it 
is unfolding in the western nations: it is not what they had envisioned, because there 
never was a vision to begin with. What they have done is take a random moment in 





history (those moments in history when they were writing their books), described the 
landscape and decided that that snapshot of the landscape they took was the right 
one. But the landscape has changed. And the more it changes, the more we must 
question the validity of wanting to preserve the landscape in itself. That does not 
mean that change is part of some mysterious future we can only await, but it means 
that we have to decide which parts of the landscape we find beautiful, and which 
parts we do not. Multiculturalism lacks a vision of what it wants the country to 
become,207 whereas we should want to know and verbalise that sending the train to 
Tuscany is better than sending it to Iraq.  
 That also means that if we follow the multiculturalist doctrine, the future of 
Blueskins and Greenskins in Sealandistan is locked in the status quo. The two 
communities do not live in sealed boxes and there is both external and internal 
dissent on the harmful practices toward animals and the elderly. Those dissenting do 
not feel their life options should be mainly stemming from their cultural heritage and 
who they “truly” are is not given by their culture. Moreover, they believe more harm is 
done to animals and the elderly than they could ever experience from nonrecognition 
of their identity. The ’90 pill-tradition’ and the ‘feast of kicking animals’ are practices 
that deserve condemnation, and cultural reformers do not conclude that these acts in 
general makes their culture good, nor equal, and they do not want these customs to 
be tolerated. There is no need for preserving that part of their culture, even if that 
would mean that the separate Greenskin and Blueskin cultures would go extinct and 
merge together. For this to happen, identity claims need to be substituted for 
arguments. Ethical confrontation should take place. As we have seen, multiculturalist’ 
reasoning of tolerance and respecting plurality is of no practical use when it is called 
in to judge on a particular issue. 
 Multiculturalists have a wrong focus when it comes to passing judgments. The 
content of a judgment of an idea or practice is deemed offensive for those not 
involved. “Not all Blueskins kill their parents”, “not all Greenskins kill animals for fun”, 
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“not everyone is pressured into it, people choose freely” will be the most often heard 
objections when debating the limits of tolerance. That is because a multiculturalist is 
worried that negative critiques are projected upon “the innocent”, on those who are 
not part of the practice, but who are members of the community. Negative statements 
rub off negatively on them. The focus should have been on those who are not the 
culprits and are now suffering from harm from “guilt by association”. That is why, 
when invited to make a moral judgement, a multiculturalist who is not ready to give 
up on his convictions must resort to non-judgmentalism.  
 The question is now how this political ideology of multiculturalism plays out in 
the real world, outside of Sealandistan. In that real world, in the United Kingdom, 
there are special religious tribunals where minority members are faced with a 
sublegal regime. Religious leaders, together with multiculturalists, publically call for 
more recognition of these “Sharia councils”. Before we look into that, it is important to 




































2.   Islamic Fundamentalism 
Introduction 
 
Not surprisingly, multiculturalism has received wide criticism. It is not without reason 
that many political leaders publicly gave up on it. But the reason they did so was not 
that they thought that the multiculturalist ideology was internally inconsistent or based 
on false premises. It was reality that caught on. The multiculturalist moral and 
political perspective on human life is one that values diversity, tolerance, and 
authenticity, regardless of the level of abhorrence of certain practices. Here Taylor 
comes to mind, who stated: “[O]ne could argue that it is reasonable to suppose that 
cultures that have provided the horizon of meaning for large numbers of human 
beings, of diverse characters and temperaments, over a long period of time – that 
have, in other words, articulated their sense of the good, the holy, the admirable – 
are almost certain to have something that deserves our admiration and respect, even 
if it is accompanied by much that we have to abhor and reject.”208 It is exactly that 
mentality that makes multiculturalism unfit as an ideology that should drive pluralist 
societies. 
 It is the multiculturalist belief that culture is good because it is valued by its 
bearers; that too much focus on what is undesirable threatens the “fact” that minority 
members need their culture intact, and that too much change is a threat to one’s 
identity. Communities are expected to provide individuals with an integrated sense of 
self – even if those communities embrace harmful practices. Change should come 
“from within”, “outsiders” should refrain from “imposing” their norms.209 Blinded by the 
positive evaluation of minority culture, there is hardly space for a debate on harmful 
practices. At best, there is room for “intercultural dialogue”: an invitation to talk in 
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order to integrate cultures. Undesirable minority practices are expected to be 
voluntarily relinquished without imposing norms, judging and “excluding the Other”.  
 It is at the cross section of multiculturalism and Islam-related practices that 
contemporary multiculturalism is struggling most. Multiculturalist sensitivities have 
detracted us from studying the underlying foundations of Islamist ideology.210 It is a 
common belief that it is wrong to focus on Islamic fundamentalism, while there are so 
many Muslims who do not adhere to radical Islam. The idea is that focusing on the 
negative side is unpleasant for Muslim citizens who want nothing to do with this 
political Islam. Some go beyond unpleasant, but call this “racist” or “discriminatory”, 
“as if all Muslims are terrorists”. Of course not all Muslims are fundamentalist. That is 
not what I wish to convey. In fact, worldwide, it is non-fundamentalist Muslims who 
suffer most from Islamic fundamentalism. Yet, at the same time, Islamic 
fundamentalism has become a problem in the West, as well. According to a 2013 
poll, about half of European Muslims adhere to fundamentalist notions of Islam: that 
there is only one interpretation of the Koran, that Muslims should return to the roots 
of Islam, and that religious rules are more important than secular laws.211  
 There is a steady body of Islamist thought justifying a parallel legal order, such 
as expressed in Sharia councils. It is not an accident that 45 to 73 percent of 
European Muslims believe religious laws are more important than secular laws: they 
are led by the idea that religion is not limited to the private sphere, but that the body 
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of Islamic laws – Sharia – supersedes secular political and legal rights and duties.212 
Therefore, it deserves to be studied, not ignored, or downplayed – as multiculturalists 
tend to do. 
 Moghissi laments the yielding of scholars to the “Islamists’ intellectual 
seductions”. It disturbs her even more that it are not merely journalists, but even 
more so, that secular Middle East scholars and prominent feminists are falling prey to 
Islamists’ messages.213 In the 1990s she theorized that these academics had 
growing concerns over the growing racist arsenal of negative imageries about Islam 
and Muslim women which caused the climate to turn. Certain scholars began to deny 
the punishing features of Islamic practices and traditions and instead began to 
emphasize the positive aspects of Islamic culture. This is, however, not the best way 
to show one’s solidarity with Muslims around the globe, Moghissi writes. She 
wonders out loud why, given the compelling body of evidence of the fundamentalists’ 
repressive measures against women, this subject is usually neglected in academic 
analyses.214 Is this tendency driven by fear of physical violence or ‘Orientalist’ 
tendencies, she asks? Is it driven by a paralyzing anxiety to be accused of cultural 
insensitivity? “Or is it a postmodern specimen of the attitude to ‘exotic’ practices and 
institutions which viewed from afar, are celebrated as ‘authentic’, ‘local’ responses to 
indigenous problems – and excused as inevitable because they ‘fit’ with the 
culture?”215 
 From her point of view, Islamic fundamentalism is not something scholars 
should overlook. So we won’t. Especially as immigration and globalization has led to 
an expansion of Islamic fundamentalism, it is important to not let “cultural 
sensitivities” overshadow the fact there currently is increasing competition between 
Islamic and secular law on western soil.  
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  This chapter is on Islamic fundamentalism, also known as Islamism or political 
Islam. Next, in the third chapter, we will see the union of Islamic fundamentalism and 
multiculturalism in the case-study of Sharia councils in the United Kingdom. That 
state does allow religious tribunals to function on its soil and high-impact speeches 
are made on behalf of more accommodation. Moreover, as I will discuss there, 
several influential religious leaders who have founded Britain’s first Sharia council 
have been trained at Egypt’s al-Azhar University and Medina University in Saudi 
Arabia. They have come to Britain to espouse the ideology of political Islam. I believe 
that discussing the origins, aims and scope of Islamic fundamentalism at length is 
needed, because it explains the nature of Sharia councils. So, what is the ideology of 
Islamism that most multiculturalists prefer to downplay?  
 
Sharia as the sacred law of Islam 
 
German political scientist Bassam Tibi (1944), author of Political Islam, World Politics 
and Europe (2008), Islamism and Islam (2012) and The Sharia State (2013) 
interchangeably uses the terms political Islam, Islamism or religious fundamentalism, 
when he describes the political and religious doctrines of radical Muslim thinkers.216 
In order to understand the background of Sharia councils in the United Kingdom, we 
need to know about the political ideology that is Islamism. 
 In his analysis, Tibi makes a distinction between Islam and Islamism.217 He 
claims the distinction between Islam and Islamism is crucial for a peaceful co-
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existence between Muslims and non-Muslims alike. “The religious faith of Islam is not 
an obstacle to peace or a threat to the non-Muslim other. Islamism, on the other 
hand, creates deep civilizational rifts between Muslims and non-Muslims”.218 The key 
difference is that Islam, on the one hand, is about faith – for instance adhering to the 
five pillars: 1) declaring there is no god except God, and Muhammad is God's 
Messenger, 2) ritual prayer five times a day, 3) giving a small percentage of one’s 
savings to the poor and needy, 4) fasting and self-control during Ramadan, and 5) 
pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime – if one is able to do so. Islamism, on 
the other hand, is about political order, a religionized political order, aimed at 
establishing a unity of state and religion under a system of constitutionally mandated 
Islamic law.219 In one phrase: Islamism is the political ideology of a Sharia state.220 
What is the foundation of this ideology? 
 The focus is on a fundamentalist version of religion and its political 
consequences. The term “fundamentalism” stems from a collection of essays 
published between 1910 and 1915 in the United Sates. In this series entitled “The 
Fundamentals. A Testimony to Truth”, protestant theologians determined that the 
unifying element within their religion was the belief that the bible was infallible, as it 
was the verbally inspired Word of God. The impetus was the concern of a rapidly 
changing social world surrounding them and an attempt to preserve the core of their 
value system. From that perspective, fundamentalism is often framed as the opposite 
of modernity. Both Protestant and Islamic fundamentalists can be said to want to 
respond to changing moral values by a return to the notion that divine revelation is 
infallible and should serve as the one guide for belief and conduct.221  
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 Yet, sociology professor Haideh Moghissi states that the efforts of Islamic 
fundamentalists are much more than just a religious movement. They see Islam “[…] 
as a totalizing force that inspires and regulates all aspects of public and private life. 
They look to the Qu’ran not merely for its moral principles, but to find clues to the 
future of the world. Fundamentalist movements are similar in that they are 
determined to subjugate all aspects of human life – be they economic, political, 
cultural, aesthetic, familial or personal – to the will of God, as declared in religious 
scripture. Islamist groups insist that they are not only going back to the basics of 
Islam, but are reviving them as well.”222 At the most basic level, fundamentalism 
refers to a mentality towards time; it proposes to go back to “an ideal past, initial 
conditions” or “golden age”. Whether there ever was such an Islamic “golden age” is 
subject to debate, but for now beside the point.223 The goal is to reform society in 
such a fashion it most corresponds to an idealized past, for which the model can be 
found in an originating text.224 That means that Islamic fundamentalists share the 
ideal that society must be saved and purified by means of establishing a true Islamic 
society. This is done on the basis of a ‘correct’ interpretation of divine texts with the 
earliest states as under Muhammed in the seventh century serving as example. 
 According to Rémi Brague (1947), French professor of philosophy and author 
of The Law of God. The Philosophical History of an Idea (2007), early Islam 
consisted of mainly Arab conquerors who needed to establish a new set of laws to 
replace the laws that governed the newly conquered territory. Leaving the indigenous 
laws and legal practices intact posed the risk of leaving the ruling elite “melting” into 
the population, thereby losing its legitimacy as ruling forces, and relaxing its hold on 
the conquered. The Muslim elite therefore had to be resistant to the old mores. 
Therefore they had to conform to a law totally of its own, and to that law only. In order 
to make it believable, a strategy was required to mask the fact that much of Islamic 
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law was borrowed from local customs and other religions. It had to appear “to come 
from within”. The hadith collections had exactly that function, Brague writes. All laws 
had to be attributed to Muhammed for them to gain legitimacy.225 British-German 
professor of Arabic and Islam Joseph Schacht (1902-1969), the leading Western 
scholar on Islamic law, described Sharia as the sacred law of Islam, as the epitome 
of Islamic thought, as the most typical manifestation of the Islamic way of life, “the 
core and kernel of Islam itself”. It consists of an all-encompassing body of religious 
duties; it is the complete aggregate of the commands of Allah which regulates the 
lives of all Muslims in every aspect.226 Sharia is foremost a body of laws that 
believers have to adhere to, rather than a source of moral values believers may 
voluntarily draw inspiration from.  
 Broadly speaking, Islam is divided in Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. The focus in 
this thesis is on Sunni Islam. There are four important Sunni schools of law 
(madhhab): the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali school, and they are identical in 
approximately 75 percent of their legal conclusions.227 
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 According to Islamic religious sources, the following is the case. Muhammed 
Ibn Abdullah is said to be born approximately in 570 AD in the Arabian city of Mecca. 
Supposedly, he received his first revelation from Allah at age 40, when he was visited 
by archangel Gabriel who channeled Allah’s views. These revelations formed the 
Koran, the holy book of Islam, which Muslims take as “God’s word”. Next to the 
Koran, the second most important religious source is the Sunna. Together, the 
Sunna and the Koran make up the key sources which form the basis of Islam. The 
Sunna consists of two components. The first is a large body of statements or 
testimonies about the exemplary conduct of Muhammed and those who 
accompanied him, his “companions”. These statements are known as hadiths. These 
hadiths often have a normative character and consist of examples of behaviour in 
which Muhammed forbade, disapproved, approved or proscribed a certain type of 
action. The hadiths serve as a vitally important source of Islamic law. There are six 
major collections of hadiths in the Sunni Islam. Of that six, the sayings of Muhammed 
as collected by the Persian Muslim scholar Muhammed al-Bukhari (810-870) have 
the highest standing. This collection, called Sahih al-Bukhari, was put together over 
200 years after Muhammed allegedly received Allah’s instructions. It consists of nine 
volumes and deals with, inter alia, prayer, funerals, tax, pilgrimage, fasting, sales and 
trade, debt transfer, agriculture, freeing slaves, wills, jihad, marriage, divorce, food 
and meals, slaughter, dress, good manners, interpretation of dreams, virtues of the 
Koran, divine will, punishment laws, disbelievers, bathing, menstrual periods, and on 
how to deal with apostates.228 Such a source of information is just as important as 
the Koran for Islamic law. 
 The Sunna was passed on by Muhammed’s companions, generation after 
generation. With companions are meant those who accompanied him during his life, 
and their descendants, and through these generations there is a so-called “chain of 
transmissions” of what Muhammed did and said, and approved and disapproved of. 
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The term companions refers to both the generation of men who knew him personally 
and strove with him to establish Islam and the two generations that succeeded them. 
Together they are known as the sahaba. There is a hadith quoting Muhammed 
saying: “The people of my own generation are the best, then those who come after 
them, and then those of the next generation.”229 All three generations (the sahaba 
plus one generation) together are known as the salafiyaah, or salaf, and they are 
considered to represent Islam in its most pure, undiluted form. Any recorded 
statement by Muhammed must be able to be traced back through an uninterrupted 
chain (isnad) of reliable transmitters (the salaf) to Muhammed himself. If the chain is 
weak or unreliable, the hadith is considered to be less fit as a source of Islamic law, 
also known as Sharia.  
 Next to the Koran and the Sunna, there is a third source of Sharia, namely 
consensus, or ijma, which can be reached by the Umma (all the world’s Muslims, a 
Muslim nation, transgressing borders, worldwide), but consensus generally refers to 
the ulama. The term ulama is used to describe the body of Muslim scholars who are 
trained in and have studied Islamic disciplines. They are accepted as the arbiters of 
what laws follow from Sharia. Fourthly and lastly, there is analogical reasoning, or 
qiyas. This is a method for extending rulings to new situations while limiting 
innovation. For instance, if wine is prohibited because of intoxication clouds the mind 
which diverts from a proper focus on Allah, then marijuana must also be forbidden.230 
These sources make up Sharia, often comprehensibly categorized in fiqh 
(jurisprudence). There are fiqh books filled with casuistry, written by authoritative 
scholars, encompassing every aspect of life, from criminal law and administrative 
law, to not to pluck your eyebrows and how to enter a bathroom.  
 Together, these four sources make up what is commonly understood to be 
Sharia, or, Islamic law. It is important to note that Islamic law applies the following 
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scale of religious qualifications, ranging from 1) obligatory (fard or wajib), 2) 
recommended (mandub), 3) permissable (mubah), 4) reprehensible (makruh), and 5) 
forbidden (haram). Forbidden acts fall under the header of “enormities”. An enormity 
is a shocking, evil, or immoral act, and is defined as “[…] any sin entailing either a 
threat of punishment in the hereafter explicitly mentioned by the Koran or hadith 
[…].”A random selection to illustrate: idolatry, greed, sarcasm towards the poor 
because of their poverty, wanting the life of this world (N: more than the next), eating 
or drinking from a gold or silver vessel, sexual intercourse with a woman during 
menstruation, tattoos, men imitating like women or vice versa, women visiting graves, 
not giving surplus water to someone thirsty, looking with lust at a woman who is not 
one’s unmarriageable kin, touching such a woman, or being alone with her, 
sodomizing your wife, cursing a Muslim, suicide, theft, drinking alcohol, showing 
others the weak points of the Muslims, and not repenting from an enormity. 231  
 
Political Islam Part I: Wahhabism 
 
One of the reasons the French reject the full face cover goes beyond being able to 
see women’s faces. The full face veil rings alarm bells regarding “a sectarian trend 
driven by radical and fundamental Muslim groups, who were taking advantage of a 
legal system that was very protective of individual fundamental rights and freedoms 
in order to obtain recognition of rights that were specifically applicable to residents of 
Muslim faith or origin”.232 What they meant was Islamism. Where does that political 
ideology come from? For that, we have to go to the Arabian peninsula, where 
Wahhabism comes from, and from where the global movement of Islamism was 
founded and spread.  
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 Wahhabism is a puritanical and reactionary ideology based on the theological 
foundations laid down by Muhammed Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab (1703-1792). In the 
eighteenth century Arabian peninsula, the practice of “government” consisted mainly 
of local and changing tribal or settlement alliances. Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab was 
constantly rejected by communities for his narrow and uncompromising views, but 
this changed as he aligned himself with Muhammed bin Saud (d. 1765) in 1744. Ibn 
Saud was an “able and ambitious desert warrior”.233 The pact between them had the 
goal of establishing a kingdom based on Sharia in an effort to challenge the Ottoman 
hegemony, where Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab would deliver the spiritual, and Saud the 
political and military.234 Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab was strongly influenced by the teachings 
of earlier mentioned 13/14th century Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyyah – who epitomizes 
political Islam.  
 One of Ibn Taymiyyah’s focal points was that the act of interpretation of the 
Koran, called tafsir, may not be based on personal opinion. One cannot discover the 
meaning of Koranic texts on one’s own. In Ibn Taymiya and His Times (2010), 
associate professor Walid Saleh informs us that: “[a] string of prophetic traditions that 
warn against such a practice are produced, all with the aim of showing that no one 
has the right to expound freely on the Qur’ān. Indeed, Ibn Taymiyya is categorically 
against such a method even if it reproduces the true and valid meaning of the 
Qur’ān!”235 Self-study and making one’s own interpretation is thus out of the 
equation. Well, then, how do believers know what to believe and how to live 
according to Islamic rules? The ulema is decisive in these matters, and in Saudi 
Arabia that means that the correct way is to replicate Islam’s pious elders, those who 
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had travelled with Muhammed and the two following generations, the salaf.236 The 
idea of replicating the salafi Koranic interpretations, as well as copying the lives of 
the prophet and the salaf, laid the foundation of what is now commonly known as the 
Salafi movement, or Salafism.237 Only with Salafism can Islam counter the pollution 
and watering down by un-Islamic influences, which has diminished its perfection – 
that is the idea.  
 Even more arresting is Ibn Taymiyya’s principle that there is a need for 
violence in defense of true Islam. He stated, for example, “[t]o fight in defense of 
religion and belief is a collective duty according to consensus; there is no other duty 
after belief than fighting the enemy who is corrupting life and the religion. There [are] 
no preconditions for this duty and the enemy should be fought with one’s best 
abilities”.238 This fighting should lead Muslims back to the times of the salaf, and is 
based on an imperial glory of Islamic civilization and serves as a guideline for the 
Islamist demand for a return to history.239 
 Ibn Taymiyya’s teachings strongly influenced Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab. In 
‘Totalitarianism and Radical Islamic Ideologies’, Dutch jurist and political philosopher 
David Suurland (1975) tells us what the consequence is of this Wahhabi take on 
Islam:  
 
“To Wahhab, Jihad was the ultimate manifestation of Islam, a furnace in which 
Muslims are melted out, that allows the separation of the bad Muslim from the good 
one and that grants its fighters instant access to paradise. The Jihad of 
Wahhab had little to do with the noble notion of inner struggle; instead, it was 
focused on purifying the world through the murder of the unbelievers, the infidels, the 
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Christians, the Jews and those Muslims who did not conform to his puritanical 
version of Islam. In the ideal Wahhabi society, the freedom of the believer is reduced 
to following the instructions of the faith to the letter. Any diversion, dissent or 
innovation is in their eyes an act of polytheism, or even worse, apostasy, and thus 
punishable by death.”240 
 
Since true Islam was the Islam of Muhammed and his companions, any diversion 
from the Salafi way of life can be judged as an act of disbelief – kufr , related to kufar, 
infidels – and thus an act of apostasy, punishable by death. Confirmation of this is, 
for instance, found in the hadith: “for the Prophet said, 'If somebody (a Muslim) 
discards his religion, kill him”.241  
 Let us return to the covenant that Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab made with Saud in the 
18th century. Saud’s gain from cooperation was that Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab consecrated 
the Saudi tribe’s raids. Instead of rivalling tribes simply being raided for food, women 
or profit, those raids became “[…] jihad – a holy war, to promote, by the sword, 
Islam’s triumph over unbelief.”242 In return for religious legitimacy, Ibn Abd-al-
Wahhab received military backing for his ideological and religious war. Saud and Ibn 
Abd-al-Wahhab’s pact was sealed by the marriage of Saud with Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab’s 
daughter – their descendants would eventually become Saudi Arabia’s political 
leaders for generations. As a result of the Saudi-Ibn Abd-al-Wahhabi coalition, Saud, 
and later his descendants, unleashed a campaign of terror in the Arabian Peninsula, 
and, for the first time in the history of Islam, there was a legitimized violent jihad 
against fellow Muslims. 243 The Saud clan would wage war for almost 200 years, yet 
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finally managed to capture Mecca, Medina and Jeddah in 1926, a success booked by 
descendent Abdul Aziz (1876-1953), now known as Ibn Saud. Those physically 
responsible for the terror campaigns needed to establish the Kingdom, were the 
Ikhwan, a Wahhabi organization made up of newly Islamized Bedouin who lived by 
the strictest Wahhabi tenets. The Ikhwan would be the instrument for molding the 
new Saudi Wahhabi society.244 In the 1920s, their brutality led to 400,000 people 
killed or wounded and over a million people fled the conquered territories.245 By the 
1930s, Wahhabi religious command had subordinated the Saudi population.246 In 
1932, Ibn Saud declared the territory the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, made himself 
king, and his family members the “Royal Family”. 
 
Political Islam Part II: The Muslim Brotherhood 
 
Islamic reactionaries admired and respected the Saudi Wahhabis, and they served 
as a source of inspiration in other circles in the Middle East. They were considered 
“authentic Muslim warriors” who fought off European control. As a reaction to the 
political and economic decline of the Islamic world in medieval and modern times, a 
puritan religious movement beyond Saudi Arabia was in the making which strove to 
purge itself of all non-Islamic influences and which envisioned a return to the earliest 
pristine days of Islam – and thus to Salafism.  
 As Wahhabism was unfolding at the Arabian Peninsula, there was a similar 
ideological development concerning Salafism taking place in Egypt. Take for instance 
Muhammed Abduh (1849-1905), an Egyptian reactionary theologian and jurist. He 
explained the backwardness and weakness of Muslims from the fact that they no 
longer lived by the principles of the salaf. He mentored Muhammed Rashid Rida 
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(1865-1935), and together they began the Islamic “reform movement” in Cairo.247 
Rida (who is said to have been financially backed by Ibn Saud248) was one of the 
most important people to be influenced by the Salafi doctrine. He also strongly 
believed that the weakness and political decline in the Islamic world could only be 
countered by a return to true Islam. Rida’s proliferation of Salafism had profound 
consequences, for it was Rida who mentored Hassan al-Banna (1905-1949). In 
1928, Al-Banna founded a new Islamic organization, “The Muslim Brotherhood”, or in 
Arabic, Ikhwan al-Muslimum. The mission of the organization was (and still is) to 
establish a pure Islamic society: a Sharia state. The Brotherhood’s credo is: “Allah is 
our objective. The Prophet is our leader, Qur’an is our law, Jihad is our way, Dying in 
the way of Allah is our highest hope.” On this use of the term jihad, Suurland 
explains: “It should be explained that the concept of jihad has two forms: the first 
being the large jihad, which is a life-long obligatory struggle against one’s inner-evil, 
and the small jihad, which is actual armed warfare against unbelievers and those 
who actively oppose Islam. In this credo, Hassan al-Banna is also directly referring to 
the small jihad”.249  
 Al-Banna’s views had a strong political dimension. Crucial in understanding 
Islamism is that it is not a religious movement with political consequences. Rather, it 
is a political movement with religious consequences.250 It was al-Banna’s ambition to 
create a global Islamic empire with Sharia as global law: “It is a duty incumbent on 
every Muslim to struggle towards the aim of making every people Muslim and the 
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whole world Islamic, so that the call of the Muezzin can resound in all the corners of 
the world: God is greatest [Allahu akbar]!”251  
 He complemented the Salafi doctrine with a rhetoric concerning colonialism 
and the threat of British control, the influence of foreign companies, on blind imitation 
of the West, on man-made laws that were failing to prevent crime, on educational 
mismanagement, and in general on intellectual chaos, the loss of moral values, on 
signs of desperation and loss of will. The Muslim Brotherhood’s goals were to free 
the “Islamic homeland” from foreign authority and to establish an Islamic state within 
that Islamic homeland.252 Al-Banna envisioned a new kind of society, one that was 
orderly, serene and authoritarian, one that was based on conformity and obedience 
in all areas of life. That also meant rolling back any progress in women’s rights, crush 
individuality and getting rid of human differences.253 To achieve this, the concept of 
the Umma, a unified Muslim population (the “Islamic nation”), was needed to drown 
out disputes.254 This Umma had to be instilled with an unrelenting anger towards evil 
enemies, and an enthusiasm for both ultra-conservative communitarian obedience 
and violence and war.255 The movement grew rapidly; from four branches in 1929 to 
over half a million active members in Egypt in 1945; in 1948 there were 2000 
branches, crossing the border to Palestine, Sudan, Iraq and Syria. In 1948 Hassan 
al-Banna was assassinated by two unknown gunmen while waiting for a taxi. But that 
was not the end of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
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 After the assassination, the Muslim Brotherhood welcomed a new member: 
renowned literary critic, novelist and poet Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). He would 
become the Brotherhood’s leading ideologue, inspiring members all over the world, 
even long after he was convicted of plotting the assassination of Egyptian president 
Nasser and was executed by hanging in 1966.256  
 To understand Qutb’s ideology better, it is important to know that in addition to 
the well-known belief that good Muslims get to go to heaven (a reward), there is also 
an imperative what good Muslims should work towards avoiding here on earth, and 
that is the idea of jahiliyyah.257 That is: Islam was revealed to mankind, but mankind 
turned its back to Islam and degenerated into jahiliyyah, roughly translatable as 
ignorance, and which refers to a state of spiritual darkness.258 “[I]t signals not only 
human arrogance, but a transgression against divine authority, the scope of which 
encompasses both public and private domains of human life as well as both visible 
and invisible dimensions of the universe.”259 Between 1948 and 1950, Qutb studied 
in the United States and he was shocked by examples of transgressions signalling 
jahiliyyah. He experienced American moral depravity, in particular as it was 
manifested in individualism, materialism, racism, the economic system, and open 
sexuality – at least compared to the more restricted sexual codes of Qutb’s own 
culture.260 It led him to the conclusion that the world is in moral decline: “[…] 
humanity is devoid of those vital values which are necessary not only for its healthy 
development but also for its real progress”, he wrote in Milestones, his main political 
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work composed when he was in prison.261 Democracy is definitely a deviation from 
Sharia.  
 
“Democracy is a man-made infidel religion” 
 
If mankind were to be saved, it needs to submit (Islam literally means submission) 
itself to the laws of Islam, or else humanity will regress into a state of jahiliyyah. 
Suurland writes: 
 
“At some point in time, man no longer relied on Allah and his commandments but 
instead they relied on mankind itself. Man created institutions that were not ordained 
by Allah and they relied on them. Man created systems of governance such as 
democracy, which were tyrannical because now some man ruled over others thereby 
enslaving them. Man-made laws are a particularly malicious form of jahiliyyah 
because what they actually represent is the fact that men trust each other more than 
they trust Allah. It is blasphemy of the worst sort because it ascribes partners to God. 
Since God is one, a concept known as Tawheed, you cannot worship anything 
besides him.262 Certainly not anything man-made. In short, what we today call the 
modern world, with its institutes, its laws and its secular systems of government, all of 
which have no basis in Sharia, is a form of tyranny bound to enslave man and keep 
them from realizing that their true freedom lies in the religion of Allah and submitting 
to its commandments. All those who do not submit, oppose. Those who oppose 
obstruct the freedom of all and are thus inevitably enemies.”263  
 
In line with Ibn Taymiyya, Salafism, and Wahhabism, all those who ‘hinder’ Islam are 
enemies of Islam. Enemies of Islam should be fought (Jihad) until either killed or 
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converted. For Christians or Jews, or any other variant that adheres “to the religion of 
Abaraham”, there is the Dhimmi status, which is a system of taxation in exchange for 
protection, as long as they comply with a number of Islamic rules.264 That means that 
any political system (or law) that deviates from Sharia, for instance a system that 
separates law and religion, is contrary to Islam – which is considered an act of 
apostasy – and contrary to what is good for mankind. Democracy thus contradicts 
Islam. American researcher Raymond Ibrahim (1973), author of The Al Qaeda 
Reader, states the view of Islamists: “democracy is a man-made infidel religion, 
devised to give the right to legislate to the masses – as opposed to Islam, where all 
legislative rights belong to Allah Most High: He has no partners.”265 Democracy 
“rebels against” and prevents Allah’s Sharia from becoming established law. Besides 
the idea that people have no right to sovereignty, its freedom of religion abolishes 
apostasy as a crime.266 Democracy’s principle of equality of citizens is considered 
blasphemous, as the Koranic dhimmi conditions (non-Muslims must pay taxes in 
exchange for protection) are unacceptable to democratic standards.  
 Also important, men’s dominion over women is legally abolished in a 
democracy. Koranic verse 4:34 reads: “Men have authority over women, for Allah 
has made the one superior to the other”. Yet, in a modern democracy men and 
women have the same legal status.267 It is also the issue of sex equality and 
fundamentalist ideology that make the debate on Sharia councils so heated.  
 Central to Islamist debate on the role and function of the two sexes is the 
notion that divinity has intended different functions for men and women, and that 
these are justified because of fundamental differences in their nature. Denying such 
differences is considered unjust, and therefore Islam deals with these differences 
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better than any other religious or social order could. Islam distinguishes between 
“equality” (which is affirmed for both sexes) and “identicalness” (which is rejected).268 
Justice is thus found in the recognition of the dissimilarities between men and 
women, which requires different rights, duties and punishments for either sex. That 
the Western world has been seeking equality of rights is considered as not doing 
justice to the different dispositions of the sexes, as Ayatollah Khomeini’s disciple 
Murtaza Mutahhari (1920) explained in The Rights of Women in Islam.269  
 Accepting (legal) equality of the sexes is thus not possible within Islamist 
doctrine. To Islamists, accepting all this means humanity will regress further into the 
dark state of jahiliyyah. This must be avoided, and that is an eternal struggle which 
will continue until the religion is purified for God.270  
 In the 1970s and 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Wahhabi’s joined 
each other and formed a global movement. In exchange for Saudi funds for its global 
operations in spreading their Islamist message, the Muslim Brotherhood made sure 
Saudi Arabia was protected against potential adversaries. With this increased 
protection, Saudi Arabia continued to strengthen its utopia within its boundaries.  
 
Sharia State Example I: Theocratic Saudi Arabia 
 
Let us take a look inside the most ‘complete’ Sharia State, to see what happens if 
Islamist principles are the basis of a nation’s blueprint.  
 To start with the juridical foundation. The 1992 Saudi “basic law” consists of 83 
articles divided into nine chapters. Article 1 of the first chapter, “General Principles”, 
states: “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion is 
Islam. Its constitution is Almighty God's Book, The Holy Qur'an, and the Sunna 
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(Traditions) of the Prophet (PBUH). Arabic is the language of the Kingdom. The City 
of Riyadh is the capital.” The Koran and the Sunna thus are the nation’s constitution. 
On the sources of law the constitution states, in article 7, that “Government in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the Book of God and the Sunna of 
the Prophet (PBUH), which are the ultimate sources of reference for this Law and the 
other laws of the State”. This is confirmed in article 8: “Governance in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia is based on justice, shura (consultation) and equality according to 
Islamic Sharia.” There is a Council of Senior Ulama responsible for fatwa’s (religious 
opinion or decision) based on the Koran and Sunna, and the judiciary and the king 
shall rule solely according to Sharia.271 In Chapter 3 of the constitution, “The Values 
of Saudi Society”, it is laid down that: “The family is the nucleus of Saudi Society. 
Members of the family shall be raised in the Islamic Creed, which demands 
allegiance and obedience to God, to His Prophet and to the rulers, respect for and 
obedience to the laws, and love for and pride in the homeland and its glorious 
history” (art. 9). There is no room for disagreement on that, as articles 11 and 12 
inform us of the following Saudi values: “Saudi society is based on full adherence to 
God's guidance. Members of this society shall cooperate amongst themselves in 
charity, piety and cohesion” and “Consolidation of the national unity is a duty. The 
State shall forbid all activities that may lead to division, disorder and partition”. 
Ultimately, the goal of the Saudi state is to “protect the Islamic Creed, apply the 
Sharia, encourage good and discourage evil, and undertake its duty regarding the 
Propagation of Islam (Da'wa)” (art. 23, chapter 5, “Rights and Duties”). Finally, the 
state “shall protect human rights in accordance with the Sharia (art. 26). There is no 
doubt that Saudi Arabia’s political system constitutes a theocracy: the state and 
religion are fully aligned.272  
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 The constitution tells us about the state’s formal criteria, namely a reference to 
the Koran and Sunna, the two most important sources of Islamic law, or Sharia. But 
what about the content? What are some of the consequences when the Koran and 
Sunna are applied as basis for a nation’s constitution, legislation and enforcement?  
 First of all, there is no freedom of religion. Wahhabi (Sunni) Islam is the only 
option, and is mandatory. Any diversion from this can be labelled apostasy or heresy 
and those found guilty of this crime face the risk of penalties, including flogging and 
death by execution. The building of churches is prohibited and bibles may not be 
distributed. Practicing Sufism, a mystical branch within Islam, and possession of Sufi 
writings is a capital offense. But Shi’a Muslims suffer the worst treatment of Muslims 
in the kingdom.273 Floggings, executions, and lifelong sentences are based on the 
sole charge of heresy. There is no recourse to a fair trial.274 The Saudi state also 
incites hatred against Shia Muslims through publications and education.275 There is 
thus no formal tolerance of religious diversity; the theocracy does not allow 
multifaithism or atheism.  
 Second, no freedom of religion obviously implies no freedom of speech. One 
example is Raif Badawi, who was arrested for his blog “the Saudi Free Liberals 
Forum” in 2012. He wrote on the need for secularism, against the Saudi 
interpretation of Islam and the lack of freedom: “As soon as a thinker starts to reveal 
his ideas, you will find hundreds of fatwas that accused him of being an infidel just 
because he had the courage to discuss some sacred topics. I’m really worried that 
Arab thinkers will migrate in search of fresh air and to escape the sword of the 
religious authorities.”276 He was arrested and sentenced to ten years in prison, a 
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thousand lashes and a fine of 1 million Saudi riyals (237.000 euro’s).277 The court 
ordered the closedown of his website. He is but one example of many who share his 
fate, as the state does not allow its citizens to work against “consolidation of the 
national unity”, cause division, or not fully adhere to the Saudi interpretation of 
Sharia. In general, Amnesty International reports on arbitrary arrest and detention 
without charge for those who publicly criticise the government, for those who violate 
religious standards and for Shia religious leaders. 278 Although the Saudi law officially 
states hearings are public, judges may decide to close the doors, leaving many trials 
closed to the public. There is also no common right to access the prosecutor’s 
evidence. Moreover, the law and practice discriminates against non-practicing Sunni, 
Shia, or other denominations, foreigners, and women.279  
 Saudi Arabia is also notorious for its criminal punishments, known as hudud 
laws: punishments fixed in the Koran and hadiths for crimes considered to be against 
the rights of God. Sharia mandates the cutting off of a hand for stealing, a 
punishment carried out in Saudi Arabia.280 Flogging is a sentence regularly executed, 
and the death penalty exists and is carried out – also for acts which are not 
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considered crimes in liberal democracies. Capital crimes include adultery, armed 
robbery, apostasy, drug smuggling, kidnapping, rape, witchcraft and sorcery.281 
 Ibn Warraq, author of Why I Am Not a Muslim (1995) and Why the West is 
Best. A Muslim Apostate’s Defense of Liberal Democracy (2011) writes on the lack of 
individual liberties: “In Islam, there is the concept of an individual with legal 
obligations, but not of the moral person who may freely choose his own path in life. 
There is no sense of the individual who can make rational decisions and accept 
moral responsibility for his actions. Ethics is reduced to obeying orders. Under Islam, 
the limits to the possible contents of your life are set by Allah and his law, while the 
collective will of the Muslim people is emphasized over any sense of individual 
rights.”282 This is especially true when living under an Islamic totalitarian regime, 
where it is hardly possible to escape government influence and the pressure of 
sticking to religion in theocratic Saudi Arabia. The secret police (mabahith) keeps 
Saudi citizens in check. British historian Robert Lacey, author of Inside the Kingdom, 
Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia (2009), 
writes: “The Mabahith are a department of the Saudi Ministry of the Interior, so vast 
and pervasive in their watchfulness that secret is scarcely the word for them. They 
have woven themselves into the very fabric of Saudi life. There is a Mabahith 
informant praying in every significant Saudi mosque, ready to make a phone call 
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should the imam’s sermon get too fiery, nor would any university faculty be complete 
without its careful listener by the coffee machine.”283  
 On the streets, Saudi citizens have to deal with the highly visible mutaween ; 
the Saudi religious police who are formally known as the Committee for the 
Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. It is the task of this ‘morality police’ to 
roam the streets and enforce Sharia-based laws. This means that prayers need to be 
done five times a day by everyone (cafes and businesses must thus be closed), 
women may not smoke, alcohol is obviously forbidden, and women have to be fully 
covered, which is a way of segregating men and women. A low point, even from the 
Saudi perspective, was reached in 2002, as the mutaween became world news. 
They prevented schoolgirls from leaving a burning school building in Mecca, because 
they were not wearing the full face covering headscarves and abayas (the typical 
Saudi black robes) as required. The religious police beat the girls back into the 
building, and they beat those who were trying to rescue the girls, as well as 
prevented firemen from going in. Around fifteen girls burned to death and dozens 
were injured.284  
 Women in general do not fare well under the Saudi Islamic doctrine, to state it 
euphemistically. It is well known that women are not equal to men in the kingdom.  
 Take for instance the practice of purdah (segregating women from men). It can 
imply veiling, but also secluding women in private homes through curtains or 
separating walls, and keeping women prisoners in their own homes.285 Thus, even in 
the private sphere, women can be segregated. The full face veil is part of the aim to 
segregate the sexes in public, in order to avoid fitna. The concept of fitna is relevant 
to the study of Islamic fundamentalism and the veiling of women. Fitna refers to 
calamity, sedition, subversion, agitation, disharmony, (sexual) temptation, sin, and 
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seduction.286 It is not the case that all women are intimidated into covering up. A 
reason why some women freely cover up, is because they believe it will indeed 
please their creator. Others believe piety brings them power, it gives them a sense of 
being in control. Take for instance the Swiss-Iranian Carmen bin Laden, who married 
the brother of Osama bin Laden and emigrated to Saudi Arabia. In Inside the 
Kingdom. My life in Saudi Arabia (2004), she writes on how she saw powerless 
women throw “all their courage” into religion: “I think that it was simpler for them than 
fighting for their rights as human beings. I think that they believed that if they were 
strictly religious, then the men – like other women – would respect that. It seemed to 
work. Religious women did get more respect than the Westernized (women).”287  
 But in general, individual liberties are very much restricted. It is the only 
country in the world where women are not allowed to drive a car – a woman who 
broke the ban on driving was sentenced to 10 lashes.288 Women cannot leave the 
house without a male escort. They may not leave the country without a male family 
member’s consent. The airport checks the computer system for this consent and 
notifies the family if their relative intended to travel without permission. Permission is 
needed for work and seeking medical treatment as well. Daughters may be married 
off against their will, and a father has the right to seize custody of his children and 
deny the mother access to her children for good.289 In court, one male testimony 
needs to be countered by two female testimonies. On this, former grand mufti Bin 
Baz said: “the Prophet (peace be upon him) explained that their shortcoming in 
reasoning is found in the fact that their memory is weak and that their witness is in 
need of another woman to corroborate it. Therefore, it is related to non-proficiency in 
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witnessing due to woman’s forgetfulness or (that) she may add something in her 
witnessing.”290  
 Women outnumber their male counterparts on universities, but they are stuck 
while watching men far less qualified control every aspect of their lives. Women are 
everlastingly minors regardless of their age or education. Child marriage is practiced 
in the country.291 Islamic family law in general, and not just the Saudi Hanbali school 
of interpretation, allows women to be married off at a young age – following the 
example of Muhammed who consummated his marriage with Aisha as she turned 
nine years old.292 The marriage contract consists of two parties, the husband and the 
woman’s male guardian, often her father. Furthermore, women must be obedient 
wives, of which a man may marry up to four.293 The family is the nucleus of Saudi 
society, as article 9 of the Basic Law reads. That also means that women who are 
victims of abuse can forced to return to their abusive father of husband. Women who 
file complaints run the risk of being send to prison, rather than a shelter. This was the 
case for Samar Badawi in 2006, a divorced mother who challenged a complaint of 
“familial ingratitude” lodged against her by her abusive father. The judge reprimanded 
her, and said he would teach her obedience and flog her himself.294 Saudi Arabia is 
also the country where a gang-rape survivor was sentenced to jail for agreeing to get 
into a car with an unrelated male.295  
 The family nucleus also means that all sex outside of marriage is a crime. 
“Deviant sexual behaviour” is a crime as well. A married man engaging in sodomy or 
any non-Muslim who commits sodomy with a Muslim can be put to death, lashed or 
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jailed, although homosexuality is said to be “vibrant” in the Kingdom.296 This should 
not be mistaken for tolerance. Homosexuality is outlawed and those found guilty are 
convicted. Sharia prohibits men imitating like women (or vice versa), which also 
serves as ground for prosecuting homosexuals and transvestites.297 The official 
textbook position, what students learn in Saudi Arabia’s educational facilities, is that 
“"Homosexuality is one of the most disgusting sins and greatest crimes […]. It is a 
vile perversion that goes against sound nature, and is one of the most corrupting and 
hideous sins […]. The punishment for homosexuality is death. Both the active and 
passive participants are to be killed whether or not they have previously had sexual 
intercourse in the context of a legal marriage […]. Some of the companions of the 
Prophet stated that [the perpetrator] is to be burned with fire. It has also been said 
that he should be stoned, or thrown from a high place.”298 The muttaween is known 
to raid parties and arrest dozens of men at the same time. This was, for instance, the 
case on March 10, 2005, when about a hundred men were arrested by the secret 
police at a private party held in a rented hall in Jeddah. The government-affiliated 
newspaper Al-Wifaq reported that they were dancing and “behaving like women”. 
Human Rights Watch reported that two weeks later, dozens of them were sentenced 
to jail and flogging in a closed session in which defense attorneys were excluded.299  
 Lastly, Saudi Arabia formally abolished slavery in 1962. However, considering 
some migrant workers are denied exit from their employers who make them work pro 
bono while enduring severe abuse, the factual abolishment of slavery is yet to 
happen. This might be easier said than done, as slavery is endorsed by Sharia.300  
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Take for instance migrant workers – mostly from East Asia – whom hardly have any 
protection against abuse. They do not fall under the national labor laws. Through a 
sponsorship system called kafala, employers have the right to withhold wages, 
making workers work against their will and retain worker’s identity documents making 
it impossible for a large number of workers to exit the country. In 2012, Human 
Rights Watch reported: “As in years past, Asian embassies reported thousands of 
complaints from domestic workers forced to work 15 to 20 hours a day, seven days a 
week, and denied their salaries. Domestic workers, most of whom are women, 
frequently endure forced confinement, food deprivation, and severe psychological, 
physical, and sexual abuse. In December 2010, authorities made no attempts to 
rescue an Indonesian migrant domestic worker who had worked for 10 years without 
pay and whose sponsors were “renting” her out to other houses, according to one 
Saudi woman who informed authorities. In November 2010, authorities in Abha, 
southern Saudi Arabia, recovered the body of Kikim Komalasari, a 36-year-old 
Indonesian domestic worker, bearing signs of extensive physical abuse. In 
September an appeals court overturned a three-year prison sentence for the 
employer found guilty of severely assaulting Sumiati Mustapa, her Indonesian 
domestic worker. In June, the government beheaded Ruyati binti Sapubi, an 
Indonesian domestic worker convicted of murdering her employer who allegedly 
refused to allow Binti Sapubi to return home. Courts sentenced another Indonesian 
domestic worker to death for killing her employer after he allegedly tried to rape 
her.”301 
 
This was a brief impression of life in the Saudi Sharia state, a kingdom founded in 
1932 after almost 200 years of immense battle and violent jihad initiated by Ibn Abd-
al-Wahhab and Saud. Salafi/Wahhabi Islamism is a religious political ideology, which 
comes with indoctrination, a total lack of free speech, persecution of those not 
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belonging, a secret police infiltrating society and a vice squad monitoring people’s 
actions on the streets. It is a totalitarian form of society: “[…] in which all activities are 
immediately linked to one another, deliberately presented as modalities of a single 
world; that form in which a system of values predominates absolutely, such that 
every individual or collective undertaking must necessarily find in it a coefficient of 
reality; that form in which, lastly, the dominant model exercises a total physical and 
spiritual constraint on the behavior of private individuals.”302 
 It is of course not the first time in world history that political leaders declare the 
Divine to be the sole guidance for governance. It is also not unique to Sunni Islam – 
Shia Iran established a theocracy in 1979. But what is new in world history, is that 
this Islam-based political ideology that should lead to a Sharia State, is now vented 
out by a nation with immense resources and access to people worldwide – more than 
ever through the Internet and television.303 As a result of the 1970s covenant 
between the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s version of political Islam and Saudi 
Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia became one of the biggest worldwide export centers of the 
new Islamic fundamentalism.304 In 2003, Saudi expenses in spreading the Wahhabi 
doctrine over the world were estimated at 70 billion US dollars in nearly 30 years, 
mostly for building mosques, religious schools, and Wahhabi religious centers. To 
mention just two out of many organizations: the Saudi sponsored al-Haramain and 
the International Islamic Relief Organization founded thousands of mosques, 
schools, colleges and Islamic centers all over the (non-Islamic) world and sent out 
over 9000 preachers. Over 13 million books have been printed. In Indonesia alone, 
the Relief Organization funded 575 Wahhabi mosques.305  
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 To give an idea of the content of Saudi propaganda and indoctrination: in 
2005, American research organization Freedom House reported on the content of 
Saudi publications used in mosques and Islamic schools in the United States – it is 
safe to assume the message is the same in every nation.  
 Muslims are instilled with the following ideas and convictions: it is a religious 
obligation for Muslims to hate Jews and Christians, and they are warned against 
befriending, imitating or helping “infidels” in any way. (In fact, Wahhabis and other 
Islamists – such as Al Qaeda’s current leader Ayman al-Zawahiri – divide individuals 
between good Muslims (who deserve loyalty) and “infidels” (who deserve enmity). 
This loyalty versus enmity-doctrine – the “al-wala’ wa al-bara”-doctrine is an 
important part of political Islam.306) 
 The Freedom House report further states that Nazi-like hatred for Jews is 
preached and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion – an anti-Semitic hoax document 
originating from Russia in 1903 which describes a Jewish plan for global domination 
– is taken as a historically valid source.307 Moreover, it is the right thing to hold 
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contempt for America, as it is ruled by civil law, rather than by totalitarian Wahhabi-
style Islamic law. As long as the United States is ruled by infidels, citizenship should 
be avoided, and instead Muslims should work towards the creation of an Islamic 
state. On a Muslim who is “guilty” of extramarital sex or homosexuality, it is said that 
it is lawful to “spill his blood and to take his money”. Regarding other non-Wahhabi 
Muslims, the Saudi state instructs to condemn those as infidels, especially those who 
preach tolerance or engage in genuine interfaith dialogue. Sufi and Shiite Muslims 
are viciously condemned, and those who leave Islam “should be killed”. Women 
should be segregated from men, veiled and may not work in certain jobs or divert 
from their assigned roles (subordinate wife, primarily care provider).308  
 This proselytizing is having effect. It is a serious threat to world peace. The 
globe is witnessing an intricate network of well-financed Islamist groups, who have 
severe brutality in combination with a multibillion dollar proselytizing campaign as 
means to reach their goal of a Sharia state, and will not stop until that goal has been 
reached.309 
 
Sharia State Example II: Islamization in Malaysia  
 
But terror is not the only way to establish a Sharia state. An example of how a nation 
can intrinsically change for the worst is Malaysia. It is an example of how a nation 
Islamised in a short period of time from a top-down, organized approach.310 This is, 
besides terror, another way of achieving that citizens subject themselves to ever-
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growing demands of Sharia. Some say Malaysia is “moderate” when it comes to 
Islam. But also in a “moderate” form, political Islam is detrimental to citizens. This 
case shows how certain repressive elements of Islamism work in practice, and that 
the ideal and practice of equal rights is incompatible with an Islamic politico-religious 
framework. Malaysia is not unique: what is described here is comparable to the 
situation in all nations that are confronted with a high degree of Islamification. 
 
Ethnic Malaysian Muslims account for over half the population of 28 million people. In 
1958, prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman (1903-1990) stated that Malaysia is not 
an Islamic State and that Islam is merely its official religion. He said: “There is no way 
we should have an Islamic State here […] we cannot force the non-Malays and non-
Muslims to follow our way of life. Our slogan ‘live and let live’ must be maintained 
because it is the only practical solution in a multi-racial society like ours.”311 That 
spirit was not there to stay. In 2008, Marina Mahathir, daughter of former prime 
minister Mathatmir bin Mohamad, stated: “Malaysia used to have the best legislation 
protecting the rights of Muslim women in the world. And now we’ve gone backwards 
slowly. The 13 states are all allowed to make their own laws in this area and 
therefore you get variations […] We have this dual system between Muslim and non-
Muslim women, we are living under a different system – what you in the West call 
Sharia law. So we are living under a kind of apartheid not based on skin colour but 
religion.”312  
 There was no Ikhwan or Boko Haram-styled violent jihad, but an Islamist 
political effort aimed at Islamizing the nation from the early 1980s onwards. First, in 
1982, the Malaysian government instituted procedures and government agencies 
that had as primary goal to ensure that economic, social and community state 
projects were in line with Islamic teachings. Second, the authority of the ulama – the 
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religious elite of scholars at the top of the hierarchy and the arbiters of Sharia – was 
centralized. There were 100 ulama in the Department for Islamic Development in 
1982, and over 700 in the Ministry of Education. This has played a huge role 
normalizing and disseminating Islamic extremism amongst Malaysian Muslims. At the 
same time, a federal-level Technical Sharia and Civil Law Committee was 
established, which transformed Islamic law into a systematized and bureaucratized 
Islamic judicial and legal system.  
 Now, the Malaysian “Islamization agenda” is no different from Islamist 
movements in the Arab region, nor is it unique for Malaysia. The primary islamist 
state goal is to be the guardian of a moral code set by Islamic law, or Sharia, based 
mainly on the Koran, the Sunna and legal interpretation by the ulama. As guardian of 
an Islamic moral code, the Islamization of Malaysia – as everywhere in the world – is 
overwhelmingly occupied with regulating family laws such as polygamy, divorce, 
custody and inheritance, and to issues as veiling, and gender relations (often in the 
form of sex segregation). A second component is the imposition of laws concerning 
Islamic criminal punishment. Generally, the effects of this Islamization for women 
have been negative and restrictive. For instance, instead of expecting men to assert 
self-control or socialize them into that, the solution to women’s safety is veiling 
women’s bodies, to seclude them from men other than their kin, regulating their role 
as mothers (caretakers and service-providers for male family members’ needs), and 
making sure they are obedient (including always sexually available) wives.313  
 A Muslim wife must be obedient and must not commit nushuz (rebellion of the 
wife against her husband’s authority).314 Koranic verse 4:34 reads: “Men are the 
protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more 
(strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means. 
Therefore, the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband’s) 
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absence what Allah would have them guard. As to those women on whose part ye 
fear disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (next), refuse to share their 
beds, (and last) chastise them (lightly); but if they return to obedience, seek not 
against them means (of annoyance); for Allah is Most High, Great (above you all).”315 
There is also this hadith: “The Prophet said, “If a woman spends the night deserting 
her husband's bed (does not sleep with him), then the angels send their curses on 
her till she comes back (to her husband).”316 Sexual availability is a wife’s marital 
obligation under Sharia: “It is obligatory for a woman to let her husband have sex with 
her immediately when: a) he asks her; b) at home (home being the place where he is 
currently staying, even if being lent to him or rented); c) she can physically endure it’; 
[…]”. If a woman shows signs of ‘rebelliousness’ (e.g. “when she answers him coldly 
when she used to do so politely, or he asks her to come to bed and she refuses”, the 
husband “warns in words”, but if she commits rebelliousness he “[…] may hit her, but 
not in a way that injures her, meaning he may not (A: bruise her,) break bones, 
wound her, or cause blood to flow.”317 The idea that women are inferior, and 
subordinate to men, and second class citizens is characteristic of Islamic 
fundamentalism. Men are expected to take the responsibility of protecting women 
and providing her with her basic needs – life, morality and chastity.318  
 The key principle of religious family law in general is to define and regulate 
membership of the community. Women, clearly, are vital to the transmission of 
collective identity, and their reproductive function and their assigned role of primary 
caretaker are exerted to control communal membership. What is particular for Islam 
though, is that the necessity of restricting women’s liberties and discouraging 
independence is based on idea of fitna. Earlier, I wrote about the concept of 
jahiliyyah, the opposite of utopian Islam, which refers to a state of severe moral 
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decline, a spiritual darkness, and which must be avoided by adhering to a 
fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic law. Fitna is a comparable concept. Through 
the eyes of Islamic fundamentalists, women are a constant source of fitna – sexual 
temptation leading to social disorder, moving towards catastrophe. ‘Uncontrolled’ and 
uncovered women are taken as the cause of moral decadence and other social 
problems. Women thus need to be removed (through veiling, segregation or 
seclusion) from the public sphere.319 It thus does not come as a surprise that the first 
category of individuals that Islamists target, are women. Preventing sexual 
aggression and assault becomes solely a woman’s responsibility – if a woman is not 
properly covered, she should not be surprised if a man cannot contain himself, that is 
the idea. Problematic is that this makes what is perceived as the lack of proper 
veiling a justification for sexual assault. For instance, there was the Chief Mufti of 
Australia who said in response to a gang rape: “If she was in her room, in her home, 
in her Hijab, no problem would have occurred.”320 
 The more Islamization, the more women’s status, rights and body come under 
heavy regulation. This too happened in Malaysia. In the late 1970s and through the 
1980s, all Islamic reactionary movements pushed for head covering and a loose long 
body covering type of dress. Norani Othman, professor of sociology in Malaysia and 
founding member of “Sisters of Islam” (an organization that challenges extremism), 
states: “The mere insistence of the hijab on women by many traditionalising ulama 
and militant or activist Islamists challenges the moral autonomy of the individual and 
reduces the personal independence of Muslim females.”321 Let alone when dress 
codes are formally regulated, as is the case in some parts of Malaysia. In the north of 
Malaysia, Islamization has led to fines for headscarves that do not cover enough, and 
lipstick and high heels have been banned. New laws segregated the sexes at public 
                                                          
319




 See: ‘Five Reasons To Ban the Burqa’, Frontpage Mag 11 July 2011 via 
<http://www.frontpagemag.com/2011/dgreenfield/five-reasons-to-ban-the-burqa/> 
321
 Othman 2006, p. 342. 
132 
 
events, and even separate payment counters in supermarkets. Couples sitting too 
closely together on park benches are fined.322 It was proposed to ban women from 
jobs with night shifts, such as the police force and hospitals, as to not disrupt family 
life.  
 Muslim women feel compelled to cover themselves. Some do so out of a 
sense of retaining a ‘lost’ cultural identity – an identity under siege due to Western 
influences, at least, that is the message. In fact, it is a vital part of the Islamization 
agenda to spread the belief that the ‘ideal’ identity of an Islamic woman must be 
‘recovered’. This idea is espoused by both male as female Islamists.323  
 The pressure to conform to formalised Islamic laws increased tremendously 
over the past decades. In 2009, a Malay was sentenced to public caning for drinking 
a beer in public, as alcohol is forbidden under Islamic law. 324 In 2010, three women 
were caned after been found guilty of extra-marital sex. In fact, the fatwa’s nowadays 
are so invasive and micromanaging people, that an e-fatwa website is now available 
for citizens. The list with over 1500 rulings includes a ban on Halloween, Valentine’s 
day, botox, yoga, black metal music, and wagyu beef, as the cows are occasionally 
fed beer.325 Moreover, the organiser of a dog-petting event received death threats as 
Muslims are not supposed to touch “unclean” animals. In October 2014, the state of 
Kelantan began enforcing a law that allows Muslim men to be imprisoned up to a 
year for missing Friday prayers three times in a row. The Shi’a denomination is 
outlawed. 326 Bibles have been confiscated since 1981, as the government fears they 
may be used for proselytizing. Up until 2014 Christians were even forbidden to use 
the word “Allah” for their Christian god. The Christian minority is concerned for its 
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safety, as churches are firebombed.327 The civil courts consider apostasy claims the 
sole preserve of Sharia courts, where apostasy is considered a crime.328 Kassim 
Ahmad, a Malaysian intellectual who stated that Muslims only need the Koran, not 
the hadiths, who questions the headscarf for women, and described Muhammed as 
“just a messenger of Allah”, is prosecuted by the government.329 For the past fifteen 
years, (educated and high-skilled) Malay are increasingly emigrating from the country 
in order to escape increasing Islamic fundamentalism and authoritarianism.330 
 Tolerance and pluralism are not values which are welcome in this version of 
Islam, and tolerance and pluralism are actively suppressed by the ulama, the minority 
religious elite. But, one may wonder, if this is not what Malaysians want, then where 
is the protest? There hardly is any. People do not dare to speak up against the tide of 
Islamization for fear of reprisals. Documentary maker Norhayati Kaprawi said about 
contemporary Malaysian society: “It's full of fear. If you don't follow the mainstream 
you will be lynched.”331 Othman explains that open debate on religion is hardly 
present in Malaysian society. That is because, as Othman as a citizen of Malaysia 
herself believes, few Malaysians have the courage to express critical views. Most 
have been socialized into accepting what the ulama prescribes, and individuals are 
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ashamed of their ignorance about Islam. Also, elected politicians are held back by an 
inner constraint to come across as anti-Islam if they – even merely appear to – 
question the validity of any decision set out in Sharia-based law proposal. Moreover, 
politicians use Islam to gain political currency, and lastly, in the absence of an open 
democratic process and debate, the all-invasive Islamic laws and fatwa’s are 
imposed on Muslims without their knowledge and consent. Islamization takes place 
in a shroud of secrecy, fear and ignorance and it intensively pervades the lives of 
Malaysians. “This abdication of civil courage and responsibility by both Muslims and 
Malaysian citizens of other faiths and religious affiliations has encouraged the 
fostering of an incipient Islamic theocracy in Malaysia and the authoritarian rule of a 
minority in matters of Islam”, Othman concludes.332  
 In a Sharia state, citizens do not have the right to challenge the Sharia rules 
that are enforced upon them.333 Policing free speech, either through legislation or 
intimidation, is thus vital in establishing and maintaining a Sharia state. It is not 
without reason that the most authoritarian Sharia state in the world, Saudi Arabia, 
denies its citizens freedom of speech and freedom of belief. In a Sharia state, 
religious minorities are unwelcome and the basic notion of equal rights is ignored. 
Individual rights and moral independence are subordinated to fulfilling religious duties 
as a member of the collective Umma.  
 
The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the Cairo Declaration 
 
In 1969, Saudi Arabia initiated the foundation of the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference (later changed to Cooperation), the IOC. It is the only intergovernmental 
organisation based on a shared religion, and is one of the largest intergovernmental 
organisation with 57 Member States in 2011.334 Those 57 Member States – 
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regardless of theological, social, cultural diversity among them – share a commitment 
to Islamic values and Sharia.  
 The OIC incorporates not only Hanbali Saudi Wahhabism, but also Maliki, 
Hanafi, Shafi (all Sunni) schools of thought, and Shia Islam. Yet, the idea of a unified 
Umma of an estimated 1.6 billion Muslims around the world is strong: “[t]he 
Organization is the collective voice of the Muslim world and ensuring [sic] to 
safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting 
international peace and harmony among various people of the world.”335 In the 1972 
Charter, the OIC affirms its support for the rights of peoples conform the UN Charter 
and international law.336 The plural form of peoples is also uses in the preamble of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights there is also a reference to “all members of the human family”, 
whereas the OIC limits itself to Muslims, and more specifically, the group of Muslims 
in the form of the Umma as the legal subject, not the individual. Furthermore, as an 
organisation founded on the shared religion of Islam, the OIC sets out, inter alia:  
 
11) “To disseminate, promote and preserve the Islamic teachings and values based 
on moderation and tolerance, promote Islamic culture and safeguard Islamic 
heritage”; 
12) “To protect and defend the true image of Islam, to combat defamation of Islam 
and encourage dialogue among civilisations and religions”;  
14) “To promote and to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms including the 
rights of women, children, youth, elderly and people with special needs as well as the 
preservation of Islamic family values”;  
16) “To safeguard the rights, dignity and religious and cultural identity of Muslim 
communities and minorities in non-Member States”. 
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The Charter is clear on its goals: Islam is a religion and a culture and must be 
protected and promoted on behalf of all Muslims in the world. Moreover, nations with 
an Islamic foundation should unite to achieve this on a global, political, level. In line 
with the UN Charter’s article 102 (“Every treaty and every international agreement 
entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes 
into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published 
by it” ), the OIC Charter is registered as a treaty and thus becomes a recognized 
international legal instrument. In 1975, six years after its establishment, the OIC is 
granted the status of “Permanent Observer”, which allows the OIC to participate as 
observers in sessions, in the work of the General Assembly and holds a permanent 
office at the UN Headquarters in New York.337  The most obvious motivation for the 
establishment of the OIC dates back to the post-war 1940s. It stems from the 
dissatisfaction of the leaders of Islamic countries with the universal, secular and 
individualist character of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, established by 
the United Nations in 1948.338 Eleanor Roosevelt (1884-1962), who chaired the 
drafting committee of the Universal Declaration, wrote in her memoirs that Saudi king 
Ibn Saud (1876-1953) believed that the content of the Declaration was not consonant 
with the Koran.339  
 Especially articles 16 and 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
prove to be difficult for the representatives of countries with a predominantly Muslim 
population. Article 16 concerns equal rights within the setting of marriage: “Men and 
women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the 
right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, 
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during marriage and at its dissolution.” This article contains many aspects which do 
not align with Sharia. For instance, Muslims may not enter marriage with non-
Muslims, especially women may not, and women do not have the same rights as 
men when it comes to dissolving the marriage under Sharia. When it comes to 
divorce, a husband can unilaterally – without permission of his wife – do so by 
pronouncing the talaq. For women, on the other hand, asking her husband for a 
divorce “when she has not suffered any harm from him”, is considered an ‘enormity’. 
An enormity is a shocking, evil, or immoral act, and is defined as “[…] any sin 
entailing either a threat of punishment in the hereafter explicitly mentioned by the 
Koran or hadith […].”340 
 Under great lobby efforts of the OIC, the provision of spousal equality in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 – in a way the successor 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – has been slimmed down to article 23 
(4): “States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure 
equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and 
at its dissolution.” The equal rights of spouses has turned into a mere effort on behalf 
of states, rather than asserting an inherent right to equality. And even more striking, 
the original ban on restricting marriages on the basis of race, nationality or religion 
has been edited out of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.341  
 The same process happened with article 18 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. That provision grants individuals the right to change religion or belief, 
as changing one’s religion is an important part of religious freedom. Article 8 of the 
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1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights” reads: “Everyone has the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change 
his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance.” Already at the onset of the deliberations on the content of this 
provision, several Islamic Member States protested.342 The dominant idea that a) a 
Muslim is born a Muslim, b) this cannot be denounced and c) if denounced that 
constitutes a crime in the form of apostasy, was and is dominant. Islamic laws are 
clear: “When a person who has reached puberty and is sane voluntarily apostatizes 
from Islam, he deserves to be killed.” And: There is no indemnity for killing an 
apostate.”343 Thus, again under influence by the OIC, the right to change one’s 
religion is deleted from the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
and replaced by the right to “have” or to “adopt” a religion or belief. It now reads: 
article 18 (1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 
teaching.”344 For Saudi Arabia, both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are deemed incompatible with 
Sharia, and it ratified neither.345  
 Leaving the OIC without a Declaration of Rights with international standing, 
the need arose for a legal document which did reflect the Koran and Sunna properly. 
In 1990, the IOC presented the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 
(henceforth: the Cairo Declaration).346 The Cairo Declaration is intended as an 
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Islamic alternative to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, since the universal 
rights system as espoused by the United Nations is considered too secular and 
Western and should be changed to accommodate Islamic culture and religious 
values.347 The Cairo Declaration is the outcome of years of preparation and debate 
among Member States and now reflects the shared values of Shia, Sunni, and thus 
Hanbali, Maliki, Hanafi and Shafi, and all hybrid forms of, Islamic thought. The 
Declaration is explicitly not secular and not universal. The preamble states:  
 
 “The Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 
 
 Reaffirming the civilizing and historical role of the Islamic Umma which God 
 made the best nation that has given mankind a universal and well-balanced 
 civilization in which harmony is established between this life and the hereafter 
 and knowledge is combined with faith; and the role that this Umma should play 
 to guide a humanity confused by competing trends and ideologies and to 
 provide solutions to the chronic problems of this materialistic civilization. 
 […] 
 Believing that fundamental rights and universal freedoms in Islam are an 
 integral part of the Islamic religion and that no one as a matter of principle has 
 the right to suspend them in whole or in part or violate or ignore them in as 
 much as they are binding divine commandments, which are contained in the 
 Revealed Books of God and were sent through the last of His Prophets to 
 complete the preceding divine messages thereby making their observance an 
 act of worship and their neglect or violation an abominable sin, and 
 accordingly every person is individually responsible - and the Umma 
 collectively responsible - for their safeguard.”348  
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The 25 articles of human rights and duties that follow the preamble all fit within the 
boundaries of Sharia.349 All human beings are equal in terms of human dignity – as 
opposed to equality in terms of rights – and united by submission to God, and true 
faith is taken as the guarantee for enhancing human dignity up to a level of human 
perfection (art. 1). The rights that ensue from the Divine are also curtailed by it. Take 
for instance the right to life: “it is prohibited to take away life except for a Shari'ah 
prescribed reason” (art. 2 (a)). Or the right to enjoy safety from bodily harm, which 
may not be breached “without a Sharia-prescribed reason” (art. 2 (d)).350 Although 
prima facie formulated as a right to life and bodily integrity, it actually legitimizes 
Sharia-based corporal punishments, including the death penalty. The fifth article on 
marital rights state that men and women have the right to marriage, and that there 
shall be no restrictions based on race, color or nationality. This provision omitted the 
right to dissolve the marriage nor the right to marry someone with another religion. 
Article 6 states that “woman is equal to man in human dignity”.  
 Equal dignity should not be confused with equal rights, as Associate Professor 
of Legal Studies Ann Elizabeth Mayer tells us. In Islam and Human Rights (2007), 
she writes: “Given the evasiveness typically found in the wording of Islamic human 
rights schemes, one is alerted to the fact that the failure to stipulate equality in 
“rights” is not accidental and that the equality in “dignity” and “obligations” is not 
intended to signify equality in “rights”.351 The Parties to the Declaration were 
consciously avoiding legal equality of the sexes or between people of religion other 
than Islam.352 The same can be observed in article 7, which grants both parents 
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rights with regard to their children “in accordance with the tenets of the Shari’ ah”. 
Furthermore, there are certain provisions on work, education, medical and socials 
care, criminal law (“as provided for in the Shari’ah”). Lastly, I want to bring attention 
to the right to express one’s opinion “freely in such a manner as would not be 
contrary to the principles of Sharia’ah” (art. 22 (a)).353 Article 22 includes a prohibition 
on violating the sanctity of ‘the prophets’ and on undermining moral and ethical 
values that may weaken faith in society.354 This provision of the Cairo Declaration 
makes critical reflections, and public debate on the legitimacy of Islam and Sharia as 
sources for morality in itself, as well as questioning the validity of Islamic ideas and 
practices, unlawful. 
 What may we expect from the Cairo Declaration? What is its legal status? For 
example, there is no international court that grants Muslims access to indict states for 
violating their rights based on the 1990 Declaration. Does it create positive (the duty 
to secure the effective enjoyment of a fundamental right) or negative (the duty to 
abstain from human rights violations) obligations for OIC Member States? No, it does 
not. Ann Elizabeth Mayer states that the “awkward” hybrid model of Western 
constitutions and internal law, one the one hand, and Islamic elements and concepts, 
on the other, are puzzling from the perspective of Islamic law. This is because 
generally, rules that are established outside the system of Islamic methods and 
criteria are considered irrelevant by Islamic scholars. Still, one could see the Cairo 
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Declaration as a step forward, as Islamic culture is merging with the universal human 
rights standard, albeit superficially. More pessimistic, however, one could say that the 
deficiencies of this Islamic version of human rights is holding back the realization of 
universal human rights. “Since Islamization pressures seem to continue, a skeptic 
might predict that any models that give governments grounds for claiming that they 
have an Islamic warrant for denying the rights afforded under international law could 
be exploited to impede the cause of human rights”, Mayer writes.355 What will 
ultimately prove to be the case is subject to speculation. Having said that, it is clear 
from the formulations of the Cairo provisions that Sharia is invoked to limit the scope 
of rights awarded. Moreover, if the Cairo Declaration had been intended to actually 
reflect the scope of liberties that all humans enjoy under the universal human rights 
system, there had not been a desire to create an alternative for Muslims.  More 
importantly, the OIC and its Cairo Declaration prove the point that despite enormous 
diversity among Muslims, Islamic doctrines, and political systems employed by OIC 
Member States, there is the general acceptance that Sharia does and should restrict 
universal and equal rights. That means that men and women do not have equal 
rights, it means that Muslims enjoy a better legal (and moral) position than Jews, 
Christians, Hindus, atheists and other Non-Muslims. It means that “cruel and 
unusual” punishments are legitimized. Despite diversity, the Koran and Sunna do 
enable interpretations which enable fundamentalist and radical Muslims to legitimize 
inequality in rights and unfair practices. The fact that article 22 of the Cairo 
Declaration prohibits debate (everyone has the right to express opinions freely as 
long as it does not contravene Sharia principles) seals off the possibility of satirising, 
questioning, contextualising, doubting, researching or reforming. That means that 
those outside and inside the Muslim world who voice their opinion against the idea 
that Sharia should set the norm for freedom and protection, are considered guilty of a 
crime.  
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In order to stimulate the stifling of debate and suppressing criticism of Islam and 
Islamism, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation has been lobbying at the UN, EU 
and western parliaments to outlaw “Islamophobia”. The OIC launched the 
Islamophobia Observatory, a watchdog organisation based in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia in 
2007. Since 2008, it has published annual reports on Islamophobia. In the first report, 
it is stated that: 
 
“One of the major challenges of today’s world is the issue of Islamophobia. In recent 
years, this phenomenon has assumed serious proportions and has become a major 
cause of concern for the Muslim world. As a result of this rising trend, Muslims, in the 
West in particular, are being stereotyped, profiled, and subjected to different forms of 
discriminatory treatment. The most sacred symbols of Islam are being defiled and 
denigrated in an insulting, offensive, and contemptuous manner to incite hatred and 
unrest in society. While Islam, as the religion of peace and tolerance, affirms 
moderation and balance and rejects all forms of extremism and terrorism, the 
proponents of Islamophobia continue their campaign in defaming Islam and 
Muslims.”356 
 There is material that shows that the term was created by Islamists to create 
an atmosphere of victimisation, where Muslims are continuously portrayed as victims 
suffering from hatred, discrimination and negative stereotyping. Although I do not 
think that Muslim citizens in the West are exonerated from factual discrimination and 
negativity, I do want to draw attention to the fact that Islamists – supported by many 
Western elites – established a theme of victimhood which is both caused by critical 
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debate and would be resolved by ending criticism of Islamic and Islamist practices 
and ideas.357  
 Take for instance Abdur-Rahman Muhammed, an American who was once an 
Islamist militant. He was present when islamist members of the International Institute 
for Islamic Thought – a Muslim Brotherhood front organization in the US – convened 
and decided to propagate this term for political purposes. Muhammed now works to 
combat Islamic extremism. On Islamophobia, he writes: “This loathsome term is 
nothing more than a thought-terminating cliche conceived in the bowels of Muslim 
think tanks for the purpose of beating down critics.”358 Indian-American journalist 
Asra Nomani (b. 1965), author of Standing Alone: An American Woman’s Struggle 
for the Soul of Islam, writes on the “bullying” of the informal honor brigade (the 
“ghairat brigade”) that operates alongside the official OIC channels. The ghairat 
brigade – partly funded and supported by the OIC – makes personal visits to silence 
people and uses the internet to consequently label critics as “Islamophobes”. There 
is also a wide community of unorganized people who take up the role of blasphemy 
police. Whenever someone publicly speaks up against Islam or Islamism, such as 
Nomani, a consorted effort is made to silence debate on extremist ideology in order 
to protect the image of Islam.359  
 The consequences of the “Islamophobia” meme are huge. Nomani writes: 
“Bullying this intense really works. Observant members of the flock are culturally 
conditioned to avoid shaming Islam, so publicly citing them for that sin often has the 
desired effect. Non-Muslims, meanwhile, are wary of being labelled “Islamophobic” 
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bigots. So attacks against both groups succeed in quashing civil discourse. They 
cause governments, writers and experts to walk on eggshells, avoiding important 
discussion.”360  
 Not only de facto are individuals discouraged to keep silent on Islamism. Also 
de iure. The OIC, as the largest voting bloc in the United Nations, resorts to legal 
instruments – e.g. by means of resolutions – to establish what would in effect be 
global blasphemy law.361  
 
Back to Europe: The Middle Way to Establishing a Sharia State 
 
There is no question that a debate on the future of Islam is taking place everywhere 
in the Muslim world as well as in the West. Unfortunately, the most dominant voice of 
Islam is that which comes from the Islamists, who force their take on Islam either 
through violent jihad – as the murder of the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists proves once 
more, or spread the message alongside an Islamization agenda through a non-
violent jihad, often accompanied by intimidating those who use their freedom of 
speech to push back the Islamist movement. This is a problem worldwide.362  
 Qutb, for a long time the Muslim Brotherhood’s most foremost ideologue, 
made it unmistakably clear that the design of the world order is what is most 
important. Aforementioned German political scientist Bassam Tibi quotes Qutb on his 
central tenet: “The dar al-Islam/territory of Islam is the place where this shari’a is 
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implemented.” For this implementation, “Muslims need to fight for an ‘Islamic world 
revolution’ to establish hakimiyyat Allah/Allah’s rule in a shari’a state, not only in the 
world of Islam, but also in the world at large. In pursuit of this, it is ‘prescribed to 
Muslims to fight jihad to establish God’s rule on the globe to save humanity.’ This 
salvation occurs on the grounds of shari’a, viewed ‘as universal law for the entire 
world’.”363  
 But Qutb’s method to bringing Islamism to the world has been updated by 
someone who is currently the world’s principal ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood: 
Egyptian-born Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926). This leading figure is now based in Qatar, 
and has published about a dozen books and has an immense following via his 
website IslamOnline and the television program “Shariah and Life” on Al Jazeera – 
estimated at 60 million viewers. Qaradawi is also founder and president of the 
Dublin-based European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) and is connected to 
the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies of Oxford University – although he is banned 
from entering the United Kingdom (and the United States). The ECFR is a board of 
Islamic scholars who are part of the network of the international Muslim Brotherhood. 
Several volumes of fatwa’s have been published under its authority, mainly focused 
on conformity to Sharia for Muslims in Europe.364  
 There are grosso modo three ways to subject people to a regime of political 
Islam: by means of terror, as happened in what we now know as Saudi Arabia and is 
happening now by, inter alia, Al Qaeda, Islamic State and Boko Haram.365 Secondly, 
compliance to a Sharia state can by accomplished by means of a top-down political 
take-over (at whatever pace), as happened in Iran and is now taking place in 
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Malaysia. Thirdly, it can be slowly effectuated in a bottom-up fashion. This is the 
method of Qaradawi’s Middle Way, as I will explain. 
 In the 1960s, Qaradawi was commissioned by Egypt’s al-Azhar university to 
write a manual of how Muslims in the West should live by Islamic tenets. The book, 
The Lawful and Prohibited in Islam, has roughly 70 editions in Arabic and has been 
translated in many languages, including English, German and French. In 1990 he 
issued an important manifest titled “Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming 
Phase”. The most important message Qaradawi has is that the conquest of the West 
should not be by “the sword or armies, but by preaching and ideology”.366 Other than 
Salafists or Wahhabis who accept the method of violent jihad, the Muslim 
Brotherhood adopted a new method that Qaradawi unfolds in his works. Since the 
1990s, this new doctrine is referred to as wassatiyya: a sort of “middle way” between 
violent extremism and secularism.367 I have to emphasize that this new doctrine is 
not a diversion from the goal of establishing a global Sharia State, but it is a new 
method for achieving this. Whereas jihadi Salafist for instance openly call for jihad, 
refuse to participate as Western citizens and reject the west as “Land of Kufr”, the 
new Islamists adopt a more pragmatic way while getting Sharia to dominate every 
realm of human activity and thought in the West.368  
 Wassatiyya prefers the use of dawa. Dawa (literally making an invitation or 
issuing a summons) is the act of non-violent proselytizing, of dialogue (“inviting non-
Muslims to Islam”). An important part of Middle Way Islamism is that obligations and 
restrictions for Muslims following from Sharia – ranging from not being allowed to 
work at a restaurant where alcohol is served to the duty to fight violent jihad in order 
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to spread Islam – may be temporarily set aside in order not to alarm non-Muslim 
Europeans while working towards a Sharia state.369 Once established, all 
suspensions are rescinded. 
 Qaradawi is not the only proponent of this method and ideology. Another well-
known one is Tariq Ramadan (born 1962), who is professor of Islamic Studies at 
Oxford University as well as at universities in Qatar, Morocco and Malaysia. He is the 
grandson of Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although this in 
itself is not something that can be held against him, Ramadan is known to ally with 
the Brotherhood and its goals. Together with Qaradawi – who he extolls, Ramadan is 
seen as one of the primary developers of the uniquely European concept of Islamic 
dawa.370  
 Qaradawi promotes this fiqh-al-aqalliyyat, or, jurisprudence for Muslim 
minorities. He believes the Islamist movement plays a vital role in creating separated 
Muslim communities in the West. As one of the middle way’s key proponents he 
warns Muslims in the West against the “melting” of Muslims and their identity into the 
large non-Muslim majority. Yet, he sees it as an opportunity as well: as most 
expatriated Muslims experience a sense of disorientation in the West, they prove to 
be ideal recipients for the movement’s propaganda. Italian scholar Lorenzo Vidino, 
author of The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West (2010), unfolds Qaradawi’s 
modus operandi for achieving global Sharia domination. He “[…] openly calls for the 
creation of a separate society for Muslims within the West. While he highlights the 
importance of keeping open a dialogue with non-Muslims, he advocates the 
establishment of Muslim communities with “their own religious, educational and 
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recreational establishments.” He urges his fellow revivalists to try “to have your small 
society within the larger society” and “your own ‘Muslim ghetto.’” 371   
 This ghettoization is part of a wider strategy of the “middle way” towards 
establishing a Sharia state. This strategy includes seven stages through which 
Muslim minorities in the West should go, according to Qaradawi. Firstly, Muslims 
should become aware of their Muslim identity, which should “awaken” in the second 
stage. Stages three and four regard the spreading of the movement and the forming 
of groups. In the fifth stage, mosques should be constructed and Islamic schools and 
organisations need to be founded – which Qaradawi views as manifestations of a 
parallel society. In stage six the non-Muslim majority becomes used to Islam as a 
permanent and visible presence. Finally, Muslims use their inner self-assurance to 
interact with the majority of the host society and begin propagating their faith and 
values.372 In this seventh stage Muslims should gain access to key positions in all 
areas, such as media, politics, economics, sociology and medicine. The purpose is 
that these “awakened” Muslims seek to adapt Western science as well as concepts 
of human and civil rights to Islam.373  
 This step-by-step implementation of Sharia in the West is preferred over the 
introduction of a Sharia state by means of violent jihad. One of the justifications of not 
using violent jihad is that when Muhammed was spreading Islam and him and his 
followers were the minority in the Arabian Peninsula, no violence was used. It was at 
a later stage, when Muhammed had formed a majority of Muslims, he began to use 
severe violence to force Islam upon others.374  
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 Although the goal is thus the same, Qaradawi prefers this “middle way” 
strategy so not to scare people off. Part of that strategy is the pragmatic decision to 
use “dawa language” that avoids negative associations for western audiences, such 
as not mentioning the desire of establishing an Islamic state, describing Islam as a 
“religion of peace and tolerance”, focussing on jihad as an “inner struggle”, describing 
Sharia as a “just order” that guarantees social justice, or Sharia as a “set of values” 
rather than a body of laws, or labelling the headscarf as an expression of female 
liberation rather than a religious obligation.375 The Islamic construct of “taqiyya” 
legitimizes this kind of double speak. At the risk of conveying some sort of a 
“conspiracy message”, I do believe it is important to discuss this concept. Taqiyya is 
described variously as “precautionary dissimulation,” “religiously-sanctioned 
deception,” “lying” or “deception” and “keeping one’s convictions secret” and “tactical 
dissimulation” or “holy deception”. Early Islamic texts read: “Al Taqiyya is with the 
tongue only; not the heart. A believer can make any statement as long as the ‘heart 
is comfortable […]”; “God gave the believers freedom of movement by takiyya; 
therefore conceal thyself […]”; “Takiyya is a cloak for the believer: he who has no 
religion has no takiyya, associate your opponents only outwardly and oppose them 
inwardly”.376 In short, Muslims have holy permission to deceive “infidels”.377 
Previously mentioned Middle Way Islamist Tariq Ramadan has been accused this 
form of “doublespeak”. French researcher Caroline Fourest analyzed fifteen of his 
books, 1,500 pages of interviews and circa a hundred recordings and concluded that 
Ramadan is the political heir of his grandfather Hassan al-Banna as he repeats the 
discourse that Banna had at the beginning of the 20th century in Egypt. She argues 
that he has one message for his Muslim followers and something else entirely 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
scholars agree on this, the Prophet were commanded to fight everyone until they established the law of 
Allah.”. See ‘Haitham al-Haddad’, The Islamic far-right in Britain, via <http://tifrib.com/haitham-al-haddad/>.  
375
 Polanz 2012, p. 26 and Wiedl 2009.  
376
 Campbell, Andrew, “Taqiyya’: How Islamic Extremists Deceive the West’, National Observer 2005, pp. 11-23 
(12). 
377
 For instance in Koran 3: 28 and 40: 28. Ibrahim, Raymond, ‘How Taqiyya Alters Islam's Rules of War. 




different to his Western audience.378 This is part of the Islamist strategy to openly 
breach with Sharia principles in order to work towards the implementation and 
acceptance of Sharia.  
 The presence of Muslims in the West is deemed “a great benefit” for the global 
Islamist movement. The idea is that if Muslims in Europe create an Islamic 
environment for Muslim immigrants and European converts and influence the social 
and political climate favourably towards Islam and the Umma, that will inspire 
Western leaders to pressure Muslim rulers on Muslim countries to be more 
accommodating to the Islamic movement in those countries.379 For this to work, 
Muslim minorities need a tailored version of Islamic law. Sharia councils are one of 




The focus in this chapter is on the worst version of Islamic fundamentalism. I am 
aware there is a plethora of varieties in theory and practice. At the same time I am 
confident that the core is as I have described it. The core of Islamic fundamentalism 
is a theologically justified political goal of saving and purifying society by means of 
establishing a Sharia state in which the Umma is unified. This Sharia state can be 
achieved by means of terror, by a political takeover, or by a bottom-up approach. It is 
this last version that is prevalent in Europe under leadership of Islamists.  
 In the 1970s and 1980s, Wahhabi Saudi Islam and the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood made a pact to exert Islamist influence in the West. In just a few 
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decades, the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates have succeeded in building a vast 
network of media outlets, think tanks, educational centres and Sharia councils in 
Europe. Moreover, Sharia-patrolled ghettoes have also become part of society as 
well.380 It is part of the “Islamic movement” Qaradawi calls for, by which he means 
“organized, collective work, undertaken by the people, to restore Islam to the 
leadership of society”, as he wrote in the introduction of his “Priorities of the Islamic 
Movement in the Coming Phase”.381 And although the “dialogue” can be one of 
openly demonstrating allegiance to democracy, religious freedom and equality – 
between Muslims and non-Muslims, and between men and women, it is very clear 
that those are constructs and practices that are firmly rejected by Islamists. It is not 
seldom Orwellian double-speak. As Qaradawi stated: “Were we to convince Western 
leaders and decision-makers of our right to live according to our faith – ideologically, 
legislatively, and ethnically – without imposing our views or inflicting harm upon them, 
we would have traversed an immense barrier in our quest for an Islamic state.”382 
From the examples of Saudi Arabia and Malaysia we know what Islamification of a 
society holds in store for its citizens.  
 It is a problem, because research about Euro-Muslims reveals a strong link 
between religious fundamentalism and a high level of “outgroup hostility”. That 
means that a sizeable number of fundamentalist Muslims are intolerant towards 
those who do not share their foundations, significantly more than fundamentalist 
Christians do. About half of Euro-Muslims believe the West is out to destroy Islam, do 
not want homosexuals as friends, and believe Jews cannot be trusted.383 This is not 
“un-Islamic” as becomes clear from studying Wahhabi Islam. It is all the more 
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problematic since Islamic fundamentalism in Europe is increasingly gaining ground 
among European Muslims.  
 That does not have to mean that all those in power should be alarmed and 
start preparing for a civil war between Muslims and Non-Muslims in Europe. But it 
does mean that knowledge and awareness on this topic is increasingly required and 
an adequate response is needed.  
 The next chapter is a study on Sharia councils. In Your Fatwa Does Not Apply 
Here: Untold Stories from the Fight Against Muslim Fundamentalism (2013), 
Bennoune does not want to conflate a wide range of ideologies and movements, but 
does find there are significant commonalities among the fundamentalists. “They 
believe in the imposition of “God’s law”, something called the Sharia – their version of 
it rather than others’ – on Muslims everywhere, and in the creation of what they deem 
to be Islamic states or disciplined diasporic communities ruled by these laws”.384 To 
start with private laws concerning the rights and duties of Muslims in the West. It is 
privately run Sharia councils that provide religious law in action for diasporic Islamic 
communities. In the West, such a minority Muslim legal order is mostly manifest in 
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3.  When multiculturalism and Islamic fundamentalism coincide: Sharia councils in 




16th century French political philosopher Jean Bodin conceptualized the modern 
sovereign state as having the exclusive right to make laws and execute them within 
its territory.385 Nowadays, due to immigration and increasing influence of Islamist 
doctrines, Sharia is competing as a body of laws within national borders. Half of 
British Muslim young adults prefers to have Sharia laws over secular laws while, at 
the same time, multiculturalists are publicly polishing the image of Islamic laws and 
advocating for the “right” to resort to those.  
 This takes Taylorian identity politics (also known as “politics of difference”) a 
step further. Whereas Charles Taylor made the case that minorities had to be 
recognized for their difference which included the right to be exempted from certain 
universal legal obligations, new multiculturalism creates space for Muslims to have 
their “own” religious laws as an additional body of laws functioning within a state’s 
borders.  
 That means that representatives of the multiculturalist ideology must have a 
positive view of Sharia as a basis of a legal system. That raises the question: how do 
multiculturalists view Sharia? Answering that question obviously involves a degree of 
generalization. There are, however, some points that are commonly present, which I 
will illustrate with the speeches by then principal leader of the Church of England, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams and former Lord Chief Justice of England 
and Wales, Baron Phillips of Worth Matravers. 
 In 2008, Rowan Williams, at the time the most senior member of the national 
church, advocated the integration of parts of Sharia in a speech that caused a major 
controversy. A few months later, he was backed by the most senior judge in England 
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and Wales. According to Nicholas Phillips (1938), then Lord Chief Justice of England 
and Wales, “[t]here is no reason why principles of Sharia Law, or any other religious 
code should not be the basis for mediation or other forms of alternative dispute 
resolution”.386  
 Interestingly, resulting from a series of conventions signed by Turkey and 
Greece dating back to 1881, a Muslim minority in the Grecian province of Western 
Thrace depends on Sharia for decisions on family law disputes. Approximately 
100,000 Greek citizens have Islamic law, which is actually a part of the Greek legal 
order. Greek courts also enforce decisions made by religious authorities. This can be 
considered problematic in light of European human rights, especially cases 
concerning women and children.387 In fact, the Canadian province Ontario previously 
allowed for private parties to solve legal matters on the basis of Sharia law through 
means of enforceable arbitration – as pressed for by Islamic fundamentalists. Under 
great pressure from women’s rights groups and liberal Muslim organizations, Ontario 
revised several provisions of the Ontario Family Statute Law Amendment Act 2009, 
so that now any decision made by a third party in arbitration or other proceedings has 
no legal effect, unless the award is exclusively in accordance with the law of Ontario 
or of another Canadian jurisdiction.388 Now the United Kingdom is experiencing a 
similar debate.389 The outcome of this debate is important: it matters whether national 
courts enforce Sharia council decisions or whether the state maintains a doctrine of 
‘one law for all’.  
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 This Archbishop’s speech sparked mass controversy as he made the point 
that it should be possible for individuals to choose jurisdiction when settling private 
legal matters, including the option to have matters settled under Sharia law. Then 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown stated that it “is very clear that British laws must be 
based on British values and that religious law, while respecting other cultures, should 
be subservient to British criminal and civil law”.390 David Cameron, at that time leader 
of the Conservative Party, rejected any expansion of Sharia law in the UK, and said it 
would undermine society, alienate other communities, and that allowing two laws to 
work side by side would be dangerous, adding: “All citizens are equal before the law”. 
The Archbishop’s position was even questioned by his colleagues.391  
 In his defense of Williams, Lord Chief Justice Phillips – at that time the most 
senior representative of England and Wales’ judicial system – stated that under the 
Arbitration Act 1996, private parties had already been able to employ Sharia law in 
the context of family disputes.392 Similar to modern and secular legal systems, 
Islamic family law consists of rules regarding marriage, divorce, inheritance, property 
division and child custody. Both Williams and Phillips did have a case in point that it 
was already perfectly possible to have certain matters settled under Sharia – albeit 
not under the Arbitration Act. 
 In the United Kingdom, Islamic family law is institutionalized in the form of 
Sharia councils – which operate under the flag of mediation and arbitration. There 
have been publicly known Sharia councils in the United Kingdom since 1982, when 
sheikhs Sayyid Mutawalli ad-Darsh and Suhaib Hasan founded the first one. “The 
Islamic Sharia Council” has not been hindered by the government. In fact, it is a 
registered charity. 393 It is an umbrella organization consisting of around a dozen 
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Sharia councils. Other well-known Sharia councils are the Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunal, which has several departments and the Sharia council hosted by the 
Birmingham Central Mosque. Estimates run from about ten councils to 85 – with 
many councils functioning outside the limelight, for instance out of mosques and from 
websites.394 
 The Archbishop suggested looking at the possibilities of accommodation with 
a clearer eye, not to imagine we know exactly what we mean by Sharia, and “not just 
associate it with what we read about Saudi Arabia or whatever.”395 Together with the 
highest judge of England and Wales, the United Kingdom has two very influential 
endorsers of more Sharia for its citizens.  
 This chapter is a case study about Sharia councils in the United Kingdom.396 
The aim is not only to provide factual information about these councils, but also, by 
describing the councils’ Islamist ideological foundations and practices, to challenge 
some of the assumptions in multiculturalist discourse. Moreover, what is the 
relationship between multiculturalism and the accommodation of Islamic 
fundamentalism? 
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 This undertaking consists of several subtasks. First, I explain what 
multiculturalists understand to be Sharia and the relationship between 
multiculturalism and Islamic fundamentalism. Second, I describe the Islamist 
background of Britain’s most known and influential Sharia council. Third, I give insight 
in the practice of Sharia councils. Fourth, having covered that basis, I challenge the 
desire to combine Sharia councils with human rights and discuss Sharia councils 
compared to rabbinical courts. Fifth, the Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) 
Bill is discussed, which aims to restrict the remit of Sharia councils. Lastly, I will 
discuss several secular alternatives to these councils.  
  
Multiculturalists’ view of Sharia 
 
So far, it is possible to distinguish positions in this “Sharia council debate”. Firstly, 
there are those denouncing the endorsement of the idea that “it should be possible to 
choose to have matters settled under Sharia”, such as Brown and Cameron. 
Generally, the idea of endorsing Sharia for British Muslims is not a popular one, to 
say the least. At the same time, however, and this is particularly important for those 
with legislative powers, they did not introduce state measures to counter Sharia 
councils. Thus: morally and publicly rejected, but factually and legally unhindered. 
Condemned, but “laissez-faire”. We label this as tolerance.  
 Next to the tolerant position, there are those who are intolerant towards Sharia 
Councils. Examples include the non-governmental organizations One Law for All, the 
organization Sharia Watch UK, Women Living Under Muslim Laws, IKWRO (Iranian 
and Kurdish Women’s Rights Organisation, the Lawyer’s Secular Society, Southall 
Black Sisters, and member of the House of Lords, Baroness Caroline Cox, who 
initiated a bill curtailing the extent to which Sharia councils can operate in the United 
Kingdom.   
 Thirdly, there are Islamists arguing in favor of Sharia councils in the United 
Kingdom. For instance, the members of the board of the Islamic Sharia Council make 
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their case for more Sharia in the West. Then there are Muslim citizens who subscribe 
to these views. A 2006 poll suggested that forty percent of British Muslims supported 
“there being areas in Britain which are pre-dominantly Muslim and in which sharia 
law is introduced”.397 An additional polling agency confirmed these results: 40 
percent of Muslims aged between 16 to 24, compared to 17 percent of those over 55, 
said they would prefer to live under Sharia law in the UK.398 A year later, another 
polling agency asked respondents to score this position: “If I could choose, I would 
prefer to live in Britain under sharia law rather than British law”. There was a broad 
consensus that Sharia was unsuited to the UK: 75 per cent of those over 55 
preferred British law, yet this figure dropped as ages went down: 75 per cent of 45‐54 
year‐olds, 63 per cent of 35‐44 year‐olds, 52 per cent of 25‐34 year‐olds, and only 50 
per cent of 16‐24 year‐olds.399  
 Half of the UK Muslim youth thus seems to prefer Sharia over democratically 
established laws, more than the previous generation. But the other half of young 
adult Muslims does not, according to these polls. There is also an active campaign 
by Muslims against Sharia. Take for instance Shaaz Mahboob, at that time vice chair 
of British Muslims for Secular Democracy, who stated that “[t]here have been no calls 
from members of the British Muslim communities demanding the introduction of 
Sharia as a parallel justice system”. He believes that the assumption by the Lord 
Chief Justice that Sharia law could become a successful alternative form of 
alternative dispute resolution will only result in further alienating and segregating 
members of the Muslim communities from the rest of society. Labour MP Khalid 
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Mahmood said: “I, along with the vast majority of UK Muslims, oppose any such 
move to introduce Sharia law here.”400 Most of the NGOs who run campaigns against 
Sharia are led by individuals with Islamic roots.  
 The Egyptian-Dutch writer Nahed Selim said: “If you want to help Muslims, 
help the right group and not the fossilized fundamentalists who want to see the 
coming generations grow up according to a misogynist ideology”.401 More Sharia in 
the United Kingdom does have an effect on those Muslims who do not want to live 
under its rules, but who do increasingly face the pressure to do so. 
 Yemeni-Swiss associate professor Elham Manea (1966), author of The Arab 
State and Women’s Rights. The Trap of Authoritarian Governance (2011), states 
there are generally three groups of people who call for the introduction of Sharia 
councils in Western legal systems. Firstly, there are representatives of Islamic 
organizations representing traditional and conservative readings of Islam – among 
which Islamists. Second, there are academics from mostly a legal and/or an 
anthropological background.402 Thirdly, there are high-profile European or North 
American officials or figures “who seem genuinely concerned about the integration of 
Muslim communities in their respective countries, and consider the move inevitable 
for any “successful” integration of Muslims”.403 I will take the latter two together under 
the banner of multiculturalism, the fourth position, following tolerance, intolerance, 
and Islamist.  
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 However well-intended, multiculturalists do the opposite from what Nahed 
Selim advised: they do not support those Muslims advocating against more Sharia in 
the United Kingdom. In contrast, they publicly advocate for the accommodation of 
Sharia in the United Kingdom; Williams and Phillips being the best examples of high-
profile officials who are leading the debate. Whether that is by opening up debate 
about the possibilities or stating there is no reason why the Arbitration Act should not 
accommodate it, both intellectuals base their conviction on the idea that it is Muslim 
identity, a pluralist society and religious freedom that warrant accommodation of 
Sharia. The argument is that more latitude should be given to minorities to resort to 
“their own” religious laws. The multiculturalist assumption is that being a member of 
an ethno-religious, in this case Muslim, minority signifies a setback compared to 
“indigenous” Britons. Legal universalism – the same laws for everyone – is 
considered discriminatory. The need for Sharia family law is constructed on the idea 
of a “Muslim identity” which needs to be recognized and accommodated in 
institutions. Access to Islamic legal institutions is considered emancipatory and just. 
For the proponents of the accommodation of Islamic family law it seems - morally 
and principally - plain wrong not to grant, at least to a certain extent, juridical 
autonomy to Islamic judges (qadis) and Muslims seeking Islamic legal solutions. The 
moral justification lies in the equal treatment of all religions, and, the reasoning goes, 
because British Muslims are not free to live under their own laws, as institutionalized 
by their own courts, they are not treated equally.404 
 This “new” multiculturalism, as American associate professor of Law Michael 
Helfand labels it, focuses on the idea that the state needs to recognize that religious 
communities are independent legal orders with their own sets of rules and practices. 
Thus, even beyond recognition of minority cultures and not criticizing minority ideas 
and practices, new multiculturalism adds the need of legal autonomy to groups. The 
idea is that “[c]ultures and religions play a freedom-enhancing role by embedding 
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shared values and interests into a series of rules and obligations. And, by building 
institutions to govern and maintain these rules, cultures and religions create 
communities that promote the core values shared by their membership.” Helfand 
believes that if the state grants autonomy and self-governance to minority 
communities, this can expand the scope of liberty enjoyed by the group members.405 
 British professor of Law Maleiha Malik is favourable towards accommodating 
Muslim legal norms. She writes that law can be used as a strategy for the 
“accommodation of difference”. In this sense, law and legal institutions have become 
more important as tools for the “politics of recognition” as the private identity has 
become more important in the public sphere. Even beyond individual disputes, the 
law and its institutions are the basis to sustain a sense of community. When it comes 
to the integration of Muslims, she contends, “it is important that law and legal 
institutions do not distort or misrecognise the value of religious norms and practices 
for those Muslims for whom they have significance.” If the law does neglect “[…] 
important features of an individual’s personal identity – e.g. as Muslims – this will 
cause harm to their sense of personal autonomy and self-respect.”406  
 In the case of advocacy on behalf of Sharia councils, it means that 
multiculturalism now includes the idea that having an Islamic faith is such a vital 
marker for individuals, that it is justified to have an additional legal system recognized 
apart from the standing system of law. That also means that multiculturalists who 
support this idea probably have a positive view towards Sharia. What is that view?
  To start: according to a multiculturalist, Sharia is not what I have presented it 
to be in the previous chapter. Sharia is not the driving force of adherents of a 
fundamentalist ideology. The sacred law of Islam is not considered “an all-embracing 
body of religious duties, the totality of Allah’s commands that regulate the life of every 
Muslim in all aspects”, as noted Arabist Joseph Schacht wrote in An Introduction to 
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Islamic Law in 1964.407 It is not considered as the aggregate of binding instructions 
following from Islamic sources such as the Koran and hadiths which function as “a 
totalizing force that inspires and regulates all aspects of public and private life” as 
sociology professor Haideh Moghissi stated.408  
 Moreover, the following is not considered as “true” representations of Islam – 
although adherents themselves vehemently disagree – Wahhabism, Salafism, 
Islamism, the regimes of Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda 
(The Base), the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Hizb ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party), Jamaat-e-
Islami (Assembly of Islam), the Taliban (The Students), Al-Shabaab (the Youth), 
Hamas (Enthusiasm), Islamic State, Boko Haram (western education is forbidden).  
 In addition, the following is not “true” Sharia as multiculturalists see it: Tariq 
Ramadan’s and Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s Middle Way Islamist method to turn Europe into 
a Sharia state, no freedom to leave Islam as apostasy is a capital crime, intolerance 
towards other religions and atheism, no freedom of speech, denouncing democracy 
as a man-made infidel concept, brutal punishments following from hudud laws, no 
freedom for women to walk around with their heads uncovered, unequal inheritance 
settlements for men and women, child marriage, forced marriage, the duty of (sexual) 
obedience for women to their spouses, no equal right to divorce for men and women, 
homosexuality as a crime, slavery, polygamy, Nazi-like Jew-hatred, violent jihad, 
vigilantism, segregation of the sexes, taqiyya, promoting ghettoization for diasporic 
Muslims – all this is not considered an adequate representation of Sharia according 
to multiculturalists.409 All this is considered a deviance from what Sharia “really” is.  
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  Well, what does it deviate from, one may ask? What do multiculturalists 
consider an accurate representation of Sharia? When studying multiculturalist 
thought, what Sharia is considered to “really” be, either a) remains (intentionally or 
unintentionally) vague, b) is unaddressed and/or c) is not the content of a 
fundamentalist ideology aiming to subvert both Muslims and non-Muslims to a 
totalizing force that inspires and regulates all aspects of public and private life.410  
 Above, I have sketched several positions in the debate of accommodating 
Sharia, ranging from intolerance (e.g. NGOs and Baroness Cox) to those endorsing 
more Sharia, e.g. Islamists. To illustrate the multiculturalists’ view of Sharia, it is 
important to analyze the speeches made. I will cite parts of the speeches and 
highlight some of what I consider the most important.  
 Former Archbishop Rowan Williams proposes to rethink the nature of 
universal British law in the light of Islamic law and Islamic identity. He wonders what 
degree of accommodation the law of the land can and should give to minority 
communities with their own strongly entrenched legal and moral codes. He 
encouraged listeners to consider “a scheme in which individuals retain the liberty to 
choose the jurisdiction under which they will seek to resolve certain carefully 
specified matters. […] This may include aspects of marital law, the regulation of 
financial transactions and authorised structures of mediation and conflict resolution – 
the main areas that have been in question where supplementary jurisdictions have 
been tried”. He stated that accommodating Sharia law to a certain extent was 
unavoidable. Moreover, it was nothing new: “as a matter of fact certain provisions of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
McGoldrick, Dominic, ‘Accommodating Muslims in Europe: From Adopting Sharia Law to Religiously Based Opt 
Outs from Generally Applicable Laws’, Human Rights Law Review 2009, pp. 603-645 (621-622). 
410
 For example, in the beginning of his lecture Williams states: “This lecture will not attempt a detailed 
discussion of the nature of sharia, which would be far beyond my competence; my aim is only, as I have said, to 
tease out some of the broader issues around the rights of religious groups within a secular state, with a few 
thoughts about what might be entailed in crafting a just and constructive relationship between Islamic law and 
the statutory law of the United Kingdom.” Williams thus intentionally plans to not to discuss the nature of 
Sharia in detail.  
165 
 
Sharia are already recognized in our society and under our law; so it’s not as if we’re 
bringing in an alien and rival system”.411  
  He recommends to dispel “one or two myths” about Sharia: “And what most 
people think they know of sharia is that it is repressive towards women and wedded 
to archaic and brutal physical punishments; just a few days ago, it was reported that 
a 'forced marriage' involving a young woman with learning difficulties had been 
'sanctioned under sharia law' – the kind of story that, in its assumption that we all 
'really' know what is involved in the practice of sharia, powerfully reinforces the image 
of – at best – a pre-modern system in which human rights have no role. The problem 
is freely admitted by Muslim scholars.” The problem here, according to Williams, is 
not that Sharia is repressive towards women, that it encompasses brutal 
punishments, or that forced marriage is sanctioned under Sharia. The problem is that 
these practices reinforce a negative image of Sharia, an image of “a pre-modern 
system in which human rights have no role”.  
 It also becomes clear that Williams thinks that the “assumption that we all 
'really' know what is involved in the practice of sharia” is unfounded. Pinpointing what 
Sharia is in a coherent and accessible manner (as I have tried to do by providing a 
historical account of the roots of (political) Islam, and by systematizing its sources, its 
implications and its practical consequences) is something at times considered by 
some scholars as essentialist.412 Essentialism is a term that is sometimes used in a 
derogatory way, especially when it comes to the multicultural debate. Generally, 
essentialism may refer to the attribution of a set of immutable features to entities 
(such as groups, cultures, or religions) which are considered necessary to establish 
its identity and function.413 The point is that to a multiculturalist it is a mistake to 
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reduce Sharia to a smaller set of characteristics, especially if this set has a negative 
connotation. Rather, multiculturalists point out the large variety of (the practice of) 
Sharia and the impossibility of generalization. Thus, stating that Sharia is (merely) 
about repression of women, brutal punishments and forced marriage is considered a 
misrepresentation.  
 But, what is a correct representation in the eyes of multiculturalists then? That 
is the following.  
 Sharia is considered to consist of “Universal principles: as any Muslim 
commentator will insist, what is in view is the eternal and absolute will of God for the 
universe and for its human inhabitants in particular; but also something that has to be 
'actualized', not a ready-made system. […] there is no single code that can be 
identified as 'the' sharia.” And: “Thus, in contrast to what is sometimes assumed, we 
do not simply have a standoff between two rival legal systems when we discuss 
Islamic and British law. […] To recognise sharia is to recognise a method of 
jurisprudence governed by revealed texts rather than a single system.” Moreover, as 
Williams quoted another Islamic scholar, “[…] that an excessively narrow 
understanding sharia as simply codified rules can have the effect of actually 
undermining the universal claims of the Qur'an.” [sic]. Williams expressed 
expectations regarding the flexibility of Sharia in itself, as it is a body of universal 
principles which are open for interpretation.414 He stated: “[…] far from being a 
monolithic system of detailed enactments, sharia designates primarily – to quote 
Ramadan again – ‘the expression of the universal principles of Islam [and] the 
framework and the thinking that makes for their actualization in human history’”. 
 Rather than a body of restrictions and obligations, Middle Way Islamists and 
multiculturalists portray Sharia as a source of universal principles and values. 
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Apparently, there are Islamic principles that are valid for everyone, everywhere, at 
any time, and Sharia provides us with a framework and method to uncover these. 
Williams goes along with referring to Islamic principles as universal.415 And: “But 
while such universal claims are not open for renegotiation, they also assume the 
voluntary consent or submission of the believer, the free decision to be and to 
continue a member of the umma.” Lastly, “Sharia is not, in that sense, intrinsically to 
do with any demand for Muslim dominance over non-Muslims.” 
 
Phillips also believed that Sharia is generally falsely negatively portrayed. “It has 
become clear to me that there is a widespread misunderstanding in this country as to 
the nature of Shari’a law. Shari’a consists of a set of principles governing the way 
that one should live one’s life in accordance with the will of God. These principles are 
based on the Qu’ran, as revealed to Muhammad and interpreted by Islamic scholars. 
These principles have much in common with other religions. They do not include 
forced marriage or the repression of women. Compliance with them requires a high 
level of personal conduct, including abstinence from alcohol. I understand that it is 
not the case that for a Muslim to lead his or her life in accordance with these 
principles will be in conflict with the requirements of the law in this country. What 
would be in conflict with the law would be to impose certain sanctions for failure to 
comply with Shari’a principles. Part of the misconception about Sharia is the belief 
that Shari’a is only about mandating sanctions such as flogging, stoning, the cutting 
off hands or death for those who fail to comply with the law. And the view of many of 
Shari’a law is coloured by violent extremists who invoke it, perversely, to justify 
terrorist atrocities such as suicide bombing, which I understand to be in conflict with 
Shari’a principles. There can be no question of such sanctions being applied to or by 
any Muslim who lives within this jurisdiction.”  
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 Phillips is convinced that the principles of Sharia simply do not include 
terrorism, the repression of women and forced marriage – the latter described by 
Williams as something to do with custom and culture rather than directly binding 
enactments by religious authority”.416 Rather than simply stating unacceptable parts 
of Sharia are un-Islamic – as Phillips does, Williams analyses “neuralgic questions of 
the status of women and converts” in more depth.  
 He stated that recognition of the authority of a communal religious court, 
especially with regard to family law, could have the effect of reinforcing repressive 
elements, with particularly serious consequences for the role and liberties of women: 
a Sharia council could, in effect, actually deprive individuals of rights and liberties. 
Therefore, he said, “no ‘supplementary’ jurisdiction could have the power to deny 
access to the rights granted to other citizens or punish its members for claiming 
those rights”, And: “citizenship in a secular society should not necessitate the 
abandoning of religious discipline, any more than religious discipline should deprive 
one of access to liberties secured by the law of the land”. To labor this point, he 
suggests thinking in terms of what Ayelet Shachar, author of Multilevel Jurisdictions: 
Cultural Differences and Women's Rights (2001), calls “transformative 
accommodation”. She argues that it is institutionally feasible for the state to 
simultaneously respect deep cultural differences and to protect the rights of 
vulnerable group members, in particular women.417   
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 Williams argued as well that the objection to “an increased legal recognition of 
communal religious identities can be met if we are prepared to think about the basic 
ground rules that might organise the relationship between jurisdictions, making sure 
that we do not collude with unexamined systems that have oppressive effect or allow 
shared public liberties to be decisively taken away by a supplementary jurisdiction.” 
From this we may conclude that any accommodation of family law that is part of 
Sharia should be done in such a fashion that it does not deprive individuals of their 
(human) rights. How this should be practically realised remains vague and 
unaddressed.  
 The issue is that in reality women’s rights are not secured in an alternative 
Islamic jurisdiction – as I will explain below. That is one of the main reasons that 
Williams’ speech caused such uproar. Four days after his speech, Williams dropped 
his call for Sharia to apply to marital law, and instead pointed to “sensitive” questions 
about the status and liberties of women.418 Yet, Phillips stated that “[i]t was not very 
radical to advocate embracing Shari’a law in the context of family disputes, for 
example, and our system already goes a long way towards accommodating the 
Archbishop’s suggestion. It is possible in this country for those who are entering into 
a contractual agreement to agree that the agreement shall be governed by a law 
other than English law. Those who, in this country, are in dispute as to their 
respective rights are free to subject that dispute to the mediation of a chosen person, 
or to agree that the dispute shall be resolved by a chosen arbitrator or arbitrators.”  
  
The relationship between multiculturalism and Islamic fundamentalism 
 
Both Williams and Phillips said that they did not want to suggest that there be parallel 
systems of law. Nonetheless, Williams also stated that the purpose of the lecture was 
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to share “a few thoughts about what might be entailed in crafting a just and 
constructive relationship between Islamic law and the statutory law of the United 
Kingdom”. He questioned “our commitment to legal monopoly” and analysed the 
conditions under which a “supplementary jurisdiction” would be acceptable. Phillips 
stressed that religious minorities may be exempted from certain laws. Likewise, he 
suggested, having to live under a singular jurisdiction which is the product of a 
Judeo-Christian culture while having a dual identity as both Muslim and British citizen 
is unfair, because it constitutes inequality compared to indigenous Britons. That is all 
the more the case, as Jewish courts have long existed in Britain, as both Phillips and 
Williams reason.  
  They do not support the introduction of Sharia that embodies corporal 
punishments. Williams also makes it clear that “an increased legal recognition of 
communal religious identities” may not have a detrimental effect on the status of 
women. That aside, they argue that for British Muslims it would be unsatisfactory and 
problematic to live as a citizen under the rule of uniform law. Their focus is on 
religious family law. “There needs to be access to recognised authority acting for a 
religious group: there is already, of course, an Islamic Shari'a Council, much in 
demand for rulings on marital questions in the UK; and if we were to see more 
latitude given in law to rights and scruples rooted in religious identity, we should need 
a much enhanced and quite sophisticated version of such a body, with increased 
resource and a high degree of community recognition, so that 'vexatious' claims 
could be summarily dealt with.”419 
 Up until this point we can summarize the claims by the former Archbishop and 
Lord Chief Justice as follows:  
 
 Sharia is unfortunately and erroneously portrayed as something that should be 
denounced, namely as a single body of laws merely concerning the repression 
of women and cruel and unusual punishments.  
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 It actually is a body of thought that inspires Muslims in the form of certain 
universal principles. These universal principles are tremendously important for 
believers, who choose freely to be part of a community whose members are 
unified under this set of principles.  
 Therefore, rather than making Muslims merely adhere to a uniform set of 
British laws, we should accommodate parts of Islamic law – mainly financial 
and family law – in the name of equality, especially because Jewish courts are 
allowed to function as well.  
 On one condition: that this supplementary jurisdiction may not be repressive 
towards women.  
 
What these universal principles are and what it practically means to accommodate 
Sharia remains unaddressed.420 Both multiculturalist speeches lack an answer to the 
question how Sharia family law should be accommodated and what such an 
accommodation would involve. For instance, would it require new laws? What would 
such laws look like? Should the benefits of Sharia be incorporated in educational 
programs? Should the United Kingdom maintain formal ties with al-Azhar University 
for Sharia instructions? Should state courts accept Sharia when parties want to? 
Should Sharia councils be publicly funded? Should Islamic judges receive 
government-supervised training? Should barristers be educated in religious laws? A 
marble court house in the Temple area for an official British Sharia council? Or 
should we merely not think too critically of Sharia councils?  
 Moreover, what would it practically mean for a man to have Islamic family law 
accommodated? For a woman? For children? What specific problems would be 
addressed by accommodation of Islamic family law? What solutions would it bring 
about? Are there benefits other than “recognising Muslim identity”? How – specifically 
– are the rights of women protected in councils based on a body of thought that is 
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grounded in the belief that justice is found in the recognition of dissimilarities between 
men and women? Dissimilarities that require different rights, duties and punishments 
for either sex? On the basis of which “universal principles” are disputes to be settled? 
In short, how can we assess multiculturalist proposals to consider “a scheme in 
which individuals retain the liberty to choose the jurisdiction under which they will 
seek to resolve certain carefully specified matters”, if it is so vague?  
 Perhaps it is unfair to hammer on the lack of functional content, as Williams 
merely suggested looking at the possibilities of accommodation “with a clearer eye, 
not imagine we know exactly what we mean by Sharia, and not just associate it with 
what we read about Saudi Arabia or whatever.”421 Yet, I do not think it is unfair. I 
actually believe it is specifically important to point out the generally vague and 
optimistic character of these multiculturalist contributions to the Sharia debate. It is 
specifically important to draw attention to the fact that what multiculturalists envision 
for society regarding the accommodation of Sharia remains (intentionally or 
unintentionally) vague, is unaddressed and/or is focused on stating what Sharia is 
not, viz. the content of a fundamentalist ideology. It is vitally important because 
multiculturalist thought of this kind creates space for the manifestation of Islamic 
fundamentalism.422 Multiculturalism emphasizes the “moral right” to have an identity 
recognized, an identity that differs from the dominant culture. Multiculturalists want to 
rid Sharia of its negative components and promote pondering over the possibilities of 
accommodating the remaining part. But what is that? What does that mean? This 
generally uncritical and positive attitude is benefiting Islamism. 
 The NGO Women Living Under Muslims Laws (WLUML) is represented in 
over 70 countries and provides information about codified and uncodified Islamic 
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laws. It aims to strengthen women’s individual and collective effort in search of 
equality and their rights.423 In secular states, WLUML is active against the increasing 
demands that Islamic laws be recognized. It also purports to challenge the idea that 
there is a “homogenous Muslim world.” In 2006, two years before the former 
Archbishop and Lord Chief Justice made their contribution to more Sharia in Britain, 
WLUML published a report: “Recognizing the Un-Recognized: Inter-Country Cases 
and Muslim Marriages & Divorces in Britain”. The report’s authors lament the call for 
formal recognition of Muslim family Law in the United Kingdom. Interestingly, they 
find that those demanding this – Sharia councils themselves and “politico-religious 
organizations” are unclear about what it precisely is that they want to see recognized. 
The report gives various reasons why the precise content of the demands is unclear.  
 Firstly, given the diversity within the Muslim community, it would be unlikely 
that consensus could be reached about the content of a specific demand of Islamic 
family law. If efforts to that end were to be made public “[…] that would 
embarrassingly explode the myth that there has always been a monolithic way of 
‘being Muslim’.” Also, what WLUML calls “politized elements in the community” – 
what I would call Islamists – are well aware that the state would in practice never 
support formal recognition of separate laws. The report concludes that “[…] given the 
above two factors, it is far more powerful to continue to make vague demands for 
recognition as this prevents open public debate both within the community and 
beyond on specificities while also giving those who make such demands the 
possibility of claiming for themselves the right to represent the community and its 
needs vis á vis British civil law. Indeed, it is in the best interests of the Shariah 
councils, for example, that Muslim family laws in Britain remain unregulated and 
uncodified because this then requires constant reference to the Shariah councils for 
interpretation.”424  
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 The lack of functional concreteness on behalf of multiculturalists is particularly 
relevant to establish. Both multiculturalists and religious fundamentalists place 
religion as a core unifier of individuals within a community. Both Islamists and 
multiculturalists want Muslims to be able to live under Sharia. Multiculturalists and 
Islamists do differ regarding the extent to which that should be (made) possible. But 
both make the case that that is what is needed by Muslims – and a sizeable part of 
the Muslim population agrees. What it is that Islamists want is clear: a Sharia state 
for a unified umma, although they may well coach this in terms which are easier to 
stomach, as Qaradawi also believes works best. As I wrote in the previous chapter, it 
is a pragmatic decision to use “dawa language” – doublespeak, taqiyya – that avoids 
negative associations for western audiences. This also involves a language that 
avoids specifying the actual implications of introducing more Sharia. The use of 
“dawa language” is problematic, because it leads people astray as to the actual plans 
of Islamists to introduce more and more Sharia in the West. From very early on, the 
European Council of Fatwa and Research – presided over by Qaradawi – published 
several fatwas about Islamic family law. They urged European Muslims to demand 
official recognition of Islam from European governments, including the right to apply 
Sharia in cases of marriage, divorce and inheritance. In a later fatwa, it was repeated 
that as far as family law was concerned, European Muslims must deal with Muslim 
judges.425  
 This Middle Way Islamist approach to guide Muslims towards Sharia 
compliance in Europe is supported by multiculturalists that publically state that 
Muslim minorities have the “right” to have private matters settled by their “own” 
religious laws. 
 That multiculturalism, when aimed at accommodating Muslim family laws, aids 
Islamism is true in the wide sense, but in this specific case Williams and Phillips 
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actually benefit Islamists in a practical way, too. Consider this: in his speech, 
Williams quotes Tariq Ramadan, who is a Middle Way Islamist who uses different 
messages for his Muslim following and for a Western non-Muslim audience 
(taqiyya).426 To the Western audience, Ramadan presents Sharia as a set of values 
and principles, a message that is somewhat more easily digestible than the version I 
have offered in the previous chapter. He writes that Sharia is primarily a question of 
values: justice, equality, freedom.427 Yet, in his books and cassettes, available in 
radical Islamist bookstores, he praises the teachings of his grandfather Hassan al-
Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and firmly supports Qaradawi.428 That 
Williams draws on Ramadan’s work to make a case for more Sharia in the United 
Kingdom, and subscribes to Islamist doublespeak that Sharia is not a body of laws 
but a set of principles, is another indication that multiculturalism gives Islamic 
fundamentalism oxygen.  
 The same can be said of Phillips, who states that Muslims living in Britain “are 
well represented by a variety of groups and individuals, including the Muslim Council 
of Britain, whose aims include the fostering of better community relations and 
working for the good of society as a whole.” The Muslim Council of Britain is an 
umbrella organisation that comprises branches of the Muslim Brotherhood and is 
connected to Jamaat-e-Islami (one of the most influential Islamist organizations).429 
Its founder and (up to 2006) secretary-general, Iqbal Sacranie, is a leading British 
Islamist.430 Like Ramadan, Sacranie uses the strategy of “dawa language”. He has 
spoken of the importance of “championing justice and promoting tolerance through 
constructive engagement with society as a whole […]”. On the other hand, he has 
also said of author Salman Rushdie “[d]eath, perhaps, is a bit too easy for him. His 
mind must be tormented for the rest of his life unless he asks for forgiveness to 
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Almighty Allah.” Sacranie has called for legislation criminalizing any defamation of 
Muhammad’s character, as it is forbidden under Sharia.431 He has supported 
Qaradawi, labelled Israel “a Nazi state” and compared Hamas suicide bombers to 
Mandela and Ghandi, stating all are freedom fighters.432  
 Moreover, in a music video, singer Deepika Thathaal (artist name Deeyah 
Khan) walks in a burka, which she takes off to reveal herself in bikini. She was 
threatened, spat on and was even once pepper sprayed during her performances. At 
that time, Thathaal could not walk around in Britain without the constant presence of 
bodyguards. Then Deputy Secretary General of the Muslim Council of Britain, Daud 
Abdullah, released a statement saying: “Many Muslim women do perform to 
audiences of other women at weddings, for example, because the sexes are strictly 
segregated. Those performers enjoy a good career. It’s when women perform for 
wider, mixed audiences that differences of opinion emerge [...] These objections are 
based on the Islamic view that women should not draw unnecessary attention to 
themselves, because of the impact this will have on a male audience. The moral 
framework of Islam has already been laid down and women should not push beyond 
its boundaries for the sake of commercial gain.”433 This part of the Islamist “moral 
framework” is emphasized by the Muslim Council of Britain, yet – ironically – ignored 
or downplayed by Phillips, who gives his public support of the Muslim Council of 
Britain as well as of parts of Sharia for British Muslims.  
 
Multiculturalists do not want a Sharia state, but what they do want is mostly limited to 
emphasizing a communal need for shared values and rejecting what is deemed a 
“too negative” focus on Sharia. Williams stated that we should look at the possibilities 
of accommodating Sharia “with a clearer eye”. Also, we are not to imagine we know 
exactly what is meant by Sharia. But who may not imagine knowing exactly what is 
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meant by Sharia? Multiculturalists? Legal universalists? Or Islamists? May Islamists 
imagine they know what they mean by Sharia? This question is particularly 
interesting in combination with Williams’ remark that we should “not just associate it 
with what we read about Saudi Arabia or whatever.”434 Let us see if the claims made 
by the most senior cleric and the most senior judge are justifiable in the light of 
Sharia councils in the United Kingdom.  
 
Behind the Islamic Sharia Council 
 
In his lecture, Williams specifically devoted attention to the London-based “Islamic 
Shariah Council”. He said: “[t]here needs to be access to recognised authority acting 
for a religious group: there is already, of course, an Islamic Shari'a Council, much in 
demand for rulings on marital questions in the UK; and if we were to see more 
latitude given in law to rights and scruples rooted in religious identity, we should need 
a much enhanced and quite sophisticated version of such a body, with increased 
resource and a high degree of community recognition, so that 'vexatious' claims 
could be summarily dealt with.” This is the most concrete suggestion he has to offer. 
This Sharia council needs to be sophisticated and awarded greater resources and 
recognition. May we associate it with what we read about Saudi Arabia? 
 “The Islamic Sharia Council” is based in Leyton, East London. It is the most 
“professional” and well-known one. It was the focus of BBC’s Panorama 
documentary 'Secrets of Britain's Sharia Councils’ in 2013. It is located in a terraced 
house with wheelchair access, a reception, and has a website with downloadable 
forms. It was founded in 1982, when representatives of ten Islamic centres decided 
to establish “The Islamic Shari’a Council” as “a quasi-Islamic Court”.435 On its 
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website, it says: “The objective of the Council was not just to guide the Muslims in 
matters of their religion and to issue fatwas when needed, but also to create a bench 
of ulama’ who would function as Qadis (Islamic judges, MZ) in matters such as 
matrimonial disputes that were referred to them. The creation of the ISC was thus a 
manifestation of the will of the Muslim community and a reflection of their collective 
desire to manage their personal affairs. The concept of the Council was the 
brainchild of the late Syyed Mutawalli ad Darsh (who was Imam at Regent’s Park 
Mosque at the time) and Dr Suhaib Hasan (who is the Secretary of the ISC at the 
moment).”436 This initiative of founding “a quasi-Islamic court” was an enterprise by 
Islamic fundamentalists, rather than by individuals who seek to help Muslims answer 
religious questions. It was their full intention to create a “semi-legal system”.  
 On his personal website, Suhaib Hasan explains why he was one of the 
founders of the Islamic Sharia Council. He writes: “Is this community not permitted to 
arrange its personal affairs itself? What about issues of personal law, such as 
religious marriage, religious divorce, inheritance and endowments? According to the 
Fiqhi perspective and to historical realities, it is perfectly natural for religious 
minorities to wish to arrange such issues within their own communities. Muslim 
jurists, especially in the Iberian peninsula after the fall of Granada in 1492 when 
many Muslim communities were left under Christian rule, emphasised the importance 
of establishing a limited semi-legal system in issues of personal law.”437  




 He quotes jurisprudence from the four Sunni schools of thought to substantiate this position. From the 
Hanafi school of law, for instance, Hasan quotes “[…] if there is no Sultan nor someone to deputise him, as in 
the cases of Muslim cities such as Cordoba where non-Muslims had taken control, it is incumbent upon the 
Muslims to agree upon someone from among them who can be appointed as ruler, and who can then appoint 
a Qadi […].” Or, from Maliki law: “Wherever there is no Sultan or there is an unjust Sultan who does not care 
about the limits laid down by Allah, then the trustworthy and the people of knowledge stand there in the place 
of the Sultan.” The Shafi’i school has a similar point of view: “If the time is devoid of an Imam or a Sultan who 
has powers to run the affairs (of the country), then all matters are referred to the scholars. It then becomes 
incumbent upon the people, to whichever class they belong, to refer back to their scholars and to abide by 
their judgement in all matters. If they do that, they are guided to the right path. They will be the scholars and 
the rulers. […]. Lastly, from Hanbali law, most prevalent in Saudi Arabia, Suhaib Hasan quotes: “If a town loses 
its Qadi, the people should appoint someone as a Qadi for themselves. His orders and rulings are binding as 
long as there is no Imam to rule over them.” See: Hasan, Suhaib, ‘Muslim family law in Britain. A paper 
submitted to the international family law conference on 14 may 2014 at the University of Islamabad’, 20 May 
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 “The establishment of such a religious body is not unique to the Muslim 
community”, writes Hasan on his blog. “The Jewish minority in Britain has been 
present for over 350 years and has set up the Beth Din for a similar purpose. Other 
religious minorities such as the Sikhs and Hindus have also established alternative 
dispute resolution services for their respective communities.”  
 That is correct, and, like multiculturalists, the Islamic fundamentalists of the 
Islamic Sharia Council focus on the Muslim community as a collective with special 
needs. That Jewish Battei Din – rabbinical courts – have been operating in the United 
Kingdom as well is an argument put forward by both multiculturalists and Islamists. It 
would be a matter of unequal treatment of Muslims if they were not allowed to have 
their private legal institutions, so the argument goes.  
 There is certainly a degree of overlap between religious family law institutions 
– which is further discussed below. There are indeed fundamentalist, or orthodox, 
Jewish councils. There are significant similarities and differences between Jewish 
and Islamic councils. One essential difference is that the representatives of the 
Islamic Sharia Council support, promote and activate the political ideology of Islamic 
fundamentalism, of political Islam. This means that beyond imposing Islamic family 
law on Muslims (which would be undesirable enough), the Sharia Council that 
Williams wants to accommodate consists of individuals who wish to turn the United 
Kingdom into a Sharia state and impose Islamic law on to the state. I will discuss 
three individuals to support this claim: Syyed Mutawalli ad-Darsh (founder of the 
Islamic Sharia Council, qadi (judge) and first president), Suhaib Hasan (founder, qadi 
and secretary) and Haitham al-Haddad (qadi and treasurer).   
 Firstly, there is the founder of the Islamic Sharia council, the late Egyptian-
born Shaikh Syyed Mutawalli ad-Darsh (1930-1997). In 1970, the rector of the – 
fundamentalist hotbed438 – al-Azhar University and he introduced a plan to launch 
international dawa. This took ad-Darsh to London as the imam of Regent’s Park 
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Mosque. As I wrote in the previous chapter, it was in the 1970s and 80s that the 
Muslim Brotherhood went global, backed by Saudi funding.  
 Supported by the Egyptian government, ad-Darsh publicly pushed for official 
recognition of as much Islamic family law as possible in the United Kingdom from the 
mid-70s onwards. His views were fundamentalist. For instance, he did not want to 
agree on specifying a minimum age for marriage,439 nor was he willing to accept the 
legitimacy of marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man. In 1982, he 
founded the first Sharia council and became a columnist and broadcaster, widely 
influencing the next generation of Muslims. 
 In 1992, he participated in a fiqh seminar themed “Muslims in the West” in 
France. It was hosted by the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France, which is 
closely connected to the International Muslim Brotherhood. He spoke alongside a 
variety of scholars, many from Saudi Arabia. Other participants included the late 
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader Abd al-Fattah Abu Ghudda, the late Lebanese and 
French Muslim Brotherhood leader Faisal Mawlawi, and present international Muslim 
Brotherhood leader Yusuf al-Qaradawi. It was the meeting that laid the foundation for 
fiqh-al-aqalliyat, jurisprudence for Muslim minorities in the West, the Middle Way 
towards a Sharia state (as discussed in the previous chapter). Many participants 
were to join the board of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (founded in 
1997), currently presided over by Qaradawi.440  
 In the mid-90s, ad-Darsh was one of the first to use the internet to promote 
Islamism. In an interview two years before his death, he stated that he fully 
sympathised with the ideas of the international Muslim Brotherhood.441  
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 Now Shaikh Maulana Abu Sayeed is qadi and president. He stated that there 
clearly is not such a thing as rape in marriage, as sex is part of marriage. He said the 
“aggression” of reporting the husband to the police was greater than the “minor 
aggression” of forcing a woman to have sexual intercourse against her will. Sayeed 
argued that many married women who alleged rape were lying, because rape is a 
ground for divorce. “Why it is happening in this society is because they have got this 
idea of so-called equality, equal rights.”442  
 Secondly, I would like to focus on the other founder of the Islamic Sharia 
Council, the earlier mentioned Shaikh Suhaib Hasan (1942). On his personal blog, 
Hasan shares some childhood memories from his home in the state of Malairkotla, 
India. In his own words, it was a childhood fully devoted to Jamaat-e-Islami – next to 
the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the first and most influential Islamist organizations.443 
Hasan’s father had joined right after it was founded in 1941, and actively preached 
on its behalf. “No exaggeration if I say that I have been brought up in the lap of 
Jamaat”, Hasan writes. One of his most pressing childhood memories “was the day 
when our whole house witnessed a lot of sadness and gloom. That was the day 
when the papers brought the news of the hanging of a great scholar, an Islamic 
activist, Abdul Qadir Audah, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.” 444  
 After his childhood, Hasan studied in Saudi Arabia and worked in East Africa 
before moving to Britain in the 1960s.445 Now he is secretary and judge of the Islamic 
Sharia Council, spokesman of Sharia law for the Muslim Council of Britain, and 
member of the board of Qaradawi’s European Council for Fatwa and Research.  
 On his blog, Hasan states he wants a “limited semi-legal system in issues of 
personal law” based on Sharia for British Muslims. He publicly argues that Britain 
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would greatly benefit from integrating aspects of family law into the nation’s civil 
code. Like Williams and Phillips, he wants to address the “great misunderstanding” of 
the issue of Sharia in the West. “Whenever people associate the word 'sharia' with 
Muslims, they think it is flogging and stoning to death and cutting off the hand". He 
says it is out of the question that penal law would be introduced in the United 
Kingdom, as “[o]nly a Muslim government that believes in Islam is going to implement 
it.”446 Nevertheless, he advises Britain to adopt Sharia criminal law, so called hudood, 
also spelled hudud, laws: “If sharia law is implemented, then you can turn this 
country into a haven of peace because once a thief's hand is cut off nobody is going 
to steal. Once, just only once, if an adulterer is stoned nobody is going to commit this 
crime at all. There would be no rapists at all. We want to offer it to the British society. 
If they accept it, it is for their good and if they don't accept it they'll need more and 
more prisons.”447  
 The documentary Undercover Mosque, though, reported that at a sermon he 
stated that the Caliphate will have “political dominance” in Britain, establishing “the 
chopping of the hands of the thieves, the flogging of the adulterers and flogging of 
the drunkards”, and waging “jihad against the non-Muslims”.448 Hasan also “reveals 
the Jewish conspiracy” on YouTube by telling viewers about The Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion, a hoax document about Jewish world domination that Islamists take 
very seriously.449 
 Thirdly, there is Shaikh Haitham al-Haddad (date of birth unknown). He agrees 
with Hasan on Sharia punishments, stating that “It is a ‘must’ for all Muslims to 
establish hudood punishments”, including for apostates and adulteresses. Born in 
Saudi Arabia, al-Haddad is now qadi and treasurer at the Islamic Sharia Council. He 
is also president of the British Muslim Research and Development Foundation. He 
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obtained a PhD at the University of London (SOAS) on the topic of Fiqh for Muslim 
Minorities in the West and often gives lectures at universities – although sometimes 
he is denied because of his views. Before obtaining a PhD at London University, he 
studied in Saudi Arabia, where he was a student of the Grand Mufti, the Hanbali 
scholar Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz (1910-1999).450 It should not come at a 
surprise that al-Haddad brought Wahhabi Saudi views to Britain.  
 He believes that “Muslims should prevent [non-Muslims] from ruling any 
country with a law other than the shari’ah and Muslims should rule the entire planet 
with this Islamic law, and should this lead to fighting the People of the Book, Allah 
said: “And fight them until there is no more Fitnah (disbelief and worshipping of 
others along with Allah) and (all and every kind of) worship is for Allah (alone).” For 
him, the ultimate aim of all Muslims is to see Islam governing the whole world. The 
“Islamic Republic of Britain” will only be possible if Muslims use the current political 
system to their advantage.”451 Besides wanting to establish an Islamic theocracy in 
the United Kingdom in general, he also believes that it is forbidden to join Christians 
in celebrating any of their festivals; that women enjoy their husbands being superior 
to them and should obey them; that female genital mutilation (or as he 
euphemistically puts it, “circumcision”) is recommended as it is a “virtue” or an 
“honour” for women and is better for the husband; that those found guilty of engaging 
in extra-marital sex should be punished in the “harshest manner possible” – stoning 
to death; and that a husband should not be questioned why he hits his wife. On 
setting a minimum age for girls to be married off, he said that “Islamic law has no 
minimum age.” “Thirteen, fourteen?” asked an audience member. al-Haddad replied 
“the earlier is the better, but you have to be careful of the legal issues.”452 
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 Moreover, homosexuality is considered a “crime against humanity” and “Jews 
are the ‘descendants of apes and pigs’ and the ‘armies of the devil’” – and pointed to 
the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.453 He justifies suicide bombings as long as non-
Muslims are killed. He praised Osama bin Laden after his death in 2011.454 On 
Salman Rushdie, who al-Haddad beliefs deserves capital punishment, he said in a 
Friday sermon: “And this reminds us, o Servants of Allah, of the stories of those who 
compose heretical writings, that you cannot tolerate esoteric interpretation, you rule 
on their apostasy and desertion of the religion […] in the West they are known as 
creative writers, and are considered as amongst the most innocent, but to us they are 
apostates, and their blood is halal.”455 On the separation between religion and the 
state, he said: “There is a conflict between these two sets of values. Muslims believe 
our values are best. The non-Islamic British believe theirs are better. But at the end 
of the day, understand this: Muslims are never going to give up certain principles, 
even if they are in conflict. That is a fact.”456  
  It should be clear that the individuals driving the largest and most well-known 
Sharia council in the United Kingdom do not view Sharia as a set of general 
principles. They take the specific laws and instructions as seriously as one possibly 
can. They fully adhere to, and are activists on behalf of, Islamism. Their political and 
religious ideology to turn the United Kingdom into a Sharia state is clear, and so are 
their ties to the international Muslim Brotherhood. And they know what they are 
talking about, coming from al-Azhar in Egypt and studying under the Grand Mufti of 
Saudi Arabia. Their aim of spreading Sharia is not limited to the United Kingdom. Al-
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Haddad expressed his wish to have a formally recognised Sharia council in The 
Netherlands, as well.457   
 These are the individuals behind the London-based Sharia council that former 
Archbishop Williams would like to see accommodated, sophisticated and awarded 
greater resources and recognition. Both multiculturalists and Islamists encourage 
Muslims to go down the path of Islamic fundamentalism. Multiculturalists may not 
know exactly what is meant by Sharia, but Islamists surely do. The latter are 
confident they are working towards official recognition of Islamic law. A statement on 
the Islamic Sharia Council’s website reads: “Though the Council is not yet legally 
recognized by the authorities in the UK, the fact that it is already established, and is 
gradually gaining ground among the Muslim community, and the satisfaction attained 
by those who seek its ruling, are all preparatory steps towards the final goal of 
gaining the confidence of the host community in the soundness of the Islamic legal 
system and the help and insight they could gain from it. The experience gained by 
the scholars taking part in its procedures make them more prepared for the 
eventuality of recognition for Islamic law.” [sic]458 
 Williams and Phillips and other “new multiculturalists” may not subscribe to 
Islamist goals, but they are furthering them. They masquerade Sharia by making it 
fuzzy and elusive. They cleanse it from objectionable aspects and state it should be 
accommodated but just not the parts that are at odds with British laws – and remain 
vague on how that should be done and what that means. They create space by 
emphasising the need for Sharia by Muslims and by reprimanding those who do 
publicly speak out against objectionable parts; or Sharia in its entirety.  
 Having said all this, it could still be possible that the board members of the 
Islamic Sharia Council have been ventilating their private Islamist opinions and 
actually perform their duties quite well as Islamic judges. It is possible that they are 
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perfectly able to operate within the boundaries of the human rights standards that 
Britain seeks to uphold. Let us turn to the legal status and practice of Sharia councils 
in the United Kingdom.  
 
Sharia and Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
England has a rich history of resolving disputes outside judicial institutions.459 The 
UK has a clearly defined legal framework, the Arbitration Act of 1996, which 
authorizes arbitration. The legal effect of an arbitration award is the same as any 
other judgment or order of the court, and is thus binding. The 1996 Act does contain 
a number of safeguards, so state courts may modify or – partially – set aside the 
ruling, for example, if the tribunal exceeded its powers, if an award relates to matters 
which are not capable of settlement via arbitration, if a party was under some 
incapacity, or if enforcing the award would be contrary to national law or public 
policy.460  
 Phillips stated that parties are already able to settle disputes by means of 
Sharia principles under the Arbitration Act 1996. He was referring to the stipulation 
that parties are free to choose the rules which are applicable to the substance of the 
dispute: “S46 (1): The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute – (a) in accordance 
with the law chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute, or 
(b) if the parties so agree, in accordance with such other considerations as are 
agreed by them or determined by the tribunal.” Sharia could thus function as a body 
of laws which the parties could use to resolve family disputes, as is the opinion of 
England and Wales’ most important judge. Shaykh Suhaib Hasan of the London-
based Islamic Sharia Council also uses the terminology of the Arbitration Act: “The 
existence of the ISC is legal under British law, based on legislation such as the 
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Arbitration Act 1996 which permits disputants in civil matters to go for mediation and 
alternative dispute resolution. The ISC is bound by civil legislation, and so it cannot 
judge on issues of child custody, maintenance and especially on issues of criminal 
law. It is thus not a parallel legal system but a procedure granted by legislation.”461  
 The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT), an umbrella organisation of Sharia 
councils under leadership of Shaykh Faiz-ul-Aqtab Siddiqi, claims their main 
enterprise is arbitrating commercial disputes under the Arbitration Act 1996. Two 
private parties sign a binding agreement prior to the hearing and the tribunal consists 
of a minimum of two arbitrators – a UK qualified solicitor or barrister, and an Islamic 
scholar. This way, the outcome is in line with both “the Laws of England and Wales 
and the recognized Schools of Islamic Sacred Law” (art. 8 (2) of the Procedure Rules 
of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal), and leads to a contractually binding arbitration 
award.462 Appeals are not possible under the MAT’s statute: article 23 of the 
procedural rules reads: “No appeal shall be made against any decisions of the 
Tribunal. This rule shall not prevent any party applying for Judicial Review with 
permission of the High Court.” During an interview, Siddiqi told me there haven’t 
been appeals as his clients are “satisfied customers who consider it a serious 
matter”. Chief Crown Prosecutor Nazir Afzal stated later that the Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunal is known to deter parties from seeking appeal, even though individuals do 
have an inalienable right to challenge the award in court, which is codified in article 
58 of the Arbitration Act. Yet, when correctly regulated by the Arbitration Act, Afzal 
sees no problem in the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal using alternative dispute 
resolution regarding local property disputes, especially when parties are equally 
matched.463 
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  However, Sharia councils in general have been able to function under the 
label of arbitration and mediation, or Alternative Dispute Resolution. In academia it is 
also standard to refer to Sharia councils by using the terminology of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR).464 It is my contention that this is incorrect. It is not merely 
erroneous because it fuses the concepts of arbitration (in which both parties agree to 
submit their dispute to a mutually agreeable third party for a decision to be made), 
and mediation, (when two parties voluntarily use a neutral third party to help them 
reach an agreement that is acceptable to both sides). Both concepts are not 
applicable. Firstly, because, as I will demonstrate below, a Sharia council’s “core 
business” consists of dealing with women requesting an Islamic divorce and not 
commercial disputes. In fact, 95 per cent of the cases (hundreds per year per 
council) relate to divorce requests. Considering that mediation and arbitration are 
tools for extra-judicial decision-making for a minimum of two parties having a legal 
dispute, a one-party divorce request surely does not count as any form of alternative 
dispute resolution. But even if there were two parties, the Arbitration Act does not 
extend to divorce.465  
 Secondly, it is incorrect by definition because Islamic judges have an agenda 
of their own.466 For instance, president of the Islamic Sharia Council Shaykh Abu 
Sayeed said regarding granting divorces on women’s request that “we don’t break 
the marriage. As long as marriage is sacred, our job is to reconcile the marriage”.467  
                                                          
464
 See, inter alia, Rohe, Mathias, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution in Europe under the Auspices of Religious 
Norms’, Religare Working Paper Number 6, 2011; Rohe, Matthias, ‘Reasons for the Application of Shari’a in the 
West’, pp. 25-46, in: Berger 2013; Boyd, Marion, ‘Religion-Based Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Challenge to 
Multiculturalism’, pp. 465-473, in: Banting, Keith et al. (eds), Belonging? Diversity, Recognition and Shared 
Citizenship in Canada, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 2007; Keshavjee, Mohamed, Islam, Sharia and 
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Mechanisms for Legal Redress in the Muslim Community, London: I.B. Tauris 
2013; Shachar 2008, pp. 572-607; Yilmaz, Ihsan, ‘Muslim Alternative Dispute Resolution and Neo-Ijtihad in 
England’, Turkish Journal of International Relations 2003, pp. 117-139. . 
465
 See also Addison, Neil, ‘Sharia Tribunals in Britain – Mediators or Arbitrators?’, p. xi, in: MacEoin & Green 
2009.  
466
 See also on this issue: Moore, Kathleen, The Unfamiliar Abode: Islamic Law in the United States and Britain, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010, p. 119. 
467
 Interview with Abu Sayeed, London, 2 July 2013. See also: ‘In the name of the law’, The Guardian 14 June 
2007 via < http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/14/religion.news>.  
189 
 
For an independent mediator or arbitrator – who should be neutral – to approach this 
task with such a clear personal agenda is entirely unacceptable.  
 Putting aside that concepts of mediation, arbitration and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution are used incorrectly, it is important to note that this is not a mix-up without 
consequences. Using the terminology of alternative dispute resolution as under the 
Arbitration Act creates a false impression that softens and obscures the reality that 
underlies the practice of Sharia councils. It further is implied that Sharia councils fall 
under a recognised regime that upholds legal standards, safeguards, and thus 
protects parties – which is not the case.468 This means that most academic 
discussions about ADR, family law and Sharia councils are off base.  
 Sharia councils have no formally recognized legal jurisdiction over family law 
due to the sensitive nature of these disputes and their consequences. Some months 
after Phillips’ speech, then minister of Justice Jack Straw confirmed this: “Arbitration 
is not a system of dispute resolution that may be used in family cases. Therefore no 
draft consent orders embodying the terms of an agreement reached by the use of a 
Sharia Council have been enforced within the meaning of the Arbitration Act 1996 in 
matrimonial proceedings.”469 The rulings coming from Sharia councils thus do not 
meet the legal system, they fall outside the Arbitration Act and the parties are thus 
not “protected” by legal safeguards. Nor are there any appeal procedures for parties 
that are confronted with unfair decisions.  
 It is a different issue when Sharia law is actually ingrained in state law, as is 
for instance the case with Iranian or Saudi Law. Then, national judges can encounter 
cases regarding international private law. There is some case law on English courts 
dealing with Sharia-based disputes. For instance, in one case the House of Lords 
argued unanimously that sending a mother and a child back to Lebanon would be a 
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flagrant breach of the Convention, as she would lose custody of her son because of 
Sharia-inspired family law.470 In another case, parents fought a custody battle, where 
the father asked the court to grant him the right to have the child live with him in 
Saudi Arabia. The father had spread but had then withdrawn allegations that the 
mother had associated with another man, which would have had draconic 
consequences for the British woman and child under Saudi Arabian Sharia law. The 
judge refused to grant the order.471 British courts ruled in favour of the mothers, 
because Sharia law would have had unacceptable consequences for them.  
 Yet, these cases had to deal with Sharia law in other jurisdictions, namely 
Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. With regard to cases in English courts which are asked 
to settle a dispute coming from a sharia council’s ruling, there are no such records. 
This could mean that these cases are swept under the carpet, or that there just are 
not many of these cases before the courts. This latter option seems more likely.472 In 
fact, John Bowen, author of several publications on English law and Sharia, said in 
an interview that none of the judges and lawyers he had talked to, and he had asked 
many, said that they had ever seen an instance where a judge had enforced an 
agreement that came out of a “sharia council mediation”.473  
 Interestingly, there is a case where the English court struck down a ruling by 
the London-based Islamic Sharia Council. In Midani v Midani in 1999, in a dispute 
about an inheritance settlement, two of four heirs (Myrna and Omar) challenged the 
London-based Sharia council’s ruling regarding their late father’s estate. They 
disputed that the council had the authority to make binding decisions and protested 
its jurisdiction over the matter. Although the two heirs did not attend meetings 
voluntarily and had put their objections to the Council’s jurisdiction in writing prior to 
any outcome, the Islamic Sharia Council ruled that half of Myrna’s inheritance was to 
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go to her brother Omar (as under Sharia men inherit more than women). The 
plaintiffs sought a declaration from the English court that the Sharia Council’s ruling 
was not an arbitration award. The court ruled that it was unable to see how the ruling 
could be binding on the heirs without their consent. Moreover, the court held that: 
“The Shari’a Council is neither a national Court nor, in this instance at any rate, an 
arbitration tribunal. It does not derive its authority from any statute, nor from any 
consensus between the parties before me. Neither does it purport to. It describes its 
bench in terms of being a “quasi-Islamic Court” and its bench’s decisions as “extra 
judicial”. It would not seem even on its own opinion to be, therefore, a judicial 
body.”474  
 With the exception of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (when it is legitimately 
functioning under the Arbitration Act – something which has also never been 
acknowledged by a British court), by far most of what is said about ADR and Sharia 
councils, is of the mark.475 There is no overlap between British courts and the work of 
Sharia councils. Almost all Sharia councils, including the MAT, focus on Islamic 
family law. Moreover, it is unlikely that any Sharia council decision will be recognised 
as a binding arbitration award. In response to BBC’s exposé on The Islamic Sharia 
Council, Helen Grant, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in 2013, said: “[S]haria 
law has no jurisdiction under the law of England and Wales and the courts do not 
recognize it. There is no parallel court system in this country, and we have no 
intention of changing the position in any part of England and Wales.”476 The Under-
Secretary was right that the courts do not recognize the rulings of Sharia councils. 
However, it must be recognised that there are, in fact, two separate legal orders now 
functioning, of which one currently operates in the “shadow of the law”. 
Multiculturalists argue that it should be possible to integrate Islamic family law in 
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secular legal systems and that this can or should be done without violating human 
rights.477 Let us see if reality allows for that to be possible.  
 
Why would someone visit a Sharia council? 
 
Regardless of statements that Sharia councils should not involve matters of criminal 
law, in practice it turns out they do.478 Unfortunately, though, there is little research 
on this. In Germany, various cases have been found of Sharia judges and families 
claiming jurisdiction over criminal matters. Legal scholar and journalist Joachim 
Wagner (1943) found the “mediation of criminal disputes” in 16 cases in less than a 
year in Germany’s large cities. In Richter Ohne Gesetz (Judges without Law, 2011), 
Wagner describes how the prosecution of crimes, such as drug deals, extortion, 
murder and manslaughter, fails as victims and witnesses do not cooperate with 
public prosecutors. For instance, witnesses all of a sudden do not remember their 
testimony. Instead, families of victims and offenders had arranged to exchange blood 
money for freedom under the direction of Sharia judges.479 Wagner warns against the 
rise of an Islamic parallel legal system that endangers the German rule of law.  
 In 2008, it became public that the British Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) 
handled six cases of domestic violence. In all six cases, MAT president Siddiqi said, 
Sharia judges ordered husbands to take anger management classes as well as 
mentoring from community elders, but issued no further punishment. All the women 
subsequently withdrew their complaints to the police, who halted investigations. The 
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advantage was, according to Siddiqi, that marriages were saved and couples were 
given a second chance.480  
 Also within British Somali community, Sharia is used to settle criminal cases. 
Saynab Muhamad, leader of the Somali Family Support Centre, believes the 
involvement of community elders is more efficient than getting the police involved. In 
one case a few years ago, Sharia was used to resolve the case of knife attacks 
among teenagers. The victim’s family and the assailant came together with Somali 
elders. During an informal hearing the two parties were reconciled under the 
leadership of an Islamic judge. “Forgiveness” was purchased by the attacker; the 
police were never involved.481 
 Yet, evading criminal responsibility (or commercial disputes) are not the main 
reason individuals go to Sharia councils – including the MAT.482 Moreover, Sharia 
criminal law or diverting Muslims away from secular criminal law enforcement and 
justice cannot even count on multiculturalist support. Vocal support from 
multiculturalists is based on the assumption that family law, and mainly marital law – 
will be the focus of Sharia – as is the case with fundamentalists. For reasons that are 
not particularly clear to me, both multiculturalists and Islamists present their case for 
Sharia family law as a “modest” demand. “We merely ask for family law to be 
recognized, and perhaps some commercial law”, seems to be the basic idea. From a 
doctrinarian view, Sharia’s hold on family law (e.g. marriage, divorce, maintenance) 
is particularly strong, especially compared to other legal branches, such as Islamic 
tax law or constitutional law.483 But also from a practical point of view, wherever 
Islamists gain political power, it is Islamic family law that is pushed to the top of the 
agenda. For instance, when the Muslim Brotherhood was voted into parliament in 
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Egypt after Mubarak’s downfall, the first thing the Islamists did was roll back women’s 
rights by means of legislating Sharia-based family law.484 The process is witnessed 
all over the world where fundamentalists gain influence.485 It is therefore with extreme 
caution and skepticism that calls for recognition or toleration of Islamic family laws 
should be assessed.  
 There are some multiculturalists who find the focus on negative aspects 
regarding the status of women discriminatory or racist. They find that criticism on 
minorities in light of sex discrimination is “used” to “portray” minorities negatively. 
Racism is taken as a cause for exaggeration of problems.486 Moreover, many 
multiculturalists advocate that Sharia family law should be possible, “as long as it 
does not endanger women’s rights”. But is that possible? Let us clarify what happens 
at Sharia councils to see whether criticism on the status of women is justified or not. 
 
In Britain, much of the tension around the debate on Sharia councils arises out of 
concern for women. This is not strange: over 95 percent of the applicants at Sharia 
councils are women seeking a religious divorce.487 That is, women initiating a divorce 
for a marriage constituted under Islamic law. This is the raison d’être of these 
councils. Religious marriage and divorce are agreements wholly separate from civil 
marriage and civil divorce.  
 A Muslim marriage, or nikah, is a contract - “a solemn Qur’anic covenant” – 
between a bride and a groom, which they, or their proxies, must freely enter into, 
writes Sonia Shah-Kazemi who published a detailed report on why women visit 
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Sharia councils in 2001.488 Shah-Kazemi here equates “the bride and groom” with 
“their proxies”. That is because, under Sharia, the woman’s marriage act can also be 
stipulated by her wali. A wali is the nearest male relative who acts on behalf of the 
woman as legal guardian. This makes it possible for a groom and the father of the 
bride to contract a marriage, leaving the woman out of the equation, especially if she 
is a minor.489  
 For the contract to be valid, the groom must provide a sum of money, the 
dower – to which both parties have agreed –, which is known as the mahr. This sum 
belongs to the wife.490 The nikah needs to be witnessed by two competent – male – 
witnesses. Men are allowed to enter into polygamous marriages, and may marry up 
to four wives. Marital rights (or duties), inter alia, are “sexual availability”, and the 
wife’s entitlement to maintenance.491  
 Unfortunately, not all marriages are destined for eternal bliss. For the 
dissolution of civil marriages under UK law one spouse needs to divorce the other on 
the basis of grounds stipulated by law. These grounds include adultery, desertion, 
having been separated for a certain period, and “unreasonable behavior”, which is as 
broad as having to watch boring TV programs all the time. The procedure and its 
outcome are sex neutral; it does not matter whether divorce is initiated by a man or a 
woman. All in all, it can take six to eight months if both spouses cooperate, but one 
spouse can frustrate the divorce, stretching it for years.492 
 A secular judge cannot dissolve a religious marriage. Religious divorce thus 
requires a separate dissolution. Women will want a divorce more than a man, since 
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Muslim men may marry up to four wives.493 This means that if a man is dissatisfied 
with his marriage to his wife, he can easily ignore that particular marriage and find up 
to three others. Because the state does not recognize religious marriages, religious 
polygamy is not illegal. Furthermore, historically, there is overlap between the way a 
woman is released from marriage and the way a master frees a slave 
(manumission).494 A husband can unilaterally – without spousal permission – divorce 
his wife by pronouncing the talaq (“I divorce you”), for which no grounds are needed. 
Rules differing per school of Islamic jurisprudence, the talaq needs to be said three 
times. He forfeits his right to return of the dower.  
 Remarriage with the same woman is possible. However, for that remarriage to 
be valid, the woman will first need a new marriage with a sort of “in between” 
husband, with whom she will have to have sexual intercourse with. After this has 
happened, she has to divorce him and can then remarry her first husband. This is for 
instance what happens if a man pronounces the talaq, but then changes his mind. All 
in all, it can be a very traumatizing experience for the woman who is basically forced 
to have sex with a strange man in order to return to her husband. This is called 
“nikah halala”.495  
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 However, just like for Jewish women under Jewish law, it is (very) difficult for 
Muslim women to get a divorce under Islamic law if they want one. There are several 
ways in which a woman can obtain a divorce. For instance, the woman can initiate a 
khulla agreement. In that case, both parties must agree to the wife’s release from the 
marriage contract, and in most cases she is expected to refund the sum of the dower 
to the husband. In a sense she “buys” a talaq. The wife forfeits her right to 
maintenance. Custody of the children can be put at stake. Although custody rulings 
fall under the sole jurisdiction of state courts and Sharia councils formally 
acknowledge this, there are known cases of the wife illegitimately losing custody in 
exchange for a divorce. In particular, women who lack knowledge of Britain’s legal 
system run the risk of falsely believing Sharia councils have jurisdiction over custody 
matters.496 From the BBC documentary “Secrets of Britain's Sharia councils” it has 
become clear that even women who have had a state court grant them sole custody 
of the children can face a subsequent ruling by Sharia judges reversing that ruling as 
Sharia has its own rules on custody.497 Sharia’s schools of jurisprudence have 
detailed custody settlements, which come down to the fact that the father is most 
likely to get custody of the child, especially if the woman remarries.498 Furthermore, 
under a khulla contract, the couple can remarry without the wife needing to remarry 
and have sex with another man first.499 Generally, husbands are known to frustrate 
the khul, which can be terribly dangerous if the husband is violent towards her and 
the children. Sharia councils can prolong this dangerous situation by siding with the 
husband, stretching the abusive marriage.500  
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 Other possibilities for dissolving the religious marriage are if the marriage has 
not yet been consummated due to the fault of the husband. Here, both parties can 
agree, without payment, that the wife is released from the marriage contract. This is 
called mubara’ah. Also, the woman, prior to the marriage, can adopt a clause in the 
contract in which the husband allows the wife the possibility of divorce. 
 Unlike under Jewish law, Sharia allows for women to obtain a divorce without 
a husband’s consent. This is called faskh, and it forms the bulk of divorce procedures 
at Sharia councils. Whereas in Western secular legal systems the grounds for 
divorce are very easily met, this is not the case under Sharia. A qadi will need to 
check whether the divorce request meets the conditions. These are, inter alia: 
 
 The husband’s renunciation of Islam, apostasy or return to his former 
religion 
 The husband has a sexual defect, is impotent, or has taken a vow to 
abstain from sexual relations 
 There has been a corruption of the marriage, for instance if the 
husband is imprisoned for a specified period 
 The husband has not provided maintenance for his wife, as he is 
required to 
 The incapacity or refusal to fulfill marital obligations by either party may 
constitute the right to divorce 
 The husband has deserted or harmed the wife 
 Both parties have engaged in “mutual cursing”, for instance, when 
adultery has been alleged by one party against the other501 
 
So, continuing with the Islamic Sharia Council as an example, when a woman files 
for an Islamic divorce, she fills out an application form provided by the Sharia council. 
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She is required to sign the application, which stipulates “I promise to accept the 
decision of the Council irrespective of my own personal interests in order to maintain 
the supremacy of the Sharia over all other considerations […] I also solemnly swear 
that at the moment I am not violating any of the matrimonial laws of the Sharia.”502 
She pays a fee of £400 (which is peculiar as the Islamic Sharia Council is a 
registered charity).503 She is either interviewed by a representative of the ISC, or the 
procedure will be conducted by means of written correspondence. The Sharia council 
will send three letters to the husband to inform him of his wife’s decision to divorce 
him, and he may or may not reply, and he may or may not actually attend the hearing 
which the ISC schedules. The husband is invited to join his wife at session.504 
 When one of the above stated grounds for divorce is accepted, or is assumed 
to be proven – by the qadi – a divorce is granted. The Islamic Sharia Council 
embraces all four schools of Sunni jurisprudence. Once a month, fifteen scholars – 
e.g. Haitham al-Haddad and Abu Sayeed – meet at Regent's Park Mosque and 
discuss the cases until consensus about the outcome is reached.505 There is no 
transparency, nor is there the possibility of redress. 
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 When it comes to delivering evidence for fulfilling the grounds for divorce, 
women are confronted with unequal burdens of proof compared to men. Islamists 
maintain that the sexes are naturally different which results in different rights, where 
women draw the shortest straw. Islamists find confirmation in Surah Al-Baqarah 
2:282 that two female witnesses are required compared to one male witness: “[…] 
And bring to witness two witnesses from among your men. And if there are not two 
men [available], then a man and two women from those whom you accept as 
witnesses - so that if one of the women errs, then the other can remind her. […]” The 
Islamic Sharia Council has now updated its website. It used to say the following 
about the testimony of women: “Man's mind is uni-focal while the women's mind is 
multi-focal. In other words, a man would be fully occupied with the task he is involved 
with; he may not be distracted by anything else while being engaged in his activity. 
On the other hand, a woman may be busy in kitchen work and she will be easily alert 
to a phone buzzer or her infants cry from the cradle. In a way she is found to be more 
sensitive and active in her dealings. Thus she has got a very praise worthy character 
but that is not so good for a case of testimony which requires more attention and 
concentration. What is wrong then, if a second woman is needed, only to remind her 
is she fails to deliver her testimony completely. So it is a case of verification of the 
testimony, not that of degradation to the status of the women at all.” And: “To deny 
the difference between the two genders is a denial of truth. Allah who created us, 
gave us rulings according to our nature. And all is well as long as we go by the 
nature.”[sic]506 
 Nonetheless, the Islamic Sharia Council can administer the faskh, although its 
qadis would rather see the marriage reconciled and are reluctant to dissolve it.507 
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Thus, if the husband does not want to divorce his wife, it is very difficult for her to get 
divorced, even if there is (severe) abuse. He can keep her lingering in an abusive 
marriage for as long as he likes. Al-Haddad stated that a husband should not be 
asked about hitting his wife.508 Qadi Suhaib Hasan has been filmed secretly on 
several occasions downplaying the severity of violence and deterring women from 
going to the police. In one instance, filmed by The Guardian, after a woman said her 
husband hit her once, he said: “Only once? So it’s not a very serious matter”.509 In 
the BBC Panorama documentary, he asked: “He actually beats you? Severely, or 
just…”, leaving that hanging in the air. “He hits me,” the undercover reporter said, 
asking if she should go to the police. “The police, that is the very last resort,” Hasan 
replied.510 Abu Sayeed is fully aware that most of the women requesting divorce are 
on the receiving end of violence. However, testimonies by these women remain 
“allegations”, if not confirmed by their husbands.511  
 Generally, it is not uncommon for a man to refuse cooperation regarding the 
divorce until he feels enough money has been paid by his wife, nor is it uncommon 
for women to plea before the qadi that she is a victim of domestic abuse, hoping that 
the “judge” will agree with her divorce request. I have witnessed these hearings. 
Women testify there has been emotional and/or physical abuse, that huge loans are 
taken out in her name which she will need to pay for, that the husband hasn’t been 
seen for years, or that he has other wives besides her. No qadi appeared surprised 
when a woman told him or her about abuse, and the police are never mentioned. 
Public Prosecutor Nazir Afzal spoke to the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal a few years 
ago about their approach regarding women seeking religious divorces. He suspected 
that the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal discouraged abused women from seeking help, 
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which means they are perpetuating serious harm: “if a woman wants a divorce, they 
will say you will disgrace your family”.512  
 The organization Women Living under Muslim Laws wonders why “no 
research to date has questioned why Shariah councils do not automatically issue a 
certificate that following civil divorce, the religious marriage is also dissolved in the 
eyes of Muslim laws, and why instead they insist upon lengthy processes of calling 
husbands to ‘give evidence’”.513 In fact, research shows that at this Sharia council 
45% of cases were decided in six to eight months, 45% in 10-19 months, and 10% 
took much longer, which, considering the violent home situation, can be very 
dangerous for the petitioners.514 
 It is a valid critique. The Sharia council connected to the Birmingham Central 
Mosque had faster procedures and did not wait for the husbands to respond. This 
council was founded in the late 1990s. The mosque serves around 4,000 
worshippers for Friday prayers. It is one of Europe’s largest mosques. Women can 
petition for a religious divorce, for which the Council asks a fee of £250 – 
“administrative costs”, when I asked about it. They do ten to fifteen cases per month. 
That makes an average of £37,500 per year.515 When I visited in 2013, women had 
to back up their request in front of a panel of three qadi’s: Amra Bone, Muhammad 
Talha Bokhari, and chaired by Indian-born Mohammad Naseem, who died aged 89 in 
2014. Naseem was a medical practitioner, mainly focused on male circumcisions. He 
was chairman of the mosque, and executive member and home affairs spokesman 
for the Islamic Party of Britain until it was dissolved in 2006. The Islamic Party of 
Britain was an Islamist political party which never succeeded in getting elected.516  
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 The Birmingham Central Mosque stance, I was told, is that marriage requires 
mutual love, trust and consent: “In Islam you live in happiness. Religion is for ease, 
not for hardship”, Amra Bone said. Divorce procedures here take about two to three 
months, which is a relatively fast procedure. They do not wait for the husband to 
respond. 
 Their position is that they live as British citizens and accept the law of the land. 
Religious law can work with the civil courts on the basis that the law of the land is 
supreme, they told me. They believe in fast procedures, as “the Koran has made 
talaq and khul easy on purpose. Sharia has made very easy grounds for marriage 
and divorce. […] Islam is not intrinsically discriminatory against women.”517  
 Yet, that is the question. Some people, including qadi Amra Bone, argue that 
Sharia councils actually help women by releasing them from a situation of marital 
captivity when their husbands are unwilling to cooperate with a religious divorce. In 
reality it is showed that women succumb to community pressure and go to a Sharia 
council, where they have to accept unfair decisions. Or, as professor of law Shaheen 
Sardar Ali labels it, “their very existence […] pressurises women to use such forums 
to obtain ‘acceptance’ from their families and communities”.518  
 Although the Birmingham council does give out faskhs in a faster and easier 
manner than the London-Based Islamic Sharia Council does, that has not settled the 
discriminatory nature of Sharia councils in general. Women still have to pay a large 
sum of money – especially considering they often lack sufficient means, all the more 
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as their husbands (as I have heard most women testify at Sharia council hearings) 
have plummeted them into debt. Moreover, all Sharia councils condone violence 
against women. Especially the Islamic Sharia Council actively detracts women from 
seeking outside help or police protection.519 The Birmingham Sharia Council 
passively ignores the fact that women are victims of (severe) physical abuse. Both 
councils are the least bit concerned when women are in abusive domestic situations, 
even when there are children involved. Victims are not advised – sometimes even 
discouraged – from filing a police complaint against violent spouses. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that some applicants may lack knowledge of the English 
language and legal system, and their rights. Even more, there is evidence for the fact 
that refusal to settle a family dispute in a Sharia council can amount to threats and 
intimidation, or, at best, being excommunicated and labeled an unbeliever. Moreover, 
the councils make custody claims – something they deny in public.  
 Besides these insurmountable problems of which the scope differs per council 
and depends on those religious authorities pulling the strings, there is another 
prohibitive objection to positively evaluating the possibilities of Sharia councils. And 
that is that, ultimately, deference to these councils places religious authorities in the 
position to move women away from a system in which they are free to enter and exit 




Sharia councils are thus mainly concerned with women requesting religious divorces. 
Islamic marriages are not registered and not recognized by British laws. One could 
think: why get a religious divorce in the first case? Why not just separate from your 
husband and leave it at that? Why is it important to get a religious divorce apart from 
a civil divorce (if there also was a civil marriage)? 
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 Khola Hasan (daughter of Shaykh Suhaib Hasan), who was qadi in training 
when I spoke to her in 2013, told me that women want a religious divorce because 
their community expects them to get one, regardless of a civil divorce – if there ever 
was a civil marriage at all. Otherwise, the members of the community will ostracize 
the woman. It must be understood that in some Muslim communities, a secular 
divorce does not suffice when the religious marriage is not formally dissolved. Muslim 
women who turn to Sharia councils for divorce, do so as a consequence of the 
shared conviction within the religious community that there is a distinct system of 
Muslim family law, to which these women feel compelled to abide by.520 When a 
woman is still considered married under Islamic law, but no longer under civil law (or 
never had a civil marriage), one speaks of “marital captivity” or “limping 
marriages”.521 Women can get a civil divorce in a court, but for an Islamic religious 
divorce they require the cooperation of the husband or a cleric functioning as judge.  
 The Dutch non-governmental organization Femmes for Freedom specifically 
supports women trapped in marital captivity and lobbies for legislation against 
husbands leaving their wives in such a situation.522 The issue can present itself in 
two forms: either women face the law of their religion – mainly Islamic and Jewish 
law, but also Catholic and Hindu – or religious family law of their country of origin, for 
instance Pakistani law. Pakistan, like many other Islamic states, does not recognize 
Western civil divorces. In that case, a religious divorce needs to be registered under 
Pakistani law. The same goes for most Islamic countries.523  
 Being ostracized by one’s community is one problem, but perhaps not the 
worst. This ‘split status’ position may, as Shachar describes, leave women under the 
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whims of “recalcitrant husbands, who are well aware of the adverse effect the 
situation has on their wives, as they fall between the cracks of the civil and religious 
jurisdictions.”524 And, as Femmes for Freedom states: “As long as the wife is tied to 
her religious marriage, she lacks independence and is hampered in her participation 
in society. She may become socially isolated and will not be able to start a new 
relationship. If she does start a new relationship without having obtained, for 
example, an Islamic divorce, she will be considered an adulterous women in most 
Islamic cultures and countries.”525 Other than shame that a community brings upon a 
non-divorced yet separated woman, she is never really free from her husband (who 
remains entitled to sexual intercourse sanctioned by Sharia, which can be a form of 
Sharia sanctioned rape). She cannot remarry as she is still married to her husband. 
There is the threat of having one’s children abducted by their father.  
 An example of the problematic nature of marital captivity is the following: an 
Iranian woman is divorced under British law, but does not have an Islamic divorce. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran does not recognize her as divorced. Without her 
husband’s consent, she cannot have her Iranian passport renewed. If her (ex-) 
husband abducts her children by taking them to Iran, she will probably never see 
them again. She is not able to travel without her husband’s permission. And, if she 
chooses to start a new relationship or remarry, and she does manage to travel to Iran 
to see her children, she will be prosecuted for adultery for which the Iranian 
authorities award the death penalty.526 As her (ex-)husband is unwilling to cooperate 
with the religious divorce, this situation could continue for her entire life.  
 Muslim women who are still considered married, can either stay alone for the 
rest of their lives or may start a new relationship, but they risk grave consequences in 
countries where adultery is considered a crime. With the husband being in control of 
the woman’s future, it “[…] leaves women vulnerable to extortion, manipulation and 
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abuse. Women who live in marital captivity are trapped for long periods of time, even 
decades, in a state of limbo and unable to rebuild their lives.”527 As the husband is 
able to marry up to four wives, he can easily continue his life without consequences.  
 The need to obtain a religious divorce next to a civil divorce can be pressing. 
One Dutch-Pakistani woman told me she did not particularly feel the need to get an 
Islamic divorce next to her Dutch civil divorce. However, her parents who lived in 
Pakistan told her that the villagers threatened to set her parents’ house on fire – with 
them in it – if she were to continue her life without a religious divorce.528  
 From one perspective, it can be argued that Sharia councils actually provide a 
solution for the problem of marital captivity. For, if a husband frustrates the divorce or 
is entirely absent, a qadi can pronounce the divorce nonetheless, thereby releasing 
the woman from marriage. This is a different approach to a multiculturalist one. A 
multiculturalist focuses on a “need” stemming from a “religious identity”, experienced 
as “member of a community”. The pragmatic approach to releasing women from a – 
not seldom abusive – marriage obviously does not have the romantic connotation of 
accommodating Sharia to fulfill the spiritual needs of a religious minority. Countering 
the multiculturalist narrative, Pragna Patel, director of non-profit organization Southall 
Black Sisters and a founding member of Women Against Fundamentalism, speaks 
about the “fallacious construction of the needs of communities”. She says: “religion is 
a private matter, a personal thing, what we do or how we pray and all that is our 
private matter. What we don’t want is religion institutionalized in the provision of 
services, including legal services, because that is when your rights are violated.”529 
This is particularly relevant. Sharia councils are not advisory institutions where co-
religionists find each other in mutual faith. Sharia councils are constituting, fueling 
and maintaining a parallel legal order that has real consequences for individuals.  
 In a toxic mix of religious fundamentalism, culture and tight-knit communities, 
Sharia councils uphold the theory and practice of the stronghold men have over 
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women. Sharia councils may “help” women who want a divorce, but it is a solution to 
a problem that they fuel and one that they seek to preserve. Moreover, that religious 
divorces are Sharia council’s “core business” does not in the least bit mean that they 
are actually willing to help women obtain one. In fact, they are known to frustrate 
women in their requests, especially if the husband is unwilling to cooperate.  
 
Sharia councils and human rights  
 
Are Sharia councils and human rights compatible? That depends on who you ask. 
The European Court of Human Rights says they are not, as I show below. Yet, 
multiculturalists have two choices when answering this question. A first option is 
simply stating that Sharia councils should operate within the boundaries of human 
rights, viz. not violate notions of sex equality (how this is to be done is never 
specified). I label this the “wishful thinking” option. A second strand of reasoning is 
that, since “Sharia cannot be defined” and its norms are “ever-changing” – in the way 
secular laws can be clearly defined – it is not possible to have a meaningful debate 
on the compatibility of Sharia and human rights.530   
 Unfortunately, in the spirit of Williams and Phillips, it is widely accepted in 
academic circles to state that Sharia is diverse and flexible, and it is also common to 
simply do away altogether with “negative” analyses which might reveal there is an 
inherent conflict between Sharia and individual rights. Take for instance this 
acceptance of the idea that Sharia law is not a concrete entity: “From this it is clear 
that there is no exact answer as to the compatibility of sharia with human rights 
standards, nor is it possible to make an assessment of the precise treatment of 
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women – sharia is flexible and can be adapted and developed along with the 
demands of modern society. While this is positive in that it goes against the 
presumption of sharia being archaic and sexist, it also means that it is difficult to 
regulate application of Islamic norms, as there is no uniform and defined body of 
‘accepted’ laws.”531 Yet, is it not clear from the fact that British Sharia Councils do 
manage to function, that at least the Islamic judges themselves have no problem 
finding their way through “the forest of vagueness” every time they decide upon a 
case? This simple argument in itself makes it possible to say that, yes, there are 
diverse interpretations, but the core of Islamic family law is readily understandable 
and enforceable. It is perfectly possible to study and evaluate the practice of Sharia 
councils in the United Kingdom, regardless of the diversity of Islamic laws and 
practices.   
 There is growing concern over the development of a ‘quasi-legal’ system, 
which functions contrary to the principle of equality before the law, and which is 
eroding the UK’s commitment to the eradication of discrimination. In a previous 
section I laid out the theory on the grounds for Islamic divorce, which itself is 
discriminatory towards women. And the practice in Sharia councils confirms that.  
 Several reports confirm the experiences I have had at the Islamic Sharia 
council in London and the Sharia council hosted by the Birmingham Central Mosque. 
These Sharia institutions, according to the framers of the reports, are not merely 
offering a helping hand in granting women their religious divorces they so 
desperately seek in order to overcome the issue of marital captivity. Sharia councils 
are courts which operate outside their legal boundaries, where faith-based 
discrimination is institutionalized and women’s dependence on Sharia and affiliated 
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institutions is deepened by means of pressure and (the threat of) violence enforced 
upon them. This is sanctioned by the community. For example, in the report ‘Equal 
and Free’, drawn up in support of Baroness Cox’s bill which aims to restrict the role 
of Sharia councils, states:  
 
“The establishment of Muslim arbitration tribunals and the growth of Sharia Councils 
may be welcomed in so far as they relieve British courts from pressure and provide 
perceived theologically appropriate resolutions to commercial and other disputes, 
whether under the Arbitration Act or via voluntary mediation. However, often based 
on inherently gender-discriminatory principles, or operating outside their legal limits, 
they have also often been the cause of much suffering for women in this country. […] 
One British Muslim woman states: “I’m speaking as a British Muslim – I would like to 
say that I feel terribly let down by the British State, with its schizophrenic response to 
the law, its own law, its abrogation of its responsibility to safeguarding rights of 
Muslim women.” Many Muslim women claim they came to Britain hoping to escape 
the injustice of Sharia law – and found their plight is worse here than in their 
countries of origin. The injustice inherent in religiously sanctioned discrimination is 
often compounded by intimidation: pressure from families and communities often 
prevents women from seeking their legal redress available in civil law. Although the 
UK Government claims that all UK citizens have equal rights and access to the law of 
the land, this ‘de jure’ right is not a ‘de facto’ reality. This report provides evidence of 
the problems and suffering of Muslim women in Britain today, including: condoning of 
domestic violence by Sharia councils and councils; asymmetrical access to divorce; 
rulings regarding child custody that ignore the best interests of the child; 
discriminatory policies defining the testimonies of women as being only worth half 
that of men; and the denial of the concept of marital rape.”532  
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The report ‘Sharia Law in Britain: A Threat to One Law for All and Equal Rights’ 
provides ample evidence of the arbitrary, discriminatory and involuntary nature of 
these Sharia councils.533 Firstly, the report also contests the image of Sharia councils 
as functioning as arbitration tribunals under the Arbitration Act 1996. As I stated 
earlier, arbitration is founded on the principle that at least two parties decide freely to 
have their conflict adjudicated by an impartial tribunal under self-chosen rules. To this 
end, prior to the decision, the parties must sign an agreement that they will accept 
the outcome. It can be argued, however, that Sharia councils lack these basic 
characteristics of arbitration. In Sharia councils, there is no control over the 
appointment of judges or arbiters, nor an independent mechanism for monitoring 
them. Those before Sharia councils often do not have access to legal advice or 
representation, and the proceedings are not recorded. There are no traceable legal 
judgments, nor is there any right to question or appeal the judgment.534 Besides, the 
qadi may issue a ruling on a divorce request without the presence of the husband, 
which again does not comply with the fundamental demand that arbitration demands 
two parties. One-party divorce rulings do not fall under the scope of the Arbitration 
Act. Also, it is odd that 95 per cent of their activities do not comply with the most 
basic notion of arbitration. And even more interesting, these councils have an 
inquisitorial approach, as opposed to an adversarial regime, which seems to be the 
most appropriate in arbitration proceedings. In addition, if a woman requests a 
religious divorce or child custody from an institution which presents itself as an 
arbitration tribunal, why make it so difficult for her? In principle, both men and women 
can take advantage of Sharia councils if they wish, but due to the discriminatory 
nature of Sharia, men have many more opportunities in practice.535 An arbiter is 
supposed to be impartial, and not favor men as a default setting.  
 But also important, the basic requirement of arbitration – voluntary agreement 
– is not always met. The ‘Sharia Law in Britain’ report devotes a lot of attention to the 
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involuntary nature of Sharia council proceedings. It contests the general assumption 
that those who attend Sharia councils do so voluntarily, and that unfair decisions can 
be redressed in state courts. As most principles of Sharia – contrary to what the 
proponents say – are contrary to British law and public policy, in theory they would be 
unlikely to be upheld in a secular court. Also, in reality, women are often pressured 
by their families to go to a Sharia council and to accept unfair decisions. British 
researcher Samia Bano, who visited Sharia councils and spoke to the women 
involved, found that, in reality, Sharia councils are “conceptualized in terms of a duty 
upon all Muslims to abide by the requirements of the sharia and the stipulations of 
the sharia councils.”536 Even more, there is evidence for the fact that refusal to settle 
a family dispute in a Sharia council can amount to threats and intimidation, or – at 
best – being excommunicated and labeled a disbeliever.537 
 Establishing the fact that the voluntary nature is, to say the least, questionable, 
is an essential part of the discussion, because if women are coerced into the 
frameworks of Sharia councils, this severely impacts the rhetorical strength of 
arguing in favor of Sharia councils, which is founded on the notion of religious 
freedoms. Yet, even if Sharia councils – hypothetically – were accessed fully 
voluntarily, that does not end the discussion on the nature of Sharia law in the United 
Kingdom. 
 Regarding discrimination on grounds of sex, the most basic and fundamental 
issue is that it is by far mostly women who seek Sharia council services. This simple 
and basic finding deserves special attention. Men are not dependent on Sharia 
council rulings. As British professor of Law Shaheen Sardar Ali states: “If, being 
allowed to practise Islam in a non-Muslim jurisdiction is a matter of freedom of 
religion and minority rights, Muslim men and women ought to be equally keen to 
access such forums […]”.538 That it is mainly women needing the service should raise 
concern in itself. 
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 Sharia family law consists of inherently discriminatory rules. It has become 
clear that the rules of the game are fundamentally more difficult for women than they 
are for men: something Islamists define as “justice” emanating from biological sex 
differences. Also, sexual obedience in marriage is not questioned by qadis. Marital 
violence is accepted as ground for divorce, rather than a ground to start an intensive 
community campaign against it.  
 Lastly, Sharia councils exist so that Islamic fundamentalists can promote their 
ideology whilst at the same time making money by letting women buy their 
freedom.539 A freedom not seldom denied, if husbands are set on remaining married 
– religiously – to their wives.540 It should not come as a surprise that Muslim women 
“[…] remain extremely cautious of initiatives to accommodate sharia into English 
law”, as British researcher Samia Bano is convinced.541 Needless to say, the 
multiculturalist’s romantic view of the need Muslims have for Sharia is off beat.  
 Proponents of recognition of Sharia councils, such as Williams and Phillips, 
and many academics, are aware that Islamic laws can and do conflict with sex 
equality as codified in secular laws and treaties. But as multiculturalists, they 
simultaneously believe equality between Muslim minorities and the “indigenous” 
majority can be achieved by detracting from the universal nature of British laws. That 
means that Muslims should be able to resort to their “own” laws, but at the same 
time, this may not infringe upon sex equality. This is a condition set in most 
contributions to this particular debate: Sharia, yes, on the condition it is not 
discriminatory – yet it is never attempted to stipulate how this can be done. It is 
important to point this out.  
 Williams states that “an increased legal recognition of communal religious 
identities can be met if we are prepared to think about the basic ground rules that 
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might organise the relationship between jurisdictions, making sure that we do not 
collude with unexamined systems that have oppressive effect or allow shared public 
liberties to be decisively taken away by a supplementary jurisdiction”. How this 
should be put into practice has yet to be specified. The problem multiculturalists 
ultimately have is that it is not possible.542 Sharia is fundamentally discriminatory 
towards non-Muslims and women – as was also made clear in the previous chapter – 
while secular laws and human rights regimes explicitly denounce unlawful 
discrimination on grounds of sex and religion. Besides, multiculturalists overlook that 
even in Islamic countries or countries with a majority of Muslims are in a constant 
tussle to (re)define laws under the influence of competing religious fundamentalists 
and secularists.  
 These and other problems were dealt with by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in the well-known Refah v Turkey case (2001). The ECtHR 
concurred with the decision by the Turkish constitutional court to ban the Refah 
Partisi (‘Welfare Party’).543 Refah operated in breach of Turkey’s constitution, which 
stated that no political party may act counter to the state’s secularist principle. Refah, 
an Islamist political party which expected to achieve a large number of votes at the 
coming election, aimed to establish a plurality of legal systems, in order to enable 
Sharia to function for the Islamic part of the population. The party stated that this 
proposed plurality actually intended to promote freedom to enter into contracts and 
the freedom to choose which court should have jurisdiction. However, Turkey’s 
secular principle entailed the notion that it considered the rules of Sharia 
incompatible with the democratic regime, as Sharia does not comply with the 
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democratic foundation of equality between citizens before the law.544 The ECtHR 
explicitly denounced the possibility of a societal model that enables legal pluralism545: 
 
“Firstly, it would do away with the State’s role as the guarantor of individual rights and 
freedoms and the impartial organiser of the practice of the various beliefs and 
religions in a democratic society, since it would oblige individuals to obey, not rules 
laid down by the State in the exercise of its above-mentioned functions, but static 
rules of law imposed by the religion concerned. But the State has a positive 
obligation to ensure that everyone within its jurisdiction enjoys in full, and without 
being able to waive them, the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. 
[…] Secondly, such a system would undeniably infringe the principle of non-
discrimination between individuals as regards their enjoyment of public freedoms, 
which is one of the fundamental principles of democracy. A difference in treatment 
between individuals in all fields of public and private law according to their religion or 
beliefs manifestly cannot be justified under the Convention, and more particularly 
Article 14 thereof, which prohibits discrimination. Such a difference in treatment 
cannot maintain a fair balance between, on the one hand, the claims of certain 
religious groups who wish to be governed by their own rules and on the other the 
interest of society as a whole, which must be based on peace and on tolerance 
between the various religions and beliefs.”546  
 
The ECtHR subscribed to the view that Sharia in itself is incompatible with the 
fundamental principles of democracy – ironically, a view Islamists agree with – as 
conceived in the Convention:  
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“Like the Constitutional Court, the Court considers that sharia, which faithfully reflects 
the dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, is stable and invariable. Principles 
such as pluralism in the political sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms 
have no place in it. The Court notes that, when read together, the offending 
statements, which contain explicit references to the introduction of sharia, are difficult 
to reconcile with the fundamental principles of democracy, as conceived in the 
Convention taken as a whole. It is difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy 
and human rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on sharia, which 
clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law 
and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way it 
intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious 
precepts.”547 
 
It was thus not merely legal pluralism that was problematic in itself, but the fact that 
Sharia would function as the content of an autonomous, separate, legal system, that 
drove the conclusion of the ECtHR. Citizens have religious freedom, including the 
right to manifest religion by worship and observance. However, the Court reiterated, 
that freedom is “primarily a matter of individual conscience which is quite different 
from the field of private law, which concerns the organisation and functioning of 
society as a whole.”548  
 Yet, at the same time, multiculturalists in the United Kingdom defend the 
freedom to choose to resort to Islamic law for Muslim minorities. Muslims should thus 
have the option to choose jurisdictions, as the proponents argue. In general, those 
who favor state sanctioning of Sharia councils hold freedom of religion to be 
foundational to their position, and find suspicions of intra-group discrimination 
remedied by its presupposed voluntary nature. When it comes down to the degree to 
which Muslims may enact and enforce a sub-legal system that is fundamentally at 
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odds with the human rights framework of the law of the land, multiculturalists 
suddenly start to question whether those involved do so out of a sense of identity. 
Yet, this judgment makes it clear the European Court understands very well the 
importance of distinguishing between private religious convictions and the Islamist 
desire to institutionalize religious laws for a minority of Muslims in the West. From the 
argument developed in Refah, it is clear that all the considerations that the Court 
presents are applicable in other legal orders that subscribe to the principles 
developed in the Convention. If Sharia law contradicts the provisions of the 
Convention in Turkey, it also contradicts the Convention in Italy, France or the United 
Kingdom. Two years after the Refah ruling, the ECtHR confirmed its views on the 
incompatibility between democracy and Sharia in the case of Gündüz v. Turkey.549  
 One could argue that the discussion about Sharia councils in the United 
Kingdom is different from a ruling against a political party that wants to have Sharia 
officially instituted. However, even if the demands of religious groups are mitigated in 
the sense that it should be “merely” restricted to family matters, then the tension with 
democratic values is still present. From the Refah case, as well as the discussion in 
the previous chapter, it is clear that Sharia encapsulates a theocratic state model. 
Even in a moderated form, such as informal Sharia councils, religious leaders have a 
position of leadership in religious communities whereby they exert tremendous power 
over individuals who happen to be pulled into a societal subsystem. As judges, 
fundamentalist leaders rule over the lives of people who depend on them without the 
possibility of redress or there being any form of accountability. It is difficult to 
harmonize this religious legal regime within the democratic structure.550 Or, as British 
scholar Rumy Hasan states: “Importantly, the establishment of even a minimal Sharia 
jurisdiction will enormously increase the power of the mullahs and imams, who will 
then inevitably push for more exemptions to the law, and more Sharia laws and 
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courts. Moreover, it will give the green light for religious leaders of other ‘faith 
communities’ to push for their own separate legal jurisdictions, a vista that cannot at 
all be appealing to anyone seeking a more just, unified, cohesive society.”551  
 Moreover, the idea against informal Islamic private law receives legal backing 
by the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), which the UK ratified in 1966. CEDAW’s ratio legis is to remedy 
the tension between religious freedoms and sex equality. States that have ratified the 
Convention are required to enshrine sex equality into their domestic legislation, and 
enact new provisions to guard against discrimination against women. Professor of 
Law Frances Raday states that CEDAW creates a clear hierarchy of values by giving 
superior force to sex equality when there is a clash between customs and cultural 
norms, including religious norms.552 Also, under Article 2(c) of CEDAW, State parties 
agree by all appropriate means to “establish legal protection of the rights of women 
on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and 
other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of 
discrimination”.  
 In fact, in 2013, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women issued a general recommendation on Article 16 of 
CEDAW – which deals with discrimination against women at the inception of, and 
during, marriage and at its dissolution by divorce or death. The Committee 
recommended that all Member States adopt legislation to eliminate the discriminatory 
aspects of family law regimes, whether they are regulated by civil code, religious law, 
ethnic custom or any combination of laws and practices. This thus also includes 
Sharia. Moreover, the Committee expressed “concern that identity-based personal 
status laws and customs perpetuate discrimination against women and that the 
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preservation of multiple legal systems is in itself discriminatory against women.”553 
From this point of view, it is bitter to see that Turkey has prohibited the unilateral 
divorce (talaq) by men under its secular civil code, while in the United Kingdom, 
multiculturalists are paying tribute to a system that embraces that religious 
construction.554  
 The Refah case and the CEDAW recommendation are strong arguments 
against the multiculturalists’ focus on the right to religious freedom when it comes to 
accommodating religious laws in informal family law tribunals.   
 Sharia councils pose several problems. Firstly, it represents an encroaching 
influence of Islamism in Europe. Secondly, it is a problem that that expression of 
Islamism comes in an institutionalised form of legal pluralism. Thirdly, it is a problem 
that this pluralism does not entail, for instance, rivalry between two equally good 
systems, but rivalry between, on the one hand, a secular democratic system that sets 
out to protect the rights of members of (religious) minorities and women just like it 
does for every other citizen, and on the other hand, a system of Islamic laws that is 
clearly incompatible with freedom and equality. Muslim women who are part of tight-
knit communities do not have the freedom and equal choice to decide to live their 
lives with or without marriage. This problem is a part of (sometimes tribal) group 
cultures, and exacerbated by Sharia councils. Sharia law is designed and intended to 
restrict and remove freedoms. But is that unique for Muslim women? 
  
Batei Din: Jewish Councils 
 
Multiculturalists state that equality also means that, like Jewish and Catholic 
minorities, Muslim minorities may resort to their own institutionalized councils. Hindus 
also have informal religious councils – there is hardly any research on those. Is it 
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indeed unfair to deny Muslims access to Sharia councils if other religious minorities 
have tribunals of their own?  
 Like the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, the London-based United Synagogue 
offers faith-based arbitration to Orthodox Jews. On its website, it states: “In Jewish 
Law, civil disputes between Jewish parties are required to be adjudicated by a Beth 
Din adopting Jewish law as the law to be applied to the resolution of the dispute. The 
London Beth Din sits as an arbitral tribunal in respect of civil disputes and the parties 
to any such dispute are required to sign an Arbitration Agreement prior to a hearing 
taking place. The effect of this is that the award given by the Beth Din has the full 
force of an Arbitration Award and may be enforced (with prior permission of the Beth 
Din) by the civil courts.”555 Yet, like Sharia councils, the problem lies in family law, 
specifically in divorce proceedings. 
 In 1857, the UK parliament passed the Matrimonial Causes Act which 
reformed the law on divorce, moving litigation from the jurisdiction of the 
ecclesiastical courts to the civil courts.556 In addition, amongst Christian believers, a 
civil divorce suffices when ending a marriage contract. When Lord Phillips and 
Archbishop Williams refer to other religious tribunals, the Jewish courts are more 
analogous to Sharia councils. Just like the Sharia divorce regime, in the Jewish 
tradition a civil divorce decree does not dissolve the religious marriage.  
 According to Jewish law, marriage is a contract of ownership, where the 
husband (ba'al in Hebrew, which means owner) ‘acquires’ his wife. Jewish law 
mandates both spouses’ consent in a religious divorce. The termination of a Jewish 
marriage is executed by a writ of divorce (the get), delivered by the husband to his 
wife, out of his own free will.557 The wife merely needs to accept the get. After ninety-
two days she can remarry. The Beth Din acts as a witness to this process of mutual 
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consent and the writing of the get for the divorce to be lawful under Jewish law. 
Without a get, a Jewish woman cannot remarry under Jewish law and she is 
condemned as an adulteress if she has sexual relations with other men. In addition, if 
those relations lead to children, these offspring are branded mamzerim – a stigma 
that lasts for nine generations. A mamzer is prohibited from marrying any Jew other 
than another mamzer, and is thus barred from marrying freely within the Jewish 
community. This prospect of being unable to remarry and jeopardising not only 
herself but her children, too, is devastating to observant Jewish women. If unable to 
divorce due to an unwilling or disappeared husband, a woman can be trapped in a 
“dead marriage” for years (or perhaps her whole life), and is labelled agunah, a 
“chained woman” – she is left in marital captivity. However, a non-divorced man may 
cohabit with other women without the stigma of adultery, nor are his children born out 
of those relations considered mamzerim.558  
 Like Muslim women, Jewish women often find themselves at a disadvantage 
in the religious divorce process. Unlike Sharia councils, where a qadi can issue a 
divorce in the absence of a husband, it is not possible for a Jewish woman to obtain 
a get without her husband’s cooperation. In that vein, a Beth Din does not function as 
a ‘court’; it is a witness to the dissolution of the marriage. The Islamic faskh thus 
offers a possibility for Muslim women to obtain a divorce from an absent or 
uncooperative husband, which Jewish women do not have. A Jewish husband, on 
the other hand, can frustrate the divorce even in cases of domestic abuse without a 
Beth Din stepping in.559  
 In order for Jewish women not to be pressured to agree to unfair financial or 
(informal) custodial demands in order to obtain the get under the supervision of male-
dominated Batei Din, the UK passed the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act in 2002. 
This Act aims to remedy the unbalanced bargaining power of the husband. If a 
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Jewish couple requests a divorce from a civil court, the civil judge can withhold the 
final legal civil dissolution of a marriage “until a declaration made by both parties that 
they have taken such steps as are required to dissolve the marriage in accordance 
with those usages”. This means that the civil divorce will not be finalised until the 
woman has received the get.560 Interestingly, the 2002 Act explicitly mentions the 
‘usages of the Jews’, and ‘any other prescribed religious usages’. ‘Prescribed’ means 
that any other religious group may subject itself to the Act by asking the Lord 
Chancellor to prescribe the religious group for that purpose. Yet, no application has 
been received from any Islamic group requesting such recognition.561 It must be 
added that this 2002 Act is successful within the Jewish community, as almost all 
Jewish citizens have a civil marriage combined with a religious marriage, which is 
unfortunately not the case in the British Islamic community. This also means that 
despite the similarities between Jewish and Islamic tribunals, both carry on 
institutionalizing marital captivity and upholding discriminatory religious laws. There 
are (legal) differences, both in religious family law regarding the competence of the 
councils, and regarding British secular law which recognises ‘Jewish usages’. 
 Another important difference is that, other than Jewish women, Muslim women 
face grave penalties, including bodily harm, when they enter a new relationship if 
their previous religious marriage is not dissolved. Sharia attaches the death penalty 
to adulteresses. This punishment can be carried out in the form of honour-based 
violence, or as a punishment under state law, for instance in Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia.562 Violent family members are a problem cross-culture and religion. However, 
                                                          
560
 Comparable to the 1983 New York Get Law, see Broyde, Michael, ‘New York’s Regulation of Jewish 
Marriage. Covenant, Contract, or Statute?’, pp. 138-163 (153), in: Nichols, Joel (ed.), Marriage and Divorce in a 
Multicultural Context: Multi-tiered Marriage and the Boundaries of Civil Law and Religion, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2011. 
561 Hunt, Phillip, ‘House of Lords (Written Answers): Justice: Sharia Law’ Hansard 3 Mar 2008, Column 
WA154.  
562
 The Crown Prosecution Service states: “Honour based violence (HBV) can be described as a collection of 
practices, which are used to control behaviour within families or other social groups to protect perceived 
cultural and religious beliefs and/or honour. Such violence can occur when perpetrators perceive that a relative 
has shamed the family and/or community by breaking their honour code.”, see lemma ‘Honour Based Violence 
and Forced Marriage’ via 
223 
 
as American emerita professor of psychology Phyllis Chesler states, the specific 
planning of murdering often young women is typical of Islam-rooted communities. 
Moreover, major religious and political leaders in developing Muslim countries keep 
silent and it is mostly Islamic communities that maintain an enforced silence on all 
matters of religious, cultural, or communal “sensitivity”, thereby perpetuating 
violence.563 The aspect of (life-threatening) violence gives Islamic, thus other than 
Jewish, marital captivity an even more problematic dimension.  
  Regarding Jewish courts, the state has made legislation in order to provide 
women with some leverage when husbands do not want to cooperate with a religious 
divorce. From interviews with rabbinic judges it was clear that it also works in 
practice: women have been able to obtain the get more easily since the Divorce 
(Religious Marriages) Act. That means that there is a fundamental difference 
between the legal relationship between the UK and Jewish courts, where there is 
formal recognition of the Jewish practices regarding family law and state intervention; 
and the UK and Sharia councils, which have not received any formal recognition, nor 
are they the subject of state intervention. What these two systems do have in 
common, though, is that they function based on a system that is inherently 
discriminatory towards women. Their religious laws are the foundation of a system 
keeping women stuck in a situation of marital captivity. Religious leaders are not 
keen on reform. Furthermore, both Muslim as well as Jewish men are known to stall 
religious divorce and use their power to blackmail women to negotiate favourable 
financial and custodial settlements in the civil procedure.564  
 Religious tribunals calling upon divine laws concur with this system and 
support community convictions involving shame and honour that keep marital 
captivity alive as an issue. Other than a tolerant (denounce yet accept) or intolerant 
(denounce and intervene) position, multiculturalists support the system of women 
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being dependent on religious councils and their husbands for their freedom. Yet, the 
romantic vision multiculturalists have regarding the possibility for Jewish and Muslim 
minorities to have access to their own laws is off beat.  
   
The Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill  
 
There is an additional problem that marks another difference between Jewish women 
and Muslim women. That is, Jewish women – apart from a tiny minority – generally 
also have a civil marriage, and therefore the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 
actually works as a lever.565 However, only about ten percent of the UK’s mosques 
are registered to conduct civil ceremonies under the 1949 Marriage Act.566 It is 
believed that a high percentage of Muslim marriages are religious only, not civil. A 
further problem is that the criminal offense of performing a marriage ceremony that is 
not registered under the Marriage Act 1949 is not enforced.567 This cements the false 
belief that the nikah (Islamic marriage contract) is registered under domestic law.568 It 
is also problematic that – unlike Jewish women – Muslim women often have relatively 
little knowledge of the British legal system and are unaware of their rights.569 It is this 
that the bill seeks to address. 
 In 2012, four years after the Archbishop and the Lord Chief Justice delivered 
their speeches, The Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill was discussed 
in the House of Lords. The bill’s aim is to prevent discrimination against Muslim 
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women and “jurisdiction creep” in Islamic courts.570 It addresses the concern that 
some Sharia councils apply Sharia principles that go well beyond their legal remit, 
such as dealing with criminal law (for example pressure being placed on women to 
withdraw allegations of domestic violence) or family law; that some Sharia council 
rulings are being misrepresented as having the force of UK law; that some Muslim 
women are being coerced into agreeing to arbitration or mediation which ought to be 
voluntary; and that some proceedings of Sharia councils are discriminatory against 
Muslim women.  
 The bill does not aim to interfere in the internal theological affairs of religious 
groups, as the report ‘A Parallel World. Confronting the abuse of many Muslim 
women in Britain today’ states.571 The report is drafted by a member of the House of 
Lords, Caroline Cox, who initiated the bill. It states furthermore that: “In a free 
society, and in accordance with the hard-fought tradition of freedom of religion and 
belief, individuals must be able to organise their affairs according to their own 
principles, whether religious or otherwise. However, attempting to operate a parallel 
legal jurisdiction and to allow the de facto creation of new legal structures and 
standards is unacceptable.” This aim is in line with the European Court of Human 
Rights’ approach to Sharia. The bill explicitly makes it clear that sex discrimination 
law applies directly to ‘Arbitration Tribunal’ proceedings: the bill proposes to amend 
the Arbitration Act of 1996 by stating that discriminatory rulings can be struck down 
under the bill. New provisions include: “No part of an arbitration agreement or 
process shall provide – (a) that the evidence of a man is worth more than the 
evidence of a woman, or vice versa, (b) that the division of an estate between male 
and female children on intestacy must be unequal, (c) that women should have fewer 
property rights than men, or vice versa, or (d) for any other term that constitutes 
discrimination on the grounds of sex.” 
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 It also creates a new criminal offence of ‘falsely claiming legal jurisdiction’ 
under the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990: “A person who falsely purports to 
exercise any of the powers or duties of a court or to make legally binding rulings shall 
be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding 7 years.”572  
 Moreover, the Equality Act would be amended so as to impose a statutory 
duty on public institutions, such as the police, social workers and health care 
personnel, to inform women they come into contact with about the rights they have 
under domestic laws.573 
 If this bill were passed, the opponents of Williams’ and Phillips’ plea in favour 
of Sharia councils would have clearly established that the state stands firm on its 
position regarding sex equality and the law: no state court may enforce an arbitration 
award that is discriminatory towards women. It also creates a positive equality duty 
on public bodies, which need to actively inform women of their rights, and Sharia 
councils would need to make explicit to their applicants that they have no jurisdiction 
whatsoever.  
 This addresses for instance the practices of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal. 
The MAT – at least formally – functions in a different way to other Sharia councils in 
the sense that they perform Islamic divorces as well, but they claim their main focus 
is on arbitrating financial disputes under the Arbitration Act. For example, the MAT 
adjudicated on an inheritance dispute between three sisters and two brothers. In 
accordance with Sharia law principles, the men were given double the inheritance of 
the women.574 The new MAT website addresses concerns regarding sex 
discrimination. It now says it offers: “A platform through which women are included as 
part of the expert panel and ensure that there is no bias within the organisation 
against genders. The active role of women professionals provides a sense of support 
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and guidance for the client and also offers re-assurance that the sensitivity of the 
matter is appreciated.”575 There is no updated research on the MAT’s practice.  
 Nonetheless, the question is whether the bill also addresses Sharia councils in 
their essence. The bill aims to restrict the (discriminatory) practices of Sharia councils 
under the Arbitration Act. However, it is my contention that it will be very difficult to 
enforce in court. The raison d’être of Sharia councils is one-party divorce requests, 
with either an absent husband or one frustrating the process (and thus disagreeing 
with the procedure as such). It would only count as arbitration if there was a married 
couple giving sole decision-making power to an independent qadi (which is not the 
case). A second step would be, hypothetically, if one of the parties is unsatisfied with 
the outcome and decides to go to a secular court to strike down the arbitration award 
based on the amended Arbitration Act. This is even more unlikely considering the 
repercussions that would follow from challenging a “divine ruling”.  
 Sharia councils do not arbitrate – with the exception of the Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunal. In general, they are divorce councils. Their products are registered talaqs, 
khuls and faskhs. Not arbitration awards considering a decision on a dispute between 
two parties. Therefore, the Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) bill misses 
the mark for the largest part.  
 There is one important exception to this. Barrister Charlotte Proudman, who 
has represented many women during their divorce procedures at Sharia councils, 
explained to me how the creation of the criminal offense could be effective.576 The 
biggest improvement would be in the elimination of illegitimate custody rulings. 
Proudman has experience with clients who have been made to surrender custody of 
their children to their (sometimes abusive) husbands based on Sharia council rulings 
– although the councils formally deny this. These women did not know that custody 
rulings were the sole remit of secular courts. When these women finally learned 
about their rights, they would go to a secular judge to seek custody of their children 
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after this had been denied by qadis. However, as is custom in many secular legal 
systems, the secular judge would deny their request based on the ground that the 
children had been accustomed to the situation of living with their father and that 
disruption to a child’s life should be kept to a minimum.577 It is at this point that the 
proposed criminal offence for falsely claiming legal jurisdiction may work. Charges 
could be pressed against the qadi(s) ruling on custody. If the criminal court were to 
convict the qadi(s), this could have a positive effect on restricting the de facto remit of 
Sharia councils.578 General and special prevention could benefit the wellbeing of 
children and restrict the effects of the inherent sex discrimination of these councils.  
 The Islamic Sharia Council responded to the bill. It is believed that the 
deficiency of the bill lies in “its failure to appreciate cultural sensitivities”. Suhaib 
Hasan argued that the bill “made no attempt to understand the workings of the 
shariah councils,” and that “it [was] morally wrong to comment on [the issue of the 
testimony of a woman being half of that of a man] without any knowledge of [it].” He 
also stated that Baroness Cox merely “regurgitated common myths about the role of 
women in Islam in an effort to undermine the work of the shariah councils,” and that 
“she deserves little praise” for doing so.579  
 
Secular alternatives to Sharia councils 
  
Valuable as this bill could actually be in keeping the public debate on religious 
tribunals going, it unfortunately does not address the problems arising from the fact 
that for at least a part of the British Muslim community, Sharia law is inevitable when 
dealing with issues regarding marriage and divorce.  
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 Rather than, for instance, outlawing Sharia councils, it is very important to 
study alternatives for women who seek religious divorce, be it Jewish, Muslim or 
whatever religious denomination. Is it possible to keep women independent from 
religious authorities yet at the same time be able to resolve the issue of 
uncooperative husbands who leave the women in marital captivity? 
 I also believe this is better than to wrongly refer to arbitration, and maintaining 
vague about Sharia and the fact that “it should not frustrate women’s rights”; yet 
leave the question how that should be organized unanswered. The United Kingdom 
could look into the following legal alternatives. 
 The Netherlands has two secular alternatives for women who have been put 
into a situation of marital captivity by their husbands. The first important alternative to 
Sharia councils was established by the Dutch-Pakistani Shirin Musa in 2010. After 
years of failed attempts to get her husband to cooperate with the divorce, she took 
the civil route: the judge imposed damages upon the husband for each day of non-
compliance with the court’s ruling that he had to release her from the religious 
marriage. He instantly did. The Dutch civil court established that it was important for 
women to carry on with their lives, including remarriage, and not have to face 
penalties in Islamic countries, often the woman’s country of origin.580  
 After her religious divorce – for which Musa principally refused to go to a 
Sharia council for, Musa founded Femmes for Freedom. This NGO sets out to help, 
financially and otherwise, women of all denominations in marital captivity. In 2013, 
Femmes for Freedom successfully lobbied to extend the law against forced marriage 
to include marital captivity – being forced to remain married – as a criminal offence (in 
case of complaint).581 That makes the Netherlands the first country in the world to 
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criminalize marital captivity. According to Musa, after years of marital captivity, a 
woman finally pressed charges, which caused her husband to immediately cooperate 
with a religious divorce. If the United Kingdom were to create this as a criminal 
offense as well, British Muslim women who are refused a religious divorce could not 
only press charges against their uncooperative husbands, but potentially also against 
the qadi. The qadi could be held accountable for acting as an accessory to marital 
captivity. Religious authority holders who have the power to pronounce divorce yet 
refuse to do so can be held criminally liable. 
 Moreover, rather than the woman not being able to travel to her country of 
origin in fear of being prosecuted, it is now the husband who risks prosecution for the 
crime of leaving his wife in a state of marital captivity. 
 This basically means that if Muslim women were to resort to secular courts to 
make their husbands cooperate, they would no longer be dependent on religious 
tribunals for their religious divorces. Although, it is unclear whether civil and criminal 
liability of keeping a woman in marital captivity stretches to uncooperative judges of 
Sharia councils as well. Future litigation will have to show the extent of the law.  
 Unfortunately, this does not solve the problem of Islamic countries that do not 
recognize secular civil law regimes. Recognition of intra-country divorces is 
something that should be codified in treaties concerning international private law. 
Moreover, the Dutch secular alternatives also do not solve the problem of absent 
husbands and marital captivity. In the case of Jewish law, there are no ways out of 
the religious marriage when the husband is untraceable.  
 There are interpretations of Sharia where marriage to an absent husband after 
a certain period automatically constitutes a “divine divorce”. That is, for an automatic 
religious divorce, no Sharia councils are needed. More fundamentalist 
interpretations, however, state that there always needs to be a talaq or a qadi ruling 
on divorce.582 If important state actors, such as an archbishop and the most senior 
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judge call for the accommodation of Sharia as a basis for “dispute settlement”, the 
fundamentalist interpretation is favoured. A greater recognition of Sharia councils 
means a greater acceptance of the unofficial regime of marital captivity. When 
multiculturalists and Islamic fundamentalists call for the recognition of Sharia 
councils, women’s dependence on these institutions is deepened, and the 
secularization process of fundamentalist Sharia rules is weakened.  
 The (potentially grave) consequences of a woman continuing with her life – for 
instance remarrying without a religious divorce, possibly causing shame or violating 
“honour” – ultimately depend on family members, (ex-)in-laws, and tribe and/or 
community members. This means that for many Muslim women with missing 
husbands, the reality is that some do rely on Sharia councils for their freedom.  
 It will take immense global community reform, education, secularization, laws 
and enforcement, (police) protection, and emancipation to counter this social, cultural 
and religious problem of marital captivity and honour based violence. Only the future 
can tell how this develops. Surely, promoting the institutionalization of Sharia 
councils – run by Islamists, backed by multiculturalists – will halt this development. As 
Yemeni-Swiss political scientist Manea Elham writes: “In fact, these voices are 
actually calling for the legitimization of systematic discrimination against women and 
children. And such discrimination will certainly not help any successful integration of 
migrants' communities of Islamic faith. Indeed, it will only lead to the cementation of 
closed parallel societies, with two types of women, Western women who enjoy their 
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While downplaying the problems faced by individuals under the increasing influence 
of Islamism, former Archbishop Williams and Lord Chief Justice Phillips made 
statements about Sharia as “universal principles”. These high-profile public figures 
argued that Sharia could and should be accommodated for the sake of equality and 
in light of the need to recognize Muslim identity – which is also what Islamists do.  
 Contemporary multiculturalism incorporates the need for (some degree of) 
legal autonomy for “communities”. Since it is religious codes that provide such laws, 
multiculturalists, like fundamentalists, place religion in the core of one’s identity. 
Multiculturalists believe that such accommodation is possible within the (legal) norms 
of the host society – either by simply stating that unacceptable parts of Sharia “have 
nothing to do with Islam”, which is not true, or that parts of Sharia may not clash with 
other human rights, which is not possible – especially with regard to family law. Yet, 
to the untrained ear, their call may sound sympathetic.  
 Multiculturalists do not want a Sharia state, but what they do want is vague, 
remains unaddressed, and is mostly limited to emphasizing a communal need for 
shared values and rejecting what is deemed a “too negative” focus on Sharia. Clarity 
is key to any debate. The vagueness of what Sharia should hold for British society 
has the result that people postpone their negative judgment whilst hoping that it can’t 
be all that bad. This is how multiculturalists create space. This space is readily 
consumed by fundamentalists who claim Muslims are entitled to Sharia, like 
multiculturalists argue as well.  
 The lack of functional content in multiculturalists’ claims should be met with 
caution. Islamic fundamentalists, such as the leaders behind the Islamic Sharia 
Council, are influential. They reach a wide audience of susceptible Muslims in Britain 
and beyond its borders, and are pursuing more Sharia in the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere in Europe. The frequent plea that Sharia should be allowed as long as it 
does not conflict with equal rights is wishful thinking at best and perilous at worst. It 
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detracts from the truth: that Sharia is a competing body of laws on British territory, 
and that these laws are hostile towards non-Muslims and towards women, to say the 
least. Moreover, Sharia is incompatible with democracy: a conviction shared by 
secularists, Islamists, and the European Court of Human Rights.  
 The well-meant mitigation that it is merely Islamic family law that requires 
recognition is, other than multiculturalists – also in academic circles – believe, not a 
modest demand. Wherever Islamists gain political power, it is Islamic family law that 
is pushed to the top of the agenda. Sharia councils are not institutions where Islamic 
individuals go to whenever they experience an identity-driven need for a 
psychological commitment to their community. Instead they are revived 
anachronisms cementing women’s secondary and dependent position.   
 Unfortunately, some women actually do depend on these councils if their 
husbands are set on keeping them in a situation of marital captivity. Rather than 
cementing the continuance of this international problem of marital captivity, for 
instance by espousing false and romantic notions of community cohesion and 
religious needs, the United Kingdom would do well to offer its citizens secular 
alternatives to Sharia councils. The Netherlands offers women who are kept in 
marital captivity the possibility of pressuring husbands into cooperation by means of 
civil and criminal liability. Future litigation will tell whether this will release Muslims 












This dissertation revolved around the question what the implications are of the 
political ideologies of multiculturalism and Islamic fundamentalism, and, more in 
particular, what the interaction is between these ideologies when it comes to the 
debate on the legitimacy of sharia councils in the United Kingdom. 
 The rhetoric of multiculturalists and fundamentalists combined results in a 
reactionary movement with religious identity politics at its core. Multiculturalists 
promote the ideology that members of minorities should not be harmed by non-
recognition, that the focus should be on either respect or toleration, and that minority 
cultures must not be criticized by the dominant majority which has the obligation to 
preserve minority cultures. Preservation is achieved by allowing or stimulating a 
Muslim legal order that stands apart from the host society’s. It undermines and re-
orders Britain’s secular and democratic character. Multiculturalists aim to do so out of 
a presumably well-meant gesture towards minorities, whereas fundamentalists do so 
driven by divine command.   
 There is a wide range of Islamist ideologies and movements, but there are 
significant commonalities among fundamentalists. They believe in the imposition of 
Islamic laws, also called Sharia. The core of this Islamic fundamentalism is a 
theologically justified political goal of saving and purifying society by means of 
establishing a Sharia state in which the Umma – all Muslims worldwide – is unified. 
This Sharia state can be achieved by means of terror, by a political takeover, or by a 
bottom-up approach. In the West, the aim is to form disciplined diasporic 
communities ruled by these laws.  
 It needs to be acknowledged that Islamic fundamentalism exists, that it is 
increasingly present, and that it is something that deserves to be rejected. Especially 
as Islamic fundamentalism is increasingly gaining ground among European Muslims.  
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 Since the 1980s, in the United Kingdom, Islamic family law has been 
informally institutionalized in the form of Sharia councils. These councils falsely 
operate under the flag of mediation and arbitration.  
 Contemporary multiculturalists advocate the position that accommodation of 
these councils is possible within the (legal) norms of the host society – either by 
stating that unacceptable parts of Sharia “have nothing to do with Islam”, which is not 
true, or that parts of Sharia should not clash with human rights, which is not possible 
– particularly with regard to family law.  
 Both political ideologies challenge the state’s sovereignty when it comes to 
laws for Muslim minorities in the West. In doing so, they cooperate closely in 
achieving, de facto, fewer rights for individuals, regardless of the amount of time 
spent on claiming otherwise. 
 The multiculturalist argument trades, at bottom, on a simple idea: namely, that 
“[…] being able to choose what to believe and how to live […] makes for a better life. 
Being told what you must believe and how you must live, conversely, make lives 
worse.”584 It remains unclear why the “liberty of free choice” for Islamic 
fundamentalism in the form of Sharia councils should go uncontested. Moreover, the 
multiculturalist ideology aims to support emancipation and integration. It misses the 
mark. Multiculturalism as an ideology is not merely theoretically questionable, but 
also practically. For: if Muslim fundamentalists in Europe seek to enhance the goal of 
more fundamentalist Sharia for more Muslims through preaching and ideology, the 
multiculturalist ideology of not judging Muslim identity is nurturing just that.  
 The development of increasing Islamic fundamentalism worries many across 
the globe, and rightfully so. This development imparts the task of clear moral 
judgment on governments, (academic) elites and citizens. Multiculturalism with its 
focus on identity, being politically correct (that is, not cause offense), and its resort to 
relativism to rectify that what is wrong, is still an important force in the Western 
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debate on Islamic fundamentalism. That is why it is important to take a critical stance 
towards both multiculturalism and Islamic fundamentalism. 
 It is right that fundamentalists choose to live under Sharia. Yet, 
multiculturalists tend to overlook the fact that they may tend to increasingly choose 
for that, if not challenged adequately. Moreover, if in the future the better part of 
society has voluntarily chosen for Islamic fundamentalism, we will see that free 
choice will cease to exist, as is more than ever the case in Malaysia, as we have 
seen. Or, in other words, the reason Western men and women have the luxury of 
debating in terms of “free choice” is precisely because they live in a liberal society 
that is committed to protecting equality.585  
 The absolute minimum someone who gets involved in the “multicultural 
debate” can do is acknowledge Islamic fundamentalism exists, is increasingly 
present, and is something that deserves to be rejected. Whether to tolerate or not to 
tolerate is a discussion in itself, but that is a discussion we can only functionally have 
if the multiculturalist position of not judging negatively and accommodating minority 
members’ freely chosen actions is abandoned.  
 
Coming at the end of my research it may be useful to position the view on Sharia 
councils as developed in this book against the broader background of five 
constitutional models on the relationship between state and religion. A state can 
categorically reject religion, enforce one specific religion, prioritize one particular 
religion, accommodate minority religions or try to be agnostic towards religion.  
 Generally speaking, a state can deal with religion, religious believers and 
religious communities in five ways. Firstly, there is the ambition to radically destroy 
every influence of religion in the social and political sphere. This model was popular 
in the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1989. This may be called “political atheism”. It 
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is mirrored by the equally radical approach to force one specific religion upon all 
others. This may be called “theocracy”, a political interpretation of religious 
fundamentalism. The second chapter of this book is dedicated to the Islamist brand 
of religious fundamentalism.  
 Next to political atheism and theocracy, there is the model of a state church. 
This commonly implies a loose orientation on one specific religion to which the state 
has contributed a special task in politics without making overriding infringements on 
the rights of others. This is the model of a state church. Present day Anglicanism 
may serve as an example. Needless to say, compared to the other two models, the 
model of a state church is the least objectionable. But also this alternative is far from 
satisfactory.586 The model of a state church is based on an inherently unequal 
treatment of all citizens – only those who happen to adhere to the state religion are 
represented. 
 The remaining two models are multiculturalism and political agnosticism. 
Multiculturalism is extensively described and analysed in the first chapter of this 
book, while political agnosticism is implicitly defended in all three chapters. The idea 
of political agnosticism is that the state should principally defend neutrality towards 
the religious choices of its citizens. The state is literally “agnostic” (“it does not know” 
in the sense of “it does not want to know”) what its citizens believe with respect to 
religion. That also means the state has no positive or negative opinions or policies 
towards religious communities. However still, it is one of the state’s core duties to 
develop and maintain a cohesive legal order that has similar consequences for all of 
its citizens alike, regardless of cultural or religious liaisons. Pushing for, or allowing, 
minority legal orders conflicts with the state’s neutrality regarding religion. Within the 
multiculturalist and Islamic fundamentalist doctrine there is space for independent 
and conflicting legal orders within state borders. Yet, it is the politically agnostic state 
that aspires to maintain one law for all.  
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 We may call this position political agnosticism because it describes the attitude 
of the state and not the attitude of the individual. The notion of “agnosticism” arose 
within the context of the religious choices of the human individual.587 An individual 
who considers him- or herself “agnostic” means that he or she does not make a 
choice between various religious options. The reasons for this may vary. One of the 
reasons often advanced by agnostics is that the arguments for the existence of God 
are not better but also not weaker than the arguments against the existence of 
God.588 Individual agnosticism usually tries to steer a middle course between atheism 
on the one hand and theism on the other.   
 Beyond this specific agnostic stance regarding not being able to know whether 
there is a deity, the state should not decide whether individuals are better off (or not) 
as members of religious communities. Thus, for instance regarding pleas on behalf of 
preservation of minority religious cultures, the state has no opinion on whether 
adherence to a religion or membership of a religious community is either worthy of 
respect and should be nurtured, or that it is something that should be loosened and 
considered detrimental for personal development.       
 Whatever may be true about individual agnosticism, for the state this 
suspension of judgment seems a perfectly sensible course to take. Especially in a 
pluralist society the state can best adopt a religiously neutral attitude, as we have 
seen in the elaborate analysis of the dangers of religious fundamentalism or 
problems of encouraging and wanting to preserve minority cultures under 
multiculturalism.   
 Modern-day multiculturalists steer towards accommodating a minority legal 
order for religious minorities. Pleas of this sort are supported by religious 
fundamentalists, who also believe minorities should be ruled over by an independent 
body of religious laws. One of the most important consequences of political 
agnosticism was the focus of this book: the necessity to stick to a monocultural legal 
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The multiculturalist moral and political perspective on human life is one that 
emphasizes the value of diversity, tolerance, and authenticity, regardless of certain 
unacceptable practices. This ideology stands apart from sociological diversity, which 
is a fact. It is a moral movement that wants to have the dignity, rights and worth of 
minority groups recognized. The multiculturalist ideology holds that members of 
minorities should not be harmed by non-recognition, that the focus should be on 
either respect or toleration, and that minority cultures must not be criticized by the  
majority, which has the obligation to preserve minority cultures.  
 Multiculturalist sensitivities have detracted many from studying the underlying 
foundations of Islamist ideology. There is a wide range of Islamist ideologies and 
movements, but there are significant commonalities among fundamentalists. They 
believe in the imposition of Islamic laws, also called Sharia. The core of this Islamic 
fundamentalism is a theologically justified political goal of saving and purifying 
society by means of establishing a Sharia state in which the Umma – all Muslims 
worldwide – is unified. This Sharia state can be achieved by means of terror, by a 
political takeover, or by a bottom-up approach. In the West, the aim is to form 
disciplined diasporic communities ruled by these laws.  
 It needs to be acknowledged that Islamic fundamentalism exists, that it is 
increasingly present, and that it is something that deserves to be rejected. Especially 
as Islamic fundamentalism is increasingly gaining ground among European Muslims.  
 Since the 1980s, in the United Kingdom, Islamic family law has been 
informally institutionalized in the form of Sharia councils. These councils falsely 
operate under the flag of mediation and arbitration.  
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 Contemporary multiculturalists advocate the position that accommodation of 
these councils is possible within the (legal) norms of the host society – either by 
stating that unacceptable parts of Sharia “have nothing to do with Islam”, which is not 
true, or that parts of Sharia should not clash with human rights, which is not possible 
– particularly with regard to family law. 
 Multiculturalism incorporates the assumed need for (some degree of) legal 
autonomy for communities, rather than one body of laws for all individuals, 
regardless of diversity. Since it is religious codes that provide such laws, 
multiculturalists, just like fundamentalists, place religion at the heart of one’s identity. 
 Multiculturalists aim to do so out of a presumably well-meant gesture towards 
minorities, whereas fundamentalists do so driven by what is taken to be divine 
command. Both political ideologies challenge the state’s sovereignty when it comes 
to ordaining and enforcing laws. Sharia councils are part of a minority Muslim legal 
order that stands apart from the host society’s. It undermines and reorders Britain’s 
secular and democratic character.     
 Multiculturalism as an ideology is not merely theoretically questionable, but 
also practically. For: if Islamic fundamentalists in Europe seek to enhance the goal of 
more fundamentalist Sharia for more Muslims through practicing their ideology, the 
multiculturalist ideology of preserving minorities is nurturing just that.  
 It is correct that fundamentalist Muslims in Europe choose to live under Sharia. 
Yet, multiculturalists tend to overlook the fact that they may increasingly choose for 
that, if not challenged adequately. Letting go of the practice and ideal of one law for 
all is a vital example of not challenging Islamic fundamentalism adequately.   
 Arguably, political agnosticism – as coined in this dissertation – is a better 







Kiezen voor Sharia?  
 




Het multiculturalistische morele en politieke perspectief op samenleven wordt 
gekenmerkt door het benadrukken van het belang van diversiteit, tolerantie en 
authenticiteit, ongeacht het bestaan van zekere onaanvaardbare cultureel-religieuze 
praktijken. Deze ideologie staat los van sociologische diversiteit, wat een gegeven is. 
Het is een morele beweging die de waardigheid, rechten en het belang van 
minderheidsgroepen erkend wil zien. De multiculturalistische ideologie houdt in dat 
leden van minderheden niet mogen worden geschaad door niet-erkenning, dat de 
nadruk moet liggen op zowel respect als verdraagzaamheid en dat minderheden niet 
worden bekritiseerd door de meerderheid. Deze laatste heeft volgens 
multiculturalisten de verplichting om minderheidsculturen te behouden. 
 Multiculturalistische gevoeligheden hebben velen afgeleid van het bestuderen 
van de fundamenten van Islamitisch fundamentalisme. Er is een breed scala aan 
Islamistische ideologieën en bewegingen. Tegelijkertijd zijn er belangrijke 
overeenkomsten tussen fundamentalisten. Zij geloven in het opleggen van 
Islamitische wetten, ook wel Sharia genoemd. De kern van het Islamitisch 
fundamentalisme bestaat uit een theologisch gerechtvaardigd politiek doel van het 
redden en het zuiveren van de samenleving door middel van het oprichten van een 
Sharia-staat waarin de Umma - alle moslims over de hele wereld - is verenigd. Een 
dergelijke staat kan worden bereikt door middel van terreur, door een politieke 
overname, of door een bottom-up benadering. In het Westen bestaat het 
Islamistische doel voornamelijk uit de wens om gemeenschappen bestaande uit 
Moslims te laten beheersen door Sharia.  
 Het is van belang te erkennen dat dergelijk Islamitisch fundamentalisme 
bestaat, dat het in steeds hogere mate aanwezig is en dat dit dient te worden 
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afgewezen. Dit is des te meer van belang nu is gebleken dat Islamitisch 
fundamentalisme aan terrein wint onder Europese moslims. 
 Sinds de jaren ’80 is het Islamitisch familierecht in het Verenigd Koninkrijk 
informeel geïnstitutionaliseerd in de vorm van Shariaraden. Deze Shariaraden 
opereren ten onrechte onder de vlag van bemiddeling en arbitrage. 
 Hedendaagse multiculturalisten pleiten voor het standpunt dat het 
accommoderen van deze raden mogelijk is binnen de (wettelijke) normen van het 
gastland. Dit doen zij door te stellen dat onaanvaardbare delen van Sharia “niets te 
maken hebben met Islam”, wat niet waar is, of dat delen van Sharia niet mogen 
botsen met mensenrechten, wat niet mogelijk is – in het bijzonder met betrekking tot 
familierecht. 
 Multiculturalisme omvat de veronderstelde behoefte aan (een zekere mate 
van) juridische autonomie voor minderheidsgemeenschappen, in plaats van juridisch 
monoculturalisme: één wettenstelsel voor alle individuen, ongeacht diversiteit. Omdat 
gedeeltelijke juridische autonomie voor minderheden religieuze wetten betreft, 
plaatsen multiculturalisten, net als fundamentalisten, religie in het hart van iemands 
identiteit. 
 Multiculturalisten plegen dit te doen vanuit een vermoedelijk goedbedoeld 
gebaar naar minderheden, terwijl fundamentalisten worden gedreven door wat zij 
aanvaarden als goddelijke bevelen. Beide politieke ideologieën stellen de 
soevereiniteit van de staat met betrekking tot het formuleren en handhaven van 
wetten op de proef. Shariaraden zijn een onderdeel van een rechtsstelsel dat 
losstaat van het statelijk rechtsstelsel. Het ondermijnt en herschikt het seculiere en 
democratische karakter van het Verenigd Koninkrijk.  
 Multiculturalisme als ideologie is niet slechts theoretisch omstreden, maar ook 
vanuit praktisch oogpunt onwenselijk. Immers, als Islamitische fundamentalisten in 
Europa streven naar méér Sharia voor méér Moslims door middel van het beoefenen 
van hun ideologie, dan voedt de multiculturalistische ideologie van het behouden van 
een minderheidsidentiteit datgene wat fundamentalisten beogen.  
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 Het is juist dat fundamentalistische moslims in Europa ervoor kiezen om te 
leven onder een regime van Sharia. Echter, multiculturalisten hebben de neiging om 
voorbij te gaan aan het feit dat zij dit in meerdere mate zullen doen indien daar 
onvoldoende weerstand aan wordt geboden. Het verlaten van de praktijk en het 
ideaal van gelijke rechten en plichten voor een ieder is een belangrijk voorbeeld van 
het onvoldoende weerstand bieden aan religieus fundamentalisme.  
 Zonder twijfel is politieke agnosticisme, zoals toegelicht in dit proefschrift, een 
beter staatsmodel voor een pluralistische samenleving dan de multiculturalistische en 
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